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Negotiating American Youth” examines the venues in which young people and 
authority figures negotiated understandings of how age and communal or familial 
expectations affected one’s marriageability, independence and dependence, 
culpability, capability, and reliability in the Early Republican United States. 
Historians have characterized the period following the American Revolution as a 
progressive march toward legally uniform and modern interpretations of 
childhood, age, and family relationships that we might recognize today as more 
standardized. More specifically, historians of the Early Republic have often 
seized on newly codified definitions of age and independence as a means to 
explain changes in family relationships and perceptions or experiences of youth. 
“Negotiating American Youth” challenges this narrative by arguing that legal 
definitions of age as they related to the experiences of young people and family 
relationships remained incredibly variable and circumstantial well into the post-
bellum period.  
A wide-range of sources underpin the study as age and its significance (or 
insignificance) seems to appear everywhere once one looks for it. From marriage 
records and divorce petitions to court cases pertaining to murder, rape, fraud, 
and dependence, age was regularly used as a form of evidence in order to justify 
or undermine one’s legal argument. Although the historical record is peppered 
with such evidence, historians have tended to overlook the consistent 
acknowledgement of age in Early Republican sources. More specifically, 
historians have failed to see that a strict interpretation of age was recognized as 
important by some Early Republicans while at the same time age was a fluid 
category of identity for others. When legal documents are paired with personal 
letters and diaries, we gain a more holistic view of how age was understood. 
Furthermore, the significance of age was determined by the venue the individual 
was operating within which, as this dissertation will explore, ranged from schools, 
youth cultures, families, and households to courts and churches. Those doing the 
negotiating included young people and their parents but also lawyers, judges, 
legislators, clergymen, and even insurance brokers, illustrating how widespread a 
consciousness of age was becoming after the Revolution. 
Age was a flexible and contextual form of identity-- a legal and social construct-- 
which was regularly discussed, negotiated, debated, performed, and utilized 
strategically throughout the Early Republican United States. To illustrate this 
point, the geographic and chronological parameters of this study are deliberately 
far reaching; regardless of regional or temporal context (North or South, urban or 
rural, 1775 or 1860), age was both important and unimportant to the average 
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On July 14th, 1808, writing from Williamsburg, Virginia, Jane C. Charlton 
mentioned in a letter to her close friend Sarah C. Watts that a young lady named 
Maria Moody had engaged in “a great deal of mischief among the Beau’s” and 
“ha[d] had two real Lovers already.”1 Five months later, on December 4th, Jane 
expressed concern that Maria would “experience a sad disappointment” when 
she moved to Richmond because, as Jane explained to Sarah, while “a great 
deal” of visiting appealed to Maria, “Girls her age never appear in publick [sic], 
but are considered as children.”2 Though she was an active member of 
Williamsburg’s youth culture, Maria was only ten years old.3 Jane’s remarks 
about Maria articulate an awareness of the disparity in ideas about childhood and 
the significance of chronological age in determining one’s life stage within a 
relatively small geographic distance. Who was considered a child, and who was 
a young woman able to conduct social visits differed in the fifty miles between 
Williamsburg and Richmond. More importantly, Jane’s comments are one of 
many examples this dissertation draws upon to provide evidence of the flexibility 
and variety of interpretations of age and life stage in the Early Republican United 
States.  
The cultural and social meanings surrounding one’s age and life stage 
differed greatly depending on where one lived and with whom one interacted, the 
																																																						
1   Jane C. Charlton to Sarah C. Watts, 14 July 1808. Sarah C. Watts Papers, Swem Special 
Collections. 
2   JCC to SCW, 4 December 1808.  
3   What likely permitted Maria access to this youth culture at such a young age was her financial 
and legal status; Maria was an orphan with a legal guardian but she had inherited a great deal 
of wealth, including interest in a tavern and property, possibly making her financially appealing 




same can be said throughout the developing nation. Age, and the significance (or 
insignificance) it held, appears everywhere once one looks for it.4 From marriage 
records and divorce petitions to court cases pertaining to murder, rape, fraud, 
and dependence, age was regularly used as a form of evidence in order to justify 
or undermine one’s legal argument. Although the historical record is peppered 
with such evidence, historians have tended to overlook the pervasive 
acknowledgement of age in Early Republican sources. More specifically, 
historians have failed to see that while Americans recognized a strict 
interpretation of age at some moments, at the same time age was a flexible and 
contextual category of identity in others. When legal documents are paired with 
personal letters and diaries, we gain a more holistic view of how age was a 
critical form of identity-- a legal and social construct-- which was regularly 
discussed, debated, performed, and utilized strategically throughout the new 
nation. To illustrate this point, the geographic and chronological parameters of 
this study are deliberately far reaching; regardless of regional or temporal context 
(North or South, urban or rural, 1775 or 1860), age was important to the average 
citizen depending on the needs of the moment. 
Rejecting a social order defined by economic and familial status, Early 
Republican state legislators hoped to create a uniform understanding of consent 
and maturity based on chronological age; hoped is the key word here, as little 
																																																						
4   Ann Little has also noted that “people’s specific age and birth dates were recorded in a striking 
number and variety in colonial-era European-language primary sources, including New 
England town, court, and church records, English ship manifests, French Canadian 
sacramental records, the records kept by religious orders in Quebec, and the sacramental 
records of French missionaries living in Algonquian villages.” Ann M. Little, “’Keep Me with 
You, So That I Might Not Be Damned’: Age and Captivity in Colonial Borderlands Warfare” in 
Age in America: The Colonial Era to the Present, ed. Nicholas L. Syrett and Corinne T. Field, 




changed in the first half of the nineteenth century even with the passing of laws 
attempting to clarify and codify age. Still, the ability to consent and reason did 
become of special interest to the average person following the American 
Revolution because of the symbolism surrounding the relationship between 
parent and child, independence and dependence.5 Age was a logical way to 
designate rights because it operated as an equalizer; regardless of one’s 
background, the age of twenty-one, for example, was a status everyone could 
eventually attain.6  
Age-based laws were enacted despite the fact that forms of civil 
registration, or the “compulsory systems for birth and death recording,” were not 
instituted until the late nineteenth century. Instead, Early Republicans relied upon 
“privately kept records to prove their own age and the facts of their identity.”7 
Consequently, a conflict existed between what officials hoped would happen as a 
result of legal definitions of age and what actually could happen. Among other 
factors, age requirements depended on what communities knew or did not know 
about their member’s ages. This reality of Early Republican life—of either not 
knowing one’s exact age or having no definitive way to prove it-- both hindered 
																																																						
5    Although the wider public became more interested in age and consent as a result of the 
American Revolution, legal debates had been going on since the eighteenth century in 
England. See Holly Brewer, By Birth or Consent: Children, Law, and the Anglo American 
Revolution in Authority (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).  
6   Theoretically, age operated as an equalizer regardless of race and status, too. But as Corinne 
T. Field demonstrates, “state governments applied age qualifications differently to male and 
female, black and white, enslaved and free.” Consequently, additional restrictions such as 
property ownership, gender, and race undercut the inclusivity of age as a marker of adult 
status. Corinne T Field, The Struggle for Equal Adulthood: Gender, Race, Age, and the Fight 
for Citizenship in Antebellum America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 
6. 
7    Shane Landrum, “From Family Bibles to Birth Certificates: Young People, Proof of Age, and 




and benefited citizens as they navigated the newly instituted legal definitions of 
age. 
One important effect of new legislation around age was that Americans 
had more incentive to lie about their stage in life than ever before. To get around 
legal restrictions surrounding consent, young people frequently lied about their 
age in order to marry, enlist in the military, or enter into legal contracts. But legal 
adults also falsified their age to reduce their culpability in criminal suits, liability 
for contracts, or gain access to opportunities. For example, chronological age 
demarcated membership qualifications and fees for mutual aid societies that 
sprang up in the Early Republican period.8 Many of the societies, like the 
Abyssinian Benevolent Daughters, included age qualifications in their by-laws; in 
1839, this New York African-American women’s mutual aid society specified that 
members must not be “under the age of 16 or over fifty.”9 Meanwhile, other 
societies were even more specific about the significance of age to membership. 
This was the case with the Pike Beneficial Society (PBS), which had a fee scale 
based on age. Members who joined between the ages of “21 to 25 years” were to 
																																																						
8    For more information on mutual aid societies in the Early Republican period see: James C. 
Riley, “Sickness in an Early Modern Workplace,” Continuity and Change 2, 3 (1987), 363-385; 
Andrea A. Rusnock and Vivien E. Dietz, “Defining Women’s Sickness and Work: Female 
Friendly Societies in England, 1780-1830,” Journal of Women’s History 24, 1 (Spring 2012), 
60-85; and Laurel Daen, “The Constitution of Disability in the Early United States,” Ph.D. 
Dissertation, The College of William and Mary, 2016.  
9   Quote: Abyssinian Benevolent Daughters of Esther Association of the City of New York, 
“Constitution and By-Laws” (New York: Office of the Colored American), 3. Similarly, in 1829, 
the less niched Philadelphian Good Intent Beneficial Society stipulated that its members must 
be “between the age of twenty-one and forty years.” Good Intent Beneficial Society of the City 




pay $10 per year in membership fees, those between “25-29 years” paid $15 per 
year, and those between “30-35” paid $25 per year.10  
Mutual aid societies had a stake in knowing with certainty a member’s age 
because as a person’s age increased, so too did their risk level and the 
company’s likelihood of paying benefits. As a result, special committees 
investigated to determine the chronological age of potential new members. One 
way to do this in an era before state issued birth certificates was by searching 
church baptismal records. This was the course of action PBS pursued when they 
investigated a new member, George Flowers. George first appeared in the PBS 
board minutes on Christmas Day in 1820, the clerk recorded that “Mr Flowers… 
states he Does not Know his Age in which case C J Boulter and Harman Baugh 
were appointed in conjunction with G Flowers to ascertain his age by the next 
stated Meeting.”11 One month later, Mr. Boulter and Mr. Baugh reported back that 
their initial inquiry at the Dutch Lutheran Church was unsuccessful.12 George 
appeared in the PBS minutes one last time (regarding his age) on February 26th, 
1821 with a certificate of evidence of his age which stated that: “George 
																																																						
10  Quote: Pike Beneficial Society of the City of Philadelphia “Constitution” (Philadelphia: Crissy 
& Markley), 19.    Laurel Daen has mentioned the age based pricing and membership 
restrictions in her dissertation, “The Constitution of Disability.” She writes, “some organizations 
required prospective members to fall into particular age groups; the Abyssinian Benevolent 
Daughters of the Esther Association of the City of New York, for example, excluded new 
applicants “under the age of 16 or over 50.” Other societies adopted age-based pricing 
schemes. The Jackson Beneficial Society of Pennsylvania asked applicants “between 21 and 
25 to pay four dollars for admission, those between 25 and 30 to pay five dollars, those 
between 30 and 35 to pay six dollars, and so on.” Daen, 182.  
11 “Minutes of the Pike Beneficial Society of Philadelphia, 1823-1843,” Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania, 25 December 1820.  
12 “With respect to the case of George Flowers We called on the Rev Mr Shaffer Minister of the 
Dutch Lutherian Church which Church he belongs to who made an Ineffectual Search but 
found that the record of his birth was not in that Churchs Books.” See “Minutes of the Pike 





Flowers… was born on the 17th of Nov 1766 and Baptized on the 17th of 
December.... Extracted from the records of the German Lutheran congregation in 
or near the city of Philad and given under my hand and seal at Philad the 5th day 
of Feb 1821.”13 It was determined that George was fifty-five years old and he was 
thereafter charged the designated entrance membership fee.  
George Flowers’s story illustrates that it was not easy to specify a 
person’s age in the first half of the nineteenth century. It took time and a 
considerable amount of effort to confirm via private sources such as church 
records to locate this information. This was problematic given that the majority of 
states in the Early Republican period used chronological age as a marker of 
rights, capacity, and culpability.  
But then, just as now, legal definitions of age have to be understood as 
both “arbitrary and necessary boundaries.”14 These boundaries have “always 
failed to account for individual variation,” but they exist because they “offer an 
efficient means for apportioning rights and responsibilities to young and old.”15 
This dissertation argues that American citizens, legal “adults” as well as “minors,” 
exploited and negotiated the arbitrariness and necessity of these legally defined 
boundaries of age and life stage when it came to marriage, guardianship 
																																																						
13 George Flowers reappeared in PBS minutes on January 28th and February 25th, 1839 
because he was found to have breached the by laws of the mutual aid society by being a 
“habitual drunkard.” Consequently, his membership was revoked on March 25th, 1839. See 
“Minutes of the Pike Beneficial Society of Philadelphia, 1823-1843,” Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania, 28 January, 25 February and 25 March 1839. 
14 Corinne T. Field and Nicholas L. Syrett, Age in America: The Colonial Era to the Present 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 3.  




arrangements, and expectations of the legal concepts of dependence, culpability, 
and capacity.16   
The example of ten-year-old Maria Moody, who at ten years old imagined 
herself part of the youth social scene, demonstrates that Early Republican social 
and communal perceptions and expectations linked to age and life stage were 
equally as malleable as-- and certainly more fluid than-- legal ones. This is 
evident when looking at guardian-ward relationships such as that of Edmund 
Ruffin who had widely varied experiences acting as guardian for his two sisters, 
Juliana and Elizabeth.17 In 1823, seventeen-year-old Juliana used legal 
definitions of age and capability to her advantage. Being over the age of 
fourteen, Juliana could request a change of guardianship and because her 
brother refused to consent to her marriage, she did exactly that. By contrast, 
when Elizabeth turned twenty-one years old in 1828 she wrote to Edmund and 
requested that he “forget what age and law have entitled me and act precisely as 
my guardian still.”18 As this dissertation will show, throughout the Early 
Republican period, young people and authority figures negotiated flexible and 
contextual understandings of how age and communal or familial expectations 
affected  marriageability, independence, culpability, capability, and reliability.    
 
																																																						
16 The age in which a person could consent to marriage, for example, differed significantly from 
state to state, and, depending on one’s gender. See Nicholas L. Syrett, American Child Bride: 
A History of Minors and Marriage in the United States (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2016), especially chapter one “Any Maid or Woman Child: A New Nation and 
Its Marriage Laws.”  
17 The Ruffin guardianship arrangements are discussed more fully in chapter three of this 
dissertation.  





Studies of the significance of age are sporadic at best in part because the 
history of childhood and youth and the history of adulthood are both developing 
historiographical fields. Recently, historians such as Corinne T. Field, Nicholas L. 
Syrett, Steven Mintz, and others have pushed for the analysis of age as a serious 
category of historical inquiry.19 Age, like gender, race, and sexuality, is a social 
construct in that the meaning or significance a society or community attaches to 
chronological ages varies by time, place, and culture. As Mintz has argued, an 
“attentiveness to class, ethnicity, and gender shows how multiple definitions of 
age coexist in particular historical eras, even within a single society” and that 
these varying definitions can, and did, “become a source of cultural conflict.”20 
Points of conflict over the role age should play in granting or restricting rights and 
opportunities appear repeatedly throughout this dissertation. This is because the 
definitions, perceptions, and understandings of age are most clearly illustrated in 
the moments during which communities, families, and young people themselves 
attempted to navigate and work through their disagreements over what age 
meant. 
																																																						
19 See also Corinne T Field, Struggle for Equal Adulthood; Nicholas L. Syrett, The American 
Child Bride; Field and Syrett, Age in America; Jon Grinspan’s The Virgin Vote: How Young 
Americans Made Democracy Social, Politics Personal, and Voting Popular in the Nineteenth 
Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016); Sharon Braslaw Sundue, 
Industrious in their Stations: Young People at Work in Urban America , 1720-1810 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009); Steven Mintz, The Prime of Life: A History 
of Modern Adulthood (New York: Belknap Press, 2015). Furthermore, two camps have 
emerged amongst scholars who study age: “those who focus on the development of age 
consciousness, the belief that one’s age is an important part of one’s identity; and those who 
have studied age grading, that is, the organization of institutions such as schools, juvenile 
courts, and government welfare programs around age-based criteria.” Quote: Field and Syrett, 
5. 
20 Steven Mintz, “Reflections on Age as a Category of Historical Analysis,” in the Journal of the 




Although the use of age as a historical point of inquiry may appear to be 
cutting-edge now, it is not an entirely new concept. Howard P. Chudacoff 
broached the topic in the late 1980s in How Old Are You?: Age Consciousness in 
American Culture. Chudacoff noted that “American speech—and thus culture—
abounds in expressions of age” and that “every age carries with it expectations, 
roles, [and] status.”21 But, Chudacoff argued, this was not always the case and 
he identified the “latter half of the nineteenth century” as the period during which 
“the age stratification of American society began to become more complex.”22 
According to Chudacoff, prior to 1850, there was little “consciousness of age” 
and that although “Americans had certain concepts about stages of life—youth, 
adulthood, old age—and about behaviors appropriate to such stages, 
demarcations between stages were neither distinct nor universally recognized.”23 
Rather, families and the communities they lived in “tended to blend together age 
groups” with roles being differentiated based on one’s sex rather than on one’s 
age.24 However, by the end of the nineteenth century as a result of the rise in 
age-graded education and the creation of pediatrics, Chudacoff argues, 
																																																						
21 Howard P. Chudacoff, How Old Are You?: Age Consciousness in American Culture 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 3.  
22 Quote: Chudacoff, 5. Chudacoff argues that the more complex a society is the more divided 
people are into specific “age groupings.” For example, “in simple societies, there may be only 
two or three age strata: children, adults, and elders. More complex societies contained more 
narrowly defined strata, such as infants, toddlers, teenagers, young adults, middle-agers, the 
‘young old,’ the ‘old old,’ and so on.” Chudacoff, 4.  
23 Chudacoff, 9.  
24 Chudacoff, 10. One exception to this, according to Chudacoff, was in rapidly industrializing 
areas such as “Lowell, Massachusetts where there arose in the 1820s and 1830s a peer-
based society consisting of thousands of young women who lived, worked, and learned 
together. Their joint activities and common experiences isolated Lowell mill workers from other 
age groups to a much greater extent than was common among young women in other 




chronological age became a significant marker of identity and expected life 
stage.25  
Chudacoff’s early arguments regarding the insignificance of age prior to 
1850 contrasts sharply with Holly Brewer’s more recent assertions that age 
became a hard legal (and, in turn, social) identifier of adulthood and minority that 
both granted and restricted rights and opportunities after the American 
Revolution.26 Published in 2005, Brewer’s work By Birth or Consent: Children, 
Law, and the Anglo American Revolution in Authority argues that “in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a fundamental shift occurred in the legal 
assumptions about childhood, adulthood, and responsibility.”27 Centered on early 
modern British political and religious debates over children and authority and the 
“age of reason,” she explains how and why policy toward children changed by 
the nineteenth century.28  
																																																						
25 See Chudacoff, Chapter 2. C. Dallet Hemphill has also challenged Chudacoff’s argument by 
insisting that a study of “New England manners support the notion that age inequality between 
mature adults and minors was the fundamental principle of the social order. One of the chief 
reasons that historians have concluded that childhood and youth were not much recognized in 
early America is because this society did not have social (or indeed physical) structures—
whether school grades or household nurseries—to spatially segregate the different age 
groups. Not only did persons of different ages mingle in the daily round of work and play in 
one-room homes and schoolhouses, but it is also true that progress from youth to maturity 
was not marked by any abrupt transition. Yet so important was the principle of age inequality 
of the Puritans that they made sure to reinforce it through their legal and familial institutions for 
education, discipline, and inheritance.” C. Dallet Hemphill, Bowing to Necessities: A History of 
Manners in America, 1620-1860 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 37. 
26 Chudacoff acknowledged that age restrictions related to consent and marriage existed in the 
Early Republican period but argued that they were “rarely applied” and “often ignored.” 
Chudacoff, 10. 
27 Brewer, 1-2. 
28 Brewer, 8. Prior to the “age of reason,” Anglo and Anglo-American societies subscribed to 
“patriarchal political theory,” which meant that obligations did not end or begin at a particular 
age. Instead, “obligations depended upon status relationships” and “upon one’s rank in 
society.” As Brewer notes, “although rank could be partly shaped by youth, it was not the 
primary determinant.” The primary determinant was birthright, more specifically, “in the 
emerging consent-based political ideology, age played the role that birth status had formerly 




Both Chudacoff’s and Brewer’s interpretations of the significance (or 
insignificance) of age during the Early Republican period seem too narrowly 
focused. Chudacoff admits that his argument is based on “negative evidence” or 
the fact that “the sources [he looked at] show[ed] an unconcern with, or omission 
of reference to, age.”29 His method is inherently problematic; an argument cannot 
be based on the absence of proof.30 Chudacoff’s work, however, does lay an 
important foundation for historians who study age consciousness in American 
history though his problematic use of sources necessitate further explorations of 
what age meant to the average person in the Early Republican period.  
Brewer’s work on the other hand suffers from the opposite problem as 
Chudacoff by fixating on legal treatises and state statutes that explicitly defined 
age. These types of sources provide only a singular prescriptive voice to inform 
us about the significance of age in this time period. Inspired and backed by 
philosophical debates about age, consent, and independence, state statutes and 
legal treatises for the most part reflected and deferred to one another. Although 
there was some difference in which age was specified as the legal age of 
independence-- some states set the age at 18, others at 21--the reasons for the 
																																																																																																																																																																	
specific ages from exercising public and even private consent.” By stripping away inherited 
status, Americans sought to do away with archaic practices of deference based on birthright. 
Instead, the newly formed American government wanted authority to be derived from 
reasoned consent and capability, two qualities one had to acquire through experience and 
age. Tangentially, according to Brewer, children lost out in this paradigm shift as their rights 
and opportunities were diminished. Brewer, 4. 
29 Chudacoff, 27.  
30 But perhaps more significantly, Chudacoff overlooked the mention of age in his own sources. 
For example, Chudacoff states that in Harvey Newcomb’s 1848 How to Be a Lady, an advice 
book marketed to girls, Newcomb did not “denote the appropriate age range for his readers.” 
See Chudacoff, 21. However, early in the work, Newcomb explicitly specifies that “the 
following pages [are] for girls and misses between the ages of eight and fifteen.” See Harvey 
Newcomb, How to Be a Lady: A Book for Girls Containing Useful Hints on the Formation of 




differences were never explained within statute. Furthermore, state statute and 
legal treatises represented only the ideal interpretation of age and independence, 
rather than the lived reality. The application of ideas about age can only be found 
within the courts (via trial records) and communities (via informal sources) where 
day-to-day life actually played out.  
“Negotiating American Youth” offers a distinct understanding of how Early 
Republicans reconciled newly forming legal and institutional definitions of age 
with their own understandings, expectations, and experiences informed by 
communal and familial perceptions of age. Sometimes a family’s expectations of 
responsibility associated with one’s age aligned with the state’s, but often a 
parent expected continued deference and servitude despite the fact that their 
child had reached the age of independence. In North Carolina Jacob Phipps 
sued John W. Garland for impregnating his thirty-year-old daughter in 1838.31 
Although the lower court ruled in Phipps’ favor, he lost the appeal at the state 
Supreme Court due to his daughter’s age, demonstrating how legal definitions of 
age could be ignored, argued, or rigidly upheld depending on the circumstances. 
What age meant in terms of responsibilities and dependence or deference 
speaks directly to the history of the family and the expectations surrounding the 
relationship between parent and child. Along with new social interpretations and 
expectations about the “ideal” family after the American Revolution came newly 
enacted legal definitions and regulations concerning family relationships. 
However, historians such as Michael Grossberg have taken too simplistic of an 
																																																						
31 Jacob Phipps v. John W. Garland, 20 N.C. 38 (1838). This example is fully discussed in 




approach to the study of the family, which has lead to a distorted understanding 
of the lived experience of nineteenth century families. More specifically, 
Grossberg argues in his influential work, Governing the Hearth: Law and the 
Family in Nineteenth-Century America, that the Early Republican period was the 
formative era of modern American family law and, in turn, modern expectations 
of family relationships.32 Grossberg traces the rise of “an American law of 
domestic relations,” focusing on the “general policies developed over the entire 
nineteenth century and followed in most states, rather than dwelling on local or 
temporal peculiarities.”33 But to only look at court cases and legal statutes that 
align with an anticipated trajectory of American family law reveals little about how 
families, parents and children, navigated these new legal definitions of 
independence as well as expectations associated with chronological age. The 
cases that fall outside of the “norm” are precisely the ones worth looking at 
because they tell the important story of the conflicts and debates that played out 
and aided Americans in reconciling traditional notions of family relationships with 
new expectations of legal independence once a child turned twenty-one.  
Finally, this dissertation contributes to the history of gender by arguing that 
age was an explicitly gendered concept. Culturally embedded expectations of 
female dependence and male independence undermined any universal legal 
definition of independence based on age.34 For young women, reaching the age 
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(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,1988) 
33 Grossberg, ix.  
34 Field, Grinspan, and Syrett each touch on this concept in their respective works cited 
previously. Field and Grinspan specifically discuss the significance of gender and age in 
permitting or restricting access to voting and citizenship while Syrett explores the importance 




of majority and legal adulthood offered far fewer opportunities and rights than it 
did for their brothers. The age of majority allowed a woman to consent for herself 
and be culpable for crimes. When a young man turned twenty-one he could do 
these things as well, but he also became a legal citizen, he could vote, and, more 
importantly, his independent identity did not disappear once he married. 
Consequently, the age of majority for most women was simply another year in 
their life; as this dissertation will show, single women were often considered 
child-like dependents by their families until they were married, regardless of their 
age.  
This is not to say that age meant nothing to women. Instead, the opposite 
is true. Although legal definitions of age and independence often meant little 
change in their lives, specific ages did become increasingly identified with 
transitional stages or anticipated experiences: when they would begin and end 
their schooling, leave home to visit or work, be expected to dress in particular 
fashions, engage in informal and formal courtship, and be married. By what ages 
these moments were supposed to have occurred, however, varied considerably 
within a community, between regions, and even with families and among 
individuals.  
Gendered impressions of age also influenced perceptions of criminality 
and victimhood, with young women more likely to be considered victims or not 
guilty (or not culpable) when on trial than their equally youthful brothers. 
Conversely, in a number of cases a young man below the age of culpability 




legally accepted because of the perception of male maturity and independence. 
As a result, legal participants strategically played upon perceptions of gender and 
age as mutually constitutive categories of identity to win their cases.   
 
“Negotiating American Youth” begins by considering the social impact of 
heightened discussion of age and life stage on young people themselves. By 
looking closely at social commentary regarding expectations linked to 
chronological age, Chapter one incorporates young people’s perceptions of 
themselves as adolescents into historical understandings of youth-- something 
that few studies on the nineteenth century have done. Young people’s 
observations about age and youth are significant because they make it possible 
to see how young people self-defined generational belonging.35 While states 
could legislate adulthood, in reality, a person did not become an adult until they 
were socially recognized as such by their community as well as themselves. 
Ultimately, this recognition often had little to do with one’s actual chronological 
age and instead was determined by the situational context of a young person’s 
life.  
Chapter two focuses on the fraught relationship between age and 
marriage in the first half of the nineteenth century. More specifically, this chapter 
examines negotiations of age and marriage in three contexts: church records, 
court records, and informal letters and diaries. The chapter begins with a case 
study using the personal records of Reverend Nicholas Collin, the overseer of 
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Philadelphia’s Gloria Dei Lutheran Church, in order to illustrate not only how 
church officials navigated social custom and legal statute to determine the proper 
age of consent but also how frequently young people resisted these legal 
definitions. The chapter then shifts to the legal arena to highlight the ways in 
which parents utilized the court system in efforts to legally challenge age and 
marriageability after their children’s marriages. It also reveals how courts often 
upheld status over chronological age in their rulings on youthful marriage, 
demonstrating a surprising flexibility in their interpretations of age, consent, and 
culpability. Finally, personal records, such as letters and diaries written to and 
from young people and their parents, demonstrate informal negotiations of age, 
status, and marriageability that took place on the communal level and how the 
outcomes of these negotiations did not always align with legal definitions of 
consent.  
The third chapter begins to trace the influence of legal definitions of age 
and independence or dependence on social and familial relationships. Chapter 
three specifically examines guardian-ward relationships, beginning with a 
discussion of how guardianship was defined through legal writings and state 
statute in the Early Republican period. The chapter then shifts to an examination 
of court cases and family letters that pertained to guardianship arrangements 
which reveal how legal expectations of guardianship intersected and conflicted 
with cultural conceptions of chronological age and life stage. For example, during 
the first half of the nineteenth century, we begin to see custody cases 




significant and complicated cases, because Early Republican guardianship laws 
only mandated the proper management of one’s estate. Consequently, these 
cases illuminate how cultural concepts of age and childhood began slipping into 
the legal arena. As evidenced in legal treatises, statutes, and court cases as well 
as personal letters and diaries, legal and cultural understandings of chronological 
age and dependence often clashed. 
Chapter four builds upon chapter three through a similar examination of 
parent-child relationships. Legally, in most states, children transitioned from the 
status of dependent child to independent adult on their twenty-first birthday. Yet 
as this chapter demonstrates through the use of family letters, a young person’s 
capability and dependence were negotiated within a family context regardless of 
the child’s chronological age. For example, Nelly Parke Custis Lewis and her 
husband promised their son Lorenzo a sizable inheritance at the age of twenty-
three, two years after his legal adulthood, in order to extend their control over his 
actions. As can be seen in a number of seduction suits and loss of services 
cases that are discussed at length in the second half of the chapter, a number of 
other parents also asserted their authority and expectations of continued 
deference and household participation well beyond their child’s twenty-first 
birthday, especially when that child was female.  
The fifth and final chapter explores how representations of age were used 
as a legal strategy in the first half of the nineteenth century. This chapter 
analyzes a range of court cases in which age was a critical component of the trial 




or uphold legal definitions of age and, in turn, culpability, reliability, and 
capability. More specifically, this chapter examines criminal cases that 
questioned a young person’s ability to reason, consent, or confess in order to 
determine if they could be held liable for a crime they committed. The legal age 
of criminal culpability in most Early Republican states was fourteen; however, a 
number of cases challenged this legal boundary depending on the severity or 
viciousness of the crime. This chapter also looks at criminal cases where the 
significance of the age of the victim came into question, usually pertaining to rape 
cases. Sex with a child younger than ten years old was automatically considered 
rape; concurrently, children below the age of fourteen were considered incapable 
of giving reliable testimony. These legal age boundaries caused a number of 
problems for the prosecution of infant rape cases when the child victim was the 
only person who could testify to what happened. As this chapter argues, legal 
definitions of age were continually questioned, qualified, and negotiated during 
court cases regarding age related crimes.  
 
Following Brewer and Grossberg’s leads, historians often have 
characterized the period following the American Revolution as a progressive 
march toward legally uniform and modern interpretations of childhood, age, and 
family relationships that we recognize today as standard. More specifically, 
historians of the Early Republic have seized on these newly codified definitions of 
age and life stage as a way to explain changes in family relationships and 




this narrative by arguing that legal definitions of age as they related to the 
experiences of young people and family relationships remained incredibly 
variable and circumstantial well into the post-bellum period. The significance (or 
insignificance) of age was determined by the venue the individual was operating 
within which, as this dissertation will show, ranged from schools, youth cultures, 
families, and households to courts and churches. Those doing the negotiating 
included young people and their parents but also lawyers, judges, legislators, 
clergymen, and even insurance brokers, illustrating how widespread a 
consciousness of age was becoming after the Revolution. Consequently, age 
has to be understood as a critical form of identity that was regularly discussed, 
negotiated, debated, performed, and utilized as a legal strategy throughout the 
new nation.36  
 
A Note on Terminology: 
 
It is important to distinguish between terms like “children” or “child” and 
“youth” as historians often use the terms interchangeably. I use the term “youth” 
																																																						
36 Age, just like race and gender, is a performed identity—especially within the legal system 
where statutes defining age were actively challenge or upheld. In her work, What Blood Won’t 
Tell, Ariela Gross critically reads trial transcripts in order to “catch glimpses of ordinary 
people's, as well as lower-level legal actors, understandings of legal and racial categories and 
their own places in the racial hierarchy.” (Gross, 12) As Gross points out, “legal rules passed 
by high courts and legislatures had to be translated into practical action on the ground;” 
consequently, “witnesses, lawyers, and litigants learned to tell stories that resonated with 
juries or with government officials.” Gross’ study focuses on the “day-to-day creation of race” 
seen through “the intersection of law and legal culture” but her conclusions can be similarly 
applied to age and used to make sense of why legal definitions of age were upheld or ignored 
depending on the case. See Ariela J. Gross, What Blood Won’t Tell: Race on Trial in America 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010) As this dissertation argues, the concept of age 
was performed—was regularly played up or down—as legal participants made sense of the 
new laws passed to protect and empower young people. Furthermore, with no institutionalized 
or state-sanctioned way of proving an individual’s age, Early Republicans could choose when 
to be very specific about age or really vague depending on what iteration would benefit them 




to refer to individuals who fall under the category of non-maturity—be it legally, 
culturally, or socially. At the same time, individuals designated as “youths” were 
allowed to have public personas and engage in public activities. Those 
considered “children,” however, lacked any form of independence, which 
constrained their ability to socialize in public. As illustrated in the first example of 
Maria Moody, at what age a person was a “child” and at what age that same 
person became a “youth” varied considerably by region. 
Additional legal terms that need to be defined include “infant,” “culpable,” 
“capable,” and “reliable.” Individuals under the age of eighteen (or twenty-one) 
were legally referred to as “infants.” While the term “infant” today refers to babies 
under the age of one year, historically the term was used in the wider sense to 
mean a legal child or a minor. The terms culpability, capability, and reliability 
might be used interchangeably. However, paying attention to subtle differences 
in the legal understanding yields insight into how perceptions of age were used to 
challenge or uphold these concepts of accountability. “Culpability” is legally 
defined as the “blameworthiness” of an individual, whether a person can be held 
accountable for their actions or events. A person’s “capability” was meant to 
describe a person’s mental capacity—if that person had the ability to understand 
the consequences of their actions, to give consent to a contract, or be “reliable” 
as a source. Being “reliable” meant that the person understood the 
consequences of lying, specifically of breaking an oath if they were to testify in 
court.  Each of theses terms—culpable, capable, and reliable— were linked to a 




be held culpable or considered reliable; and, for most states, below the age of 














































“Tomorrow I am seventeen!” 
Youthful Awareness of Age and Life Stage 
 
 
 “My Eighteenth Birthday!,” Philadelphian Isaac Mickel excitedly began his 
diary entry on October 18th, 1840; “I will merely remark that to day I complete my 
eighteenth year—one half of my life having been spent in sleep—one quarter in 
mischief—one eighth in eating—one sixteenth in study—and the balance—in 
vain! Could I live my years over again I would keep out of love, out of debt and 
out of newspapers.”37 This was not the first time Isaac reflected on his actions, 
nor the first time Isaac had noted his birthday in his diary, but it was the first time 
that he intentionally reflected on his life because of his age.38 What may have 
inspired Isaac to reflect back on his life at this particular age, eighteen? As this 
dissertation explores, Isaac was likely responding to the increase in conflicting 
messages Americans in the Early Republic were receiving regarding the 
significance of age and life stage.   
From philosophical musings on the “true” nature of the child and advice 
literature targeted at youth, to legal statute setting the age of consent at twenty-
one and court cases challenging legal definitions of age, nineteenth-century 
youth heard a cacophony of voices—from their parents, their teachers, and their 
communities—which must have both informed and confused them about when, 
how, and in what contexts their chronological age mattered. These same voices 
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have informed and confused historians. This chapter begins the messy work of 
untangling these complicated and conflicting messages by starting with the 
voices of the young in order to understand how young people themselves made 
sense of age, life stage, and generational belonging. Only through incorporating 
young people’s voices in histories of youth can we gain a clearer picture of how 
their view of age operated socially and culturally in the Early Republican period. 
The archives are bursting with the personal papers of young people, from 
correspondence between friends, siblings, and cousins to private diaries and 
public commonplace books. To ignore these plentiful sources, as historians of 
the Early Republic have consistently done, does a disservice to the historical 
record. Youthful writings are full of secretive gossip, public news, advice, and 
self-reflective recordings of their own interactions with fellow young people. More 
specifically, these sources are a treasure trove for understanding how young 
people comprehended their own age and stage in life, the pressures they felt 
from their families, communities, and peers, and how they made sense of the 
arbitrariness of legal definitions of age. Widespread among the many diaries and 
letters young people left behind is a heightened awareness of age—of their own 
and of those around them. They were also very aware that perceptions of age as 
well as the experiences of youth varied considerably between communities. If 
contemporary young people acknowledged these differences, historians of 
childhood and youth need to do the same.  
On the macro level, legal statute and advice literature motivated young 




age and their transitional stage in life. They knew that their age simultaneously 
protected them, restricted them, and empowered them, depending on their 
circumstances. Young people could lean upon their minority when trying to 
diminish culpability while at the same time they were motived to inflate their age 
to gain access to opportunities without parental consent-- like marriage and labor 
arrangements. But these definitions of age and ability that youth operated within 
and around were imposed by “adults.” Although these sources of information 
about youth tell us about the social construction of childhood and adulthood, they 
tell us little about how young people culturally defined generational belonging for 
themselves.  
This chapter explores how young people integrated social and cultural 
perceptions of age to define themselves and their peers as youth. Beginning with 
a brief look at how young people internalized broader social messages regarding 
age found in law and prescriptive advice literature, it becomes clear that young 
people were intensely aware of specific age, indicating that it was an integral part 
of youthful identity. But age is, and always has been, contextual and subject to 
regional culture. A look at how young people identified regional differences in 
perceptions of age adds a layer of complexity to defining youth. This, in turn, 
accounts for the inconsistent application of legal statute discussed in subsequent 
chapters. Finally, this chapter concludes with discussion of the construction and 
purpose of youth culture, illustrating on the micro level how young people actively 
defined, included, and excluded youth within a specific, community-based 




parameters of belonging and purpose, it is possible to gain insight into young 
people’s perceptions of themselves.  
 
The messages that young people received from the state via legal statutes 
and prescriptive advice literature regarding age, expected maturity, and capability 
certainly informed and influenced youthful behavior and interaction with fellow 
youth. To start, they acknowledged when their specific chronological age, for 
better or worse, granted them access to legal definitions of adulthood and the 
responsibilities that came with that status.39 For example, on March 29th, 1842 
Charles W. Plummer proclaimed in his diary “All Hail, I am 21 Years of Age to 
day… the laws of the land declare me to be a man and a Citizen!”40 For Charles, 
his twenty-first birthday meant the ability to vote and to be acknowledged by his 
country as a man. Benjamin Browne Foster, on the other hand, lamented he was 
only seventeen the year of a presidential election, writing in 1848 “O, I have 
wished that I was for one year, and on this one topic, a man, a voter.”41 Both 
Charles and Benjamin acknowledged age as the key factor in granting or denying 
them access to voting and legal definitions of manhood.  
But twenty-one was not a celebratory age for all youth. Elizabeth Ruffin 
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interprets seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English political debates that inspired the 
incorporation of age restrictions into American legal statute following the Revolution. 
40 Charles W. Plummer Diary, 29 March 1842, quoted in John Grinspan, The Virgin Vote: How 
Young Americans Made Democracy Social, Politics Personal, and Voting Popular in the 
Nineteenth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 59. Grinspan 
argues that elections and the recognition of the ability to vote at twenty-one offered many 
young man “the clear[est] path to manhood” they ever saw. Grinspan, 38 
41 Benjamin Browne Foster, 11 September 1848 in Benjamin Browne Foster’s Down East Diary, 




acknowledged when she reached her legal majority in a much more somber, 
regretful tone than Charles. “This legal independence—what a mistaken notion is 
entertained of it: what an undesirable possession it is in my opinion,” she wrote to 
her brother and guardian, Edmund.42 In a second, undated letter, she even went 
as far as to ask Edmund, “if you would just forget what age and law have entitled 
me and act precisely as my guardian still… I should deem it a peculiar favor.”43 
Elizabeth, because of her gender, was not granted citizenship or really anything 
other than the ability to consent to marriage for herself and be prosecuted to the 
full extent of the law. This inequality of rights was likely the reason Elizabeth was 
not as eager as Charles to claim her independent status.44 
As age increasingly factored into determining one's rights, opportunities, 
expectations, abilities, culpability, and even marriageability, Early Republican 
youth became increasingly aware of the significance of age, both their own and 
others’. Many young women and men like Philadelphian Isaac Mickel referenced 
their own age around sixteen and seventeen in their writings; for example, Nelly 
Custis recorded in 1797 “Tomorrow I am seventeen!” and Susan McDowall noted 
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Historical Collections. 
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44 Another example of youth acknowledging the impact of legal statutes on perceptions of age 
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in 1856 “with the rising sun, I will hail me sixteen.”45 Nelly, Susan, and Isaac likely 
saw these ages as transitional markers of their identity-- over the age of fourteen, 
they were old enough to testify in court, be held culpable for a crime, request a 
change of guardian, but they were not yet legally recognized as independent 
adults capable of consent; for that (in most states) they would have to wait until 
they turned twenty-one. 
In addition to legal statutes, many young people turned to prescriptive 
advice literature for direction in navigating the life stage of youth as well as 
guidance in understanding just when and how they were expected to transition 
into adulthood.46 Benjamin Browne Foster, for example, noted in his diary that he 
read Young Man from Home, while Isaac Mickel consulted Principles of 
Politeness.47 Works like these encouraged introspection and linked filial 
obedience, religion, and industriousness as keys to successful moral 
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Patricia Brady (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 32. Susan McDowall, 10 
April 1856, Susan McDowall Diary, Duke. It is important to point out that these ages would 
also have been recognized as “old” enough or “mature” enough to be worth preserving by 
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46 C. Dallet Hemphill’s Bowing to Necessities provides the most comprehensive examination and 
discussion of conduct literature in early America. According to Hemphill, "over two hundred 
different works prescribing proper face-to-face behavior were published or imported in 
northern America before 1861.” C. Dallet Hemphill, Bowing to Necessities: A History of 
Manners in America, 1620-1860 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 5. In regard to 
advice literature for young people, Howard P. Chudacoff has argued that these manuals, 
prompted by the popularity of the Second Great Awakening, represented an “attempt by clergy 
and lay leaders to prepare young people for a life of duty, to both God and society.” 
Chudacoff, 21. During the Early Republican period, there was an increase in production and 
circulation of prescriptive advice literature targeted at youth. According to C. Dallet Hemphill, 
this “flood of youthful advice was likely the author’s response—and contribution—to the 
decline of older institutions for controlling youth.” Hemphill, 102 
47 Benjamin noted in his diary that he “read chapters 4 and 6 of Young Man from Home.” 
Benjamin Browne Foster, 7 November 1849, 229. Isaac Mickel mentions using the Principles 




adulthood.48 Many also stressed the significance of self-reliance; Titcomb’s 
Letters to Young People, for example, explained to young men that “there is no 
surer sign of an unmanly and cowardly spirit than a vague desire for help; a wish 
to depend, to lean upon somebody, and enjoy the fruits of the industry of 
others.”49 This idea that young people had to “do for themselves” to find success 
in life grew out of Revolutionary rhetoric, and, although many youth continued to 
rely on family connections for a leg up, this sentiment did inspire lower-class 
youth that they could move up the social ladder if they strategized their youth 
correctly.  
Thus, young people internalized that the life stage of youth had to be 
navigated strategically and that even the smallest mistake could have 
ramifications for one’s adulthood. Author Henry Newcomb, as one example, 
began his advice book to young men warning that “when young people suppose 
it is of no consequence what they do, or how they behave, because they are 
young, then they do not think enough of themselves."50 Rather than view their 
youth as a time to make mistakes, Newcomb wanted young people to be 
strategic from the start. Newcomb cautioned young people that “the most 
insignificant action you perform [in childhood and youth], in its influence upon 
your character, will reach through the whole period of your existence."51 One 
could not risk making mistakes, as these mistakes could have long-term 
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This message, the importance of considering one’s youth carefully, 
prompted some young people to anxiously reflect upon their birthdays with 
dread. For example, in 1847 on his sixteenth birthday, Benjamin Browne Foster 
wrote in his diary with despair:  
"Good god, is it possible that the anniversary of my birth has stolen 
so unawares and come so suddenly upon me? My last birthday was 
ushered in by my spirit with a sort of rapturous exultation far different 
from my present feelings. I experience a sad sensation now. Why is 
it, I know not. Who can tell why maturity of mind ever brings 
mournfulness? I am not now a boy.... And I am yet entirely 
undecided as to an avocation, unsettled in a business. Some laugh 
at me and a tell me I am but a small boy yet. A small boy! My life is 
already probably a quarter or a fifth gone and with what result? 
Leaving me ignorant, poor, fickle, wavering, without brilliancy, 
talents, wealth or influential friends to set me forward, nothing but my 
own resources, the meagre ones of-- a small boy!"52  
 
 Benjamin’s comments reveal not only how he interpreted his own age and 
stage in life, but also how his community imposed their own perceptions. 
Benjamin identified himself as “not… a boy,” and scoffed at the idea that others 
viewed him as a “small boy;’ but he did not go as far as to refer to himself as a 
man, indicating that he felt somewhere between the two life stages. His 
frustration over not yet having established himself in a career suggests that he 
saw himself closer to manhood than childhood. At the same time, if those within 
his community laughed at him and called him a “small boy” when he voiced these 
frustrations, as he says they did, this suggests that his immediate community did 
not have the same expectations for sixteen-year-olds as he did.   
 Although Benjamin was frustrated with his lack of progress, he clearly 
																																																						




viewed his stage in life as a time to take chances and risks as his parents would 
support him even if he failed. A month prior to his birthday Benjamin wrote: “I 
shrink to think of the time when I am twenty-one and shall have no home to fall 
back upon in case of disappointment, when I must do or die..."53 Twenty-one was 
Benjamin’s definition of adulthood, and, significantly, demonstrates that he 
associated the legal age of adulthood with his own personal understanding of 
when parental support would end. Consequently, it seems that birthdays 
triggered anxiety for Benjamin because he viewed them in the context of being 
one year closer to twenty-one and in turn the adult responsibilities he did not yet 
see himself ready for.  
 Finally, Benjamin’s last comment, regarding what qualities he needed to 
build a career, are indicative of how he understood success and in turn, help 
explain some of Benjamin’s actions a few years later. According to Benjamin, he 
lacked “brilliancy, talents, wealth, or influential friends to set [him] forward.” 
Benjamin’s family was working class, which meant that wealth would not be 
available to him. Additionally, “brilliancy” and “talents” are qualities that one is 
generally born with or puts considerable effort into achieving, neither of which 
happened for Benjamin. He was left with cultivating “influential friends” that might 
help him move up in life; and as will be discussed later in this chapter, this was 
the strategy Benjamin pursued in his youth.  
 Diarist Ella Gertrude Clanton provides an excellent comparative example, 
as she would have been a contemporary of Benjamin’s and around the same 
age. On her own sixteenth birthday in 1851, Ella wrote, “How rapidly time flies!... 
																																																						




How sad the thought makes me…How will all this end. To what end am I 
destined. Surely for something else than to waste the precious moments of 
existence as I have for the last two years.”54 Ella commented again on her 
birthday two years later: “I am now eighteen and my feeling is regret—sincere 
regret.”55 The tone and content of her entries are very similar to Benjamin’s and 
demonstrates that this message-- of the significance of youth as being a time of 
strategic action-- was universal and applied to both genders. 
Just as prescriptive advice literature prompted young people to think 
strategically and reflect on their actions as youth, the guidance these manuals 
provided on age-appropriate behavior also encouraged a judgmental awareness 
of other people’s ages. This was particularly true concerning individuals active in 
youth culture who were perceived as too young or too old. Twenty-one-year-old 
Harriet Manigault commented on the significance of perceived age and belonging 
in her diary, writing on August 12th, 1804 about a “Mr B” and a “Mr Davies,” two 
men who attempted to “appear younger than [they] really [were]” in order to 
participate in youth culture: “Mr B. I suppose, from his appearance that is about 
forty, but he wishes to pass for five & twenty.”56 Comparatively, ten-year-old 
Maria Moody was identified by fellow youth as too young for the youth culture of 
Richmond, Virginia.57 Although the age parameters of individual youth cultures 
varied by region, young people were clearly aware of the specific age of their 
																																																						
54 Ella Gertrude Clanton Thomas, 4 April 1851 in The Secret Eye: Diary of Ella Gertrude Clanton 
Thomas, 1848-1889, ed. Virginia Ingraham Burr (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1990), 84. 
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peers and factored it into determining each one’s membership.58   
  
As much as definitions of age found in legal statute and advice literature 
informed youth, they remained malleable guidelines that were regularly ignored 
and occasionally challenged as young people lived out their adolescence within 
their local communities, families, and peer groups. One way to see how 
perceptions and experiences of youth in the Early Republic were shaped by 
regionalism is to look at the writings of what I call “social connectors,” young 
people who traveled and served as links between different youth cultures. 
Significantly, social connectors consistently explained away peculiarities in 
attitude, appearance, and behavior of other youth based on regional differences 
rather than individual character traits. For example, Laura Henrietta Wirt told her 
close friend Louisa Cabell about an eighteen-year-old “girl” named Cora 
Livingston who visited Washington D.C., Laura’s home town, in the summer of 
1824.59 Cora’s “dancing attracted a great deal of attention by its novelty [in 
Washington]. It [was] very graceful and a little theatrical,” Laura explained, “which 
was excused, as the style of New Orleans.”60 Evidently, region so thoroughly 
informed one’s actions that a visiting individual’s youth culture of origin could be 
																																																						
58 Young people also indicated an importance of interacting with similarly aged youth. For 
example, Isaac Mickels excitedly noted when he was fourteen that “in the evening I went to 
Miss Sarah Haine’s Birth-day party—where there were twelve or fourteen young ladies (!) of 
my own age, in whose company I enjoyed a great deal.” (Mickel, 10 April 1837, 5) Laura 
Henrietta Wirt also wrote that she had “many other acquaintances of [her] own age.” Laura 
Henrietta Wirt, 23 June 1820, Laura Henrietta Wirt Randall Papers, Virginia Historical Society.  
59 Early Republican Laura Henrietta Wirt was an elite young woman who frequently traveled 
between her own “home town” youth culture of Washington D. C., Baltimore, Richmond, and 
as far afield as St. Petersburg, Russia. Lucky for historians, Laura was also a prolific letter 
writer who dutifully reported her observations of fellow youth to her close friend Louisa Cabell.  




identified through their behavior. 
Laura spent “five weeks” in Baltimore as a visitor herself and her 
reflections on her experience within a different youth culture reiterate the 
significance of regionalism on experiences (and perceptions) of youthful 
behaviors and interactions. Laura summed up her impression of Baltimore as “a 
very agreeable place to visit at. But, for a permanent residence… [she] prefer[ed] 
Washington.”61 Laura interpreted the youth culture of Baltimore as “more sociable 
and intimate” than Washington’s, but also as “too little intellectual to be long 
agreeable.” She explained that “the girls think and discourse of nothing but dress, 
with the occasional relief of a little scandal. And the young men [were] pretty 
nearly, or quite as bad.”62 Laura’s comparative comments are illuminating not 
only for what they tell us about Baltimore, but also because she unintentionally 
tells us about expectations of behavior in Washington youth culture-- that it was 
more formal and intellectually oriented. Furthermore, she suggests that visiting 
young people had to learn to adapt to the differences in youth cultures in order to 
be accepted.   
Letters from Mildred Smith and William Taylor Barry provide additional 
evidence of the influence (and awareness) of region as a shaper of youth culture. 
In a 1780 letter to Eliza Ambler, Mildred wrote “the girls [in York] are charming 
and very fond of [me] but they are all so much my Senior, and besides there is so 
much freedome and levite almost amounting to indiscretion in their conduct that I 
																																																						





often blush for them…”63 Mildred’s embarrassment over the “senior” girls’ 
behavior suggests that her idea of appropriate youthful interactions differed from 
those she experienced in York. Additionally, because Mildred identified the girls 
she interacted with as “so much [her] Senior,” she alluded to the idea that in 
other youth cultures, perhaps she would not have interacted with these young 
women because she would have been too young or because they would have 
aged out of youth culture themselves.  
Similarly, William Taylor Barry, a youthful visitor from Kentucky, viewed 
Williamsburg’s youth culture as too informal to the point of offense. On January 
30th, 1804, nineteen-year-old William wrote to his older brother John, “there is a 
certain looseness of manners and conversation among [the girls] that I do not 
admire… such freedom of conduct may be altogether consistent with the strictest 
principles of virtue, but, I must confess it don’t meet my notions of propriety.”64 In 
a second letter, William continued: “I have not met with more than one or two 
girls of reading in the place; they generally see so much company that little time 
can be devoted to the cultivation of letters. They are not only deficient in literary 
attainments, but their manners are by no means as polished as I expected.”65 
William’s comments demonstrate an awareness that different youth cultures 
subscribed to different standards and expectations of youthful behavior. His 
judgments of Williamsburg’s young women suggest that the youth culture in 
Kentucky was perhaps more formal, divided by gender, and concerned with 
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64 William Taylor Barry to Brother John Barry, 30 January 1804, William Taylor Barry Papers, 
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 Within a particular region, even a particular town, multiple youth cultures 
existed side by side. The two most common venues that facilitated elite youth 
cultures were educational institutions and cosmopolitan neighborhoods. But even 
within these larger, community-based youth cultures there existed sub-youth 
cultures that had their own requirements for membership. The purpose of youth 
culture was to provide a space for young people to interact, free from the direct 
observation of authority figures, such as parents or teachers. More importantly, 
these spaces of youthful interaction allowed young people to test their identities 
as emerging adults and to engage in informal courtship opportunities without 
serious consequences if they took a misstep.  
Attending an educational institution in and of itself was a requirement to 
gaining access to many youth cultures. Several passages from the diary of 
Benjamin Browne Foster, when examined together, illustrate this point. Benjamin 
enrolled at Bowdoin College in 1851 when nineteen years old, and he took note 
of his fellow Freshmen classmates who ranged in age from “fifteen and twenty-
five.”66 Benjamin also taught at the local schoolhouse and on the first day of 
classes he recorded that he had “eighty-nine scholars, from five [years] to 
twenty.”67 More revealing, though, are Benjamin’s repeated mentions of 
“Yaggers,” or local young man, that regularly got into scuffles with the students.68 
Collectively, Benjamin’s comments provide evidence that disparate youth 
cultures existed even within Brunswick, Maine. Evidently age was irrelevant to 
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determining one’s belonging, as the ages of Benjamin’s peers and students were 
wide-ranging and overlapped. Furthermore, his recognition of an outsider group 
of young men, “Yaggers,” suggest one youth culture was reserved for the 
College students and another for local youth from the nearby town.  
Benjamin’s comments about “Yaggers” and “students” demonstrate the 
extreme divisions that could exist within age cohorts. The individuals active in 
these two separate youth cultures were well known, or at least easily identified, 
by one another, and the rivalry between the two was so intense that acts of 
violence often ensued. On October 31st, 1851, Benjamin wrote about being 
“followed by a gang of Yaggers, who passed around the college yards with oaths, 
threats and defiance. At length they ventured out to the college grounds when 
the cry Yaggers brought a reinforcement of students and caused the insurgents 
to vamoose.”69 A month later, Benjamin recorded that he went out with friends 
and “carried a pistol in [his] breast pocket” because “the Yaggers have been 
horribly saucy… and we were somewhat fearful.”70 An awareness of class most 
likely contributed to the division between students and “Yaggers,” which 
generated some of the tensions amongst the city’s young residents. 
 
By paying attention to the “things” Early Republican youth made note of or 
requested money for when writing home to parents while away at school, it is 
possible to identify on the micro-level how young people found belonging with 
																																																						
69 Benjamin Browne Foster, 31 October 1851, 315. I have not been able to find any origin of the 
word “Yagger.” It might have been a variant of a “jagger” which was someone who indulged in 
excessive behaviors like consuming alcohol and drugs or fighting, but that connection is purely 
speculative.  




their peers within their distinctive youth cultures. Wealth allowed a young person 
to attend the right school, but it also allowed them to board at the right boarding-
houses or pay for the latest fashions and activities necessary for acceptance. Yet 
wealth alone did not secure one’s place in all youth cultures, as some were 
centered around religion or extracurricular activities such as social clubs or illicit 
behavior.  
Seventeen-year-old William and Mary student George Blow explicitly 
connected the necessity of money in gaining and maintaining access to elite, 
youthful social circles—in his case, the youth culture of Early Republican 
Williamsburg. In 1805, George informed his father: “that a young man must of 
necessity be extravagant [sic] at this place if he wishes to associate with the best 
company.” “The money,” George explained, “…has initiated me into every 
respectable circle of this city.”71 George began to list out his expenses in each 
letter he wrote home as a way of proving he was not overspending.72 For 
example, on June 1st, 1805, George wrote: “My expenses this Quarter will be for 
Board $58. For room rent $6, for washing $5, shoecleaning $3, making $72 
exclusive of sundry little expenses amounting in the whole to about $80 exclusive 
of pocket money to pay for Fruit, Clothesmending, subscription to dances.”73 He 
																																																						
71 George Blow to Father, 4 May 1805, Blow Family Papers, Swem Special Collections. In 
another letter, George exasperatedly declared that if his father wanted him to spend less 
money, then he was willing to make an “honourable retreat” from “the most polished societies 
of Williamsburg.” Quote: GB to Father, 10 February 1805. George, of course, was bluffing. 
Removing himself from the elite youth culture of Williamsburg was not an option as it would 
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which his father knew. Consequently, Richard Blow had no choice but to provide the funds 
necessary to maintain young George’s belonging among Williamsburg’s most elite youth-- 
even if he complained to George while doing it. 
72 GB to Father, 20 May 1804. 




concluded his letter by stating, “you see by this true statement that a young man 
is compelled to spend a large sum altho he be very prudent, there are very few 
students here whose Quarterly expenses amount to less than $100.”74 George 
viewed each of these expenses as “necessary for him to maintain his 
respectability,” which meant access to William and Mary’s elite youth culture.75 
Services such as “washing,” “shoecleaning,” and “Clothesmending” and goods 
such as “subscriptions to dances” were luxuries afforded by wealth but also 
seemingly necessities for a young person like George, hoping to maintain the 
proper appearance both physically and socially in order to be accepted amongst 
his elite peers.76  
Another necessity for the students of the College of William and Mary was 
																																																						
74 Ibid.  
75 GB to Father, 20 March 1804. 
76 The line separating necessity from want was not only debated between parents and their 
children, but also by the courts, which occasionally intervened when a guardian questioned 
their ward’s expenses. The reason courts debated the necessity of a good or service had to 
do with establishing financial culpability of minors. Legally, tradesmen were allowed to engage 
in business with a minor without their parent or guardian’s consent when the minor was 
purchasing or paying for a “necessity,” such as boarding or a reasonable amount of 
immediately needed goods or services. In an effort to protect the minor, the “burthen of 
proving the existence of an actual necessity lies on the tradesman, who, in regard to that, acts 
at his peril.” In order to determine what could be considered an “over-supply of an infant’s 
wants” even when the “articles [purchased] might in other respects be ranked as necessaries,” 
the tradesmen was obligated to “acquaint himself with the infant’s circumstances and 
necessities.” If it was determined the tradesmen was irresponsible by providing unnecessary 
goods to a minor, he would be liable for the expense. The court case, Johnson v Lines, heard 
in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1843, provides an excellent example of disagreements 
over what made a good or service a necessity and how young people could find themselves in 
the middle of that debate. Edward Lines, a tradesman, attempted to sue David Eckert who 
was the guardian of John Johnson, for payment of the $1063.27 bill Johnson ran up. Johnson 
made the purchases while he was a minor between October 9th, 1836 and January 30th, 
1838; although it is unclear exactly how old Johnson was, the court described him as “a 
wasteful boy” and a “young spendthrift.” The goods Johnson purchased were as follows: 
“twelve coats, seventeen vests, and twenty-three pantaloons… thirty-nine handkerchiefs, and 
five canes, with kid gloves, fur caps, chip hats, and fancy bag, to match.” Lines maintained 
that the goods he provided Johnson were “necessaries,” however the court ruled against him. 
One of each of these items could be considered a necessity, but the excessive quantities of 
the goods made the purchases no longer necessities. See Johnson v. Lines, 40 Am. Dec. 




securing a spot in the right boarding-houses in town. Where and from whom they 
rented a room could have negative or positive affects on a young person’s social 
opportunities. For example, although initially William Taylor Barry sought out a 
room in a house that kept “thirty boarders,” he soon decided it would be 
“disagreeable” and opted to live with Mr. Anderson instead. Because he was able 
to secure boarding with Mr. Anderson, William wrote to his brother that he was 
“fortunate... to get into a pretty good house.”77 Mr. Anderson ran a female 
academy in addition to the boarding house and was mentioned frequently in 
letters written by Williamsburg’s youth.78 The frequency with which Mr. Anderson 
was mentioned suggests that he served as a link between the young men of 
William and Mary and the young women living in Williamsburg, having possibly 
acted as a facilitator of youthful interactions. However, board with Mr. Anderson 
was not cheap, and he only took on “seven or eight boarders” at a time.79  
Benjamin Browne Foster was a bit more explicit about the importance of 
living in a “good house” in order to gain access to social mobility. In 1849, at the 
age of seventeen, Benjamin was working as a store clerk in Newbury, 
Massachusetts. At first he boarded with “the Stickneys” but opted to leave their 
boarding house after realizing their social connections were “mediocre” at best 
and that they would not be able to “introduce [him] into ‘upper circles’” like he had 
																																																						
77 William Taylor Barry to Brother, 23 February 1804.  
78 George Blow, Jane C. Charlton, and Julia Paguad all mentioned Mr. Anderson at some point 
in their letters.  
79 William Taylor Barry to Brother, 6 February 1804. According to William, it cost $50 a quarter to 
board with Mr. Anderson in the spring of 1804; in comparison, George Blow paid only $40 a 
quarter to board with “Mrs. Powell” the following year. WTB to Brother, 6 February 1804 and 




hoped.80 As outsiders, William from Kentucky and Benjamin from Maine, they 
needed the social capital that came along with boarding with social elites and so 
they saw the higher boarding costs as a necessary expenses.  
Clothing was another point of access to youth culture and regular topic of 
young people’s letters home to parents.81 In 1833, seventeen-year-old Evelyn 
Byrd Pollard, away at school, wrote to her mother pleading for new clothes: 
“everybody is getting Spring clothes, and I think I am very much in want of some 
nice dresses… [but] I have not enough money to get any.”82 Evelyn wrote again 
three years later, “if you believe me Mama I am very badly off here for dresses, 
my light silk I have to wear on all occasions, and it is as dirty as can be. I should 
be so glad if you could send me money enough directly to get me some kind of 
frock, perhaps I could get a cheap silk at Levies. I am very much in want of 
another dress if I remain here much longer.”83  
Evelyn’s concern with wearing the same thing repeatedly and that it was 
“dirty as can be” was not unwarranted. Young people and parents both 
acknowledged the significance of appropriate dress in designating a person as a 
																																																						
80 Benjamin Browne Foster, 30 October 1849, 225 
81 Historians have established the importance of fashion as “marker of class and racial status” as 
well as “an indicator of age and gender. In the Old South, clothing and hairstyles functioned 
both as outward signs of one’s status as a young lady and as effective means of enforcing 
ladylike behavior.” Anya Jabour, Scarlett's Sisters: Young Women in the Old South (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 33. Furthermore, this awareness of the 
importance of appearance was so ingrained in young people’s minds that sixteen-year-old 
Severn Eyre refused to leave his boardinghouse because he lacked “fashionable cloaths 
[sic].” Severn Eyre, 15 August 1785, Severn Eyre Diary, Virginia Historical Society. For more 
information on the significance of fashion in early America in general, see Kate Haulman, The 
Politics of Fashion in Eighteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2014) 
82 Evelyn Byrd Pollard to Mother, 6 April 1833, Pollard Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society.  




member of the adolescent elite.84 For example, Margaret Izard Manigault 
gossiped to another parent about her neighbor  “Mme Camac” because of her 
choice of clothing, “imagine a woman of over sixty dressed like a young person of 
fifteen," she wrote.85 One Williamsburg youth, Jane Charleton, snidely wrote 
about a recently married friend: “do tell her, I mean to send her some mob caps 
and aprons as I expect she dresses quite in the antique stile.”86 Teenagers Mary 
and Sally Garland’s mother expressed a similar connection between fashion and 
age: “I expect your Dress was very hansome [sic]” she wrote to Sally, “and 
Mary’s suited to her age better than if it had been made showey [sic].”87 All three 
women’s comments demonstrate that certain fashions were associated with 
particular ages. If a person dressed in a fashion deemed too young or too old, 
they could elicit gossip, which might significantly affect their chances of being 
accepted into youth culture or elite adult society.  
Because not every youth culture could be accessed with money or 
material goods, some youth converted to Christianity to find acceptance and 
belonging. For example, in 1849, fifteen-year-old Ella Gertude Clanton found 
acceptance among the other girls at Wesleyan Female College in Macon, 
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certain class: “I presume that after I get up onto High St. which may be the means of 
introduction to society, I must have a new suit of wearing apparel.”  Benjamin Browne Foster, 
22 January 1850, 252.  
85 Margaret Izard Manigault to Josephine Du Pont, 24 January 1815 in Betty-Bright P. Low, “The 
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86 Jane C. Charlton to Sarah C. Watts, 19 March 1809, Sarah C. Watts Papers. 
87 Mother (JHG) to Sally Garland, 19 February 1819, Garland Family Papers, Virginia Historical 




Georgia only after she declared she had been converted and “fel[t] how good 
God [was].” Ella wrote in her diary: “when I first came here I disliked the place, 
found the girls unsociable.”88 However, after her conversion experience, she 
exclaimed “oh how happy I am now!...I believe I love all the girls. Oh my heart is 
so much changed.”89 Once she vocalized her conversion, Ella was invited to 
attend nightly prayer meetings where she made close, meaningful connections 
with the other girls. Ella noted that “many of the girls ha[d] been converted,” but 
whether her own conversion was sincere or calculated to gain acceptance is 
unclear. Regardless, Ella’s conversion is what secured her a place in the youth 
culture of Wesleyan. 
George Blow’s letters provide evidence of less respectable (from parents’ 
perspective) ways young people found belonging among their peers through illicit 
behavior. In March of 1804, George’s father accused him of drinking, gambling, 
and being involved in a duel while away from home at the College of William and 
Mary. George exclaimed that he was “mortif[ied]” and “surprise[d]” by the 
accusations and concluded that “some vile, malicious, slanderous calumniator 
[must have] been casting assertions on [his] conduct.” George “confess[ed]… 
that the young men had been disappated [sic] this course” and that he had 
“sometimes joined them” but promised he had always “avoided inebriation.” He 
continued, “you must also know that a part of the young men have practiced 
gambling,” but he had “neither won nor lost a single penny since [his] arrival.”90 
Whether George was being honest or simply trying to stay in his father’s good 
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graces, his admission that young men at the College were drinking and gambling 
in their free time suggests participation in these vices translated to belonging in 
the College’s youth culture. 
Each of the above examples represents one way in which young people 
gained access to youth cultures, but to find belonging meant that others were 
excluded. Although an active member of Bowdoin College’s youth culture, 
Benjamin’s diary also reveals that he was not always included among his peers. 
Three years prior to his enrollment at the College, a sixteen-year-old Benjamin 
noted bitterly his outsider status of his neighborhood’s youth culture. “I 
understand that the 'young people' of this place sailed in the new Mattawamkeag 
steamer as far as the point yesterday,” he wrote, “Charles and I, of course, knew 
nothing about it. There is a circle of Orono society I do not enter, an 'upper ten' 
with which I do not fellowship.”91 Why Benjamin and his brother, Charles, were 
excluded is unclear, but Benjamin’s reference to the “upper ten” implies class or 
wealth impeded their acceptance in to the elite youth culture of Orono, Maine. 
Benjamin’s prior comments about “yaggers,” as well as his experience as an 
outsider in Orono, demonstrates that although age helped establish or exclude 
one’s belonging in some youth cultures, it was not the only-- or even consistently 
the most important—factor in regulating memberships.92  
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92 When fifteen years old, Isaac Mickel wrote about the less respectable youth he saw in 
Philadelphia, providing another example of disparate youth cultures within the same town. “If 
you walk out in the evening, at every corner you will meet a group of lads from 12 to 20,” Isaac 
explained, “swearing, cursing each other, lying, insulting females, and using indecent and 
offensive expressions." Isaac frowned upon the behavior of these youth and he speculated 
that by “21 you [will] find them habitual drunkards and worse, at 25 they [will be] worn down by 




The benefits that came along with belonging to a particular youth culture 
ranged significantly; however, access to information and courtship opportunities 
with similarly classed youth tended to be two universal purposes of these groups. 
A close analysis of youthful writing reveals that young people kept tabs on their 
fellows and made a point to know who was dating whom, who was related to 
whom, who boarded with whom, because by doing so, they could strategically 
build their social networks to benefit their immediate and adult lives. By finding 
acceptance, young people also found access to information that would have 
otherwise been shielded from the wider community.  
The ability to obtain (and retain) access to information about a particular 
peer-group or youth culture had little to do with being in the physical space it 
inhabited.93 For example, teenager Sarah C. Watts had attended Anderson’s 
Female Academy located in Williamsburg, Virginia in 1807 before returning to her 
parents’ home in Bedford, Virginia later that same year. Through her continued 
correspondence with Jane Charlton and Eliza Wright, and despite her physical 
absence, Sarah maintained access to information about her peers, and most 
																																																						
93 Although this intelligence undoubtedly passed between young people through the spoken 
word, more significantly they relayed this “insider knowledge” through written correspondence. 
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importantly about her fiancé, who she had left behind in Williamsburg. The letters 
Sarah received reveal a world of peer-moderated heterosocial youth culture and 
demonstrate the types of information young people gleaned through their 
participation and interaction with fellow youth. In addition to hearing about 
upcoming events, Sarah learned a great deal about formal and informal 
courtship, local gossip and scandals as well as heterosocial interactions 
occurring among Williamsburg’s young people.   
Although the news shared through letters may seem like mundane gossip, 
the information provided was incredibly significant. Gossip is a key means of 
social communication.94 For example, Jane relayed news to Sarah about her 
fiancé, “Mr. Irvine.”95 “I can’t forbear telling you what I heard of him yesterday,” 
Jane wrote, “which is that his talents are thought superior to any in the junior 
class, which consists of forty, or fifty.”96 Jane did not specify where she had 
learned this bit of information about Mr. Irvine, but, by communicating it to Sarah, 
she continued Sarah's access to knowledge reserved for members of 
Williamsburg's youth culture. More importantly, Jane’s information may have 
reaffirmed for Sarah her decision to marry Mr. Irvine. It let her know that others 
esteemed him and his position.  
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Terri L Snyder, Brabbling Women: Disorderly Speech and Law in Early Virginia (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2003) and Elizabeth Reis, Damned Women: Sinners and Witches in 
Puritan New England (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999) 
95 Unfortunately, not much information exists about “Mr. Irvine” beyond the references Jane 
made to him in her letters because the College of William & Mary has been involved in 
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Similarly, Joseph Prentis, Jr., who no longer lived in Williamsburg, was 
able to sustain his connection to the town's youth culture through continued 
correspondence with his cousin, Julia F. Pagau. Significantly, this line of 
communication permitted him access to intelligence regarding courtship and 
prospective mates. For example, on March 21st, 1808, Julia wrote to Joseph with 
information about Mary Miller. “Mary has several admirers from what I can learn;” 
she warned, “[and] I think if you have any notion that way, you had better be in 
haste My Friend; or else perhaps, you may loose [sic] your chance.”97 Whether 
Joseph acted on this information or not is unclear, but the fact he was warned 
illustrates the utility of youthful social networks, even when limited by 
geographical distance.  
It is important to remember that letters and journals circulated among 
family and peers which made explicit discussions of gossip regarding fellow 
youth difficult; consequently, young writers often had to decide which information 
was private knowledge and which would be public.98  Young people concealed 
private information in a variety of ways. For example, journal writer Sarah Duval 
regularly referred to the young men she confessed to having feelings for only by 
the first letter of their last name, sometimes going a step further and literally 
cutting the entire reference out of her journal. Laura Henrietta Wirt applauded a 
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friend’s ingenious decision to “secret a love letter in [her] shoe.”99 Jane Charleton 
creatively used codenames in her letters to Sarah in order to include information 
about private relationships.100 The need to hide information indicates the 
importance of being accepted among one’s peers because in order to have 
access to the information one needed to belong to the group. 
Paying attention to when Jane used real names versus when she used 
codenames reveals important details about how public and private information 
regarding relationships among young people was shared. Jane informed Sarah 
that “Little Bat... is attached to S B, but whether it is mutual or not I cant say.”101 It 
is impossible to determine who “Little Bat” was, however “S B” was most likely 
Sally Browne, a friend of Jane and Sarah's. Sally left Williamsburg in January 
1808 but returned in March 1809.102 Although Sally was “not much admired by 
the Gentlemen” in Williamsburg, “Bat appear[ed] to be entirely devoted to her.”103 
Sarah, and any of the other members of this social network, would have 
understood Jane's obscure references, whereas adults and outsiders would not 
have. Thus, assigning codenames to males as well as females, such as “S B” 
and “Bat,” protected budding romances from the scrutiny and potential 
disapproval of authority figures. Historians argue that young southern women, 
marriage was the most important (and, for a few, nearly the only) choice of their 
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100 Anya Jabour argues that young southern women “distanced themselves from their hopeful 
beaux by giving them  ridiculous nicknames [and] describing them in highly unflattering terms.” 
However, Jane's letters reveal that nicknames were used when referring to female friends as 
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adult life; Jane's use of nicknames could be viewed as sensitive to this reality.104 
The example of teenager Nancy Shippen, active in the youth culture of 
Philadelphia in the late 1770s, illustrates why young people relied on the use of 
codenames to keep private relationships from authority figures. Nancy, like Jane, 
also used pet names and initials to engage in (what ended up being) a not-so-
secretive courtship with a young French diplomat, Louis Otto. Nancy regularly 
referred to Louis as “Leander” in her diary but numerous letters were shared 
between the two with an assortment of code names. Louis regularly signed off is 
letters as “M,” “L,” “O,” “John-Wait-Too-Long,” “Damon,” “Mr. Venoni,” “J Wait-
Patiently,” “Mr. Runaway,” “Mr. Reciprocity,” “Lewis Scriblerius,” and even, 
“Maria.”105 In turn, Louis addressed his letters to Nancy: “Miss Runaway,” “Miss 
Inconstant,” “Amanda,” “Julia,” “Phyllis,” and “Emilia.”106 Although the nicknames 
were a form of epistolary flirtation, the fact that the couple had so many may 
have been an additional safeguard, an intentional way to confuse anyone who 
may have found their letters.  
However, Nancy’s parents eventually caught on to the relationship, and 
what happened next illustrates the need for youthful secrecy. Another man, 
Henry Livingston, openly courted Nancy, and her parents considered him the 
superior match because of his family’s wealth. Louis finally proposed to Nancy in 
1781; while her parents did not outright refuse consent, they did ask that he not 
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visit Nancy for “four days.”107 During his imposed exile from the Shippen house, 
Nancy’s parents pressured her into a quick marriage with Henry Livingston, 
effectively ending the romantic relationship with Louis once and for all. 
Unfortunately for Nancy, her marriage to Henry ended disastrously. Nancy was 
so tortured by the relationship that she gave up custody of her beloved, infant 
daughter in order to get away from Livingston. In 1783 she moved back home 
with her parents and spent the rest of her life bitter that she had missed out on 
happiness with the man she considered her true love, Louis.108  
 The sad saga of Caroline Wadleigh and Melville Fuller offers another 
example of the importance of keeping budding romances a secret from parents. 
In 1848, Caroline was sent to live in Orono, Maine with her uncle, Ira Wadleigh 
and his wife, Catherine, in order to become educated and “accomplished.” 
Catherine’s seventeen-year-old son Melville also lived at the Wadleigh home and 
within a few months, he and Carolina developed “a fierce, romantic 
attachment.”109 The relationship was found out and Catherine sent Melville “to 
Augusta for the express reason of breaking up the tender tie.” The imposed 
distance, however, was ineffective. Melville and Caroline not only found a way to 
continue their correspondence but also “met secretly at least once.”110 As a 
consequence of these transgressions, Caroline was sent back home and the 
courtship was permanently ended.111 
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This is not to say that informal courtship was completely frowned upon 
and forbidden. Rather, interactions with the opposite sex were exciting yet 
regular and expected occurrences that filled young people’s letters. New 
Englander Benjamin Browne Foster recorded his daily adventures as a store 
clerk, student, and teacher who strategically romanced young women for his own 
social gain. Consequently, Benjamin’s diary provides a window into how young 
men processed, internalized, and even strategized their experiences with fellow 
youth, especially when it came to interactions with the opposite sex.112 Benjamin 
was quite transient and worked strategically for the social capital he acquired 
when in a new place. Born into a working class family in Orono, Maine, Benjamin 
moved around New England working as a store clerk for a year at a time and 
often wrote anxiously about the uncertainty of his future.113 He began his diary in 
1847 when he was just fifteen, and commented occasionally on his interactions 
with local youth. It is important to remember that Benjamin was likely fully 
excluded from the elite youth culture of his hometown, Orono, Maine; 
hyperaware of the boundaries of belonging, Benjamin strategically maneuvered 
between the youth cultures he visited to ensure he would never be an outsider 
again. His romance-- and strategy-- filled years were between the ages of 
seventeen and nineteen, when he worked, lived, and loved in Newburyport, 
Massachusetts. Between 1849 and 1850, Benjamin fell in and out of love with 
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Harriet Manigault, 12 January 1815 in The Diary of Harriet Manigault, 77. 
113 Benjamin eventually enrolled in Bowdoin College at the age of nineteen and became an 




four different young women in addition to being regularly infatuated with 
countless others.114  
But Benjamin did not “love” blindly, rather he took careful note of his love 
interests’ family or social connections and considered how the romance might be 
advantageous to him. For example, Benjamin first set eyes on Margaret “Peg” 
Spring on January 5th, 1850 and dutifully recorded that “she is of a fine family, 
one of the ‘upper ten’,” indicating that she was from a known, wealthy, and well-
connected family.115 Comparatively, on January 14th, he wrote that he ran into 
Anne Chase and explained that his lack of romantic interest was because “she 
isn’t of the upper circle. She works in the bookbindery.”116 Benjamin’s emphasis 
on the word “works” is revealing; it implies Anne was excluded from elite youth 
culture and courtship opportunities because of her working class status. Yet, 
Benjamin worked as a clerk and was readily accepted, indicating that gendered 
expectations of labor and youth clearly played a role in determining belonging in 
Newburyport, Massachusetts.  
Benjamin approached courtship as a means of advancing his acceptance 
and upward mobility in elite youth culture; somewhat straddling the boundary 
between being “in” and “out,” he was always careful not to jeopardize the place 
he had secured to date. This is particularly evident in Benjamin’s first 
(unsuccessful) attempt to court an elite young woman in Newburyport, sixteen-
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year-old Cad Knapp. Benjamin first carefully crafted a letter to Cad, which read: 
“Will it offend you if I love you? I am serious. If so, I pray you tell me so.” He then 
tossed the letter into Cad’s lap at the end of church one day.117 “I was cautious 
enough to avoid date, address, or signature,” he wrote, strategically ensuring that 
although Cad knew who delivered it to her, no one else would if they found it, 
thus protecting his position if he were rejected. The next day, she had yet to 
respond and Benjamin retraced his steps, reassuring himself that “I don’t fear 
that [the letter] can be used against me.”118 Unfortunately for Benjamin, Cad did 
not return the feelings, “my misfortune is always to pitch upon the wrong girl,” he 
disappointedly wrote on February 8th, 1850. Although unsuccessful, Benjamin’s 
anonymous note demonstrates one of the ways a youth might engage in informal 
courtship while taking care to avoid detection.  
Benjamin’s interactions with another romantic interest, Margaret “Peg” 
Spring, are the most illustrative of how he used courtship strategically. In March, 
Benjamin sensed Margaret had taken an interest in him and shrewdly pursued an 
informal relationship in order to gain introduction to other elite young women in 
Newburyport, Massachusetts. Benjamin and Margaret took moon-lit walks and 
attended dances together, held hands, and even regularly kissed on her porch. 
However, when Margaret invited Benjamin in one evening to visit with her 
mother, he quickly declined, “No, no. I don’t go so far as that,” he wrote, 
“Moonlight walks are pleasant; candlelight ‘sittings up’ serious.”119 On March 31st, 
Benjamin acknowledged that “the thing is getting too serious, and though I am 
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sensible of some benefits, for already Margaret has introduced me to two or 
three girls of rank, yet I ought to back off.”120 For Benjamin, the courtship with 
Margaret was fictitious and purely strategic, but he recognized that leading her 
on for too long could have social consequences.121  
Still, Benjamin pushed on with the charade; that is until the adults of their 
community began to take notice of Benjamin and Margaret’s “intimacy” and 
pressed Benjamin about his intentions. In April, Benjamin was confronted by 
Margaret’s mother and his own mother. In both responses, Benjamin called 
attention to his age as a way of justifying and diminishing the seriousness of his 
interactions with Margaret. When Mrs. Spring asked Benjamin if he loved her 
daughter and had interest in marrying her, he responded by stating that “on 
account of my youth, my situation not being permanently decided and my 
expectations indistinct,” he could not possibly entertain the thought of 
marriage.122 Benjamin also received a letter from his mother, chastising him for 
the potential damage he had done to his reputation and anger he would cause 
the Spring family for leading Margaret on. Benjamin wrote back, insisting “I have 
slight apprehensions of injuring my general reputation by the flirtation. It is too 
common a thing here for a person to show a girl attention and then a separation 
to come, especially with Maggie Spring. My youth is in my favor here,” he 
explained,  “And I have a good excuse in her general character as a flirt for 
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121 Twenty-year-old Virginia Wilson Hankins provides an example of the frustration young 
women felt over not knowing if they were being toyed with or used by their suitors. “I rode with 
Mr. S.L. He said he liked me better every time he sees… but I bet he in truth like me? I 
mean—admire—respect me. Does he feel happy in my society—do I entertain him? I would 
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backing off.”123  
In the end, Benjamin broke off his relationship with Margaret without 
perceived injury to his own reputation-- as he predicted. The fact that their 
relationship continued as long as it did indicates that informal courtship was an 
expected part of youthful behavior-- especially in Newburyport, according to 
Benjamin. However, once the relationship continued on for too long or became 
too visible, parents intervened to ascertain intent or shut it down before things got 
too serious. The relationship is also illustrative of how courtship could be used 
strategically to move up in society. Margaret came from a good family, which 
meant she had connections to other elite young women that she could provide 
Benjamin access to. At the same time, Margaret was known as a flirtatious young 
woman, making her both an easy target to seduce but also provided Benjamin 
with an easy out once he no longer needed her for introductions. Young men 
were expected to “play the field,” while young women were expected to remain 
chaste, consequently, no one would think twice of Benjamin not wanting to marry 
a young woman who was known to date around.   
Philadelphian Isaac Mickel offers another example of a young man who 
regularly strategized his way to become a more active and successful participant 
in his local youth culture. In 1841, eighteen-year-old Isaac confided in his diary: “I 
start out from home after supper, and for want of agreeable acquaintance upon 
whom to call, for want of friends my own age, I fetch up in public places, where 
looking on may lead me, as it has led others, to participating in.”124 In another 
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entry, Isaac explained he did not go to church that day because “the walking 
[was] so sloppy that there will be no pretty girls there,” in turn suggesting he only 
went to church to interact with young women.125 He was more explicit with his 
intentions when he stated that he and a friend, Lamuel H Davis together 
determined “to seek the society of ladies more” and “resolved … to become 
beaus wherever there [was] a belle; to be ladies’ men.”126 By becoming “ladies’ 
men,” Isaac and Lamuel, like Benjamin, hoped to gain greater popularity and in 
turn social success, which could lead to better marriage and career opportunities 
later in life.    
Isaac was a prolific writer who kept careful record of every experience he 
had or decision he made in order to analyze it and question how it might benefit 
him in later life. A regular topic in his diary was his many successes and awkward 
fumbles when interacting with young ladies his “own age.” Between the ages of 
fourteen and eighteen, Isaac wrote forty-nine entries in his diary, and in twenty-
five of those he mentioned these interactions. For example, Isaac recorded when 
a friend asked him to write a love letter for him and noted the time he “went to an 
evening party and dealt pretty extensively in the commodity called kisses.” By 
including these encounters with young women in his diary, Isaac was 
acknowledging them as significant to building the social capital he needed to be 
a successful adult in later life. 
Isaac’s entries regarding interactions with the opposite sex also reveal the 
insecurities young men faced when interacting with young women. Every other 
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week, Isaac’s perception of himself in relation to young women changed. One 
week he was “dealing in the commodity called kisses,” while the next he was 
determined to learn how to bow correctly by reading advice literature.127 Writing 
in the third person, Isaac explained “the first bow [he] ever undertook to perform 
before ladies—was his last! He caught his feet in the carpet, and fell sprawling 
upon the floor; and since then, at introductions, recognitions, and salutations, he 
has never ventured beyond an inclination of the head.” Isaac concluded he was 
so embarrassed that he was “resolved to begin de novo… by reading 
Chesterfield.”128 Why Isaac wrote in the third person is unclear, possibly to 
distance himself from the ownership of the event that writing about it in the first 
person would have demanded of him. 
Part of the reason Isaac was so concerned with making a good impression 
is because young people could equally enhance or injure their own as well as 
other's reputations and, subsequently, their positions in adult life through their 
participation in youth culture. Like Isaac, nineteen-year-old William Taylor Barry 
was explicit about what he hoped to get out of his interactions with fellow youth. 
William strategically moved to Williamsburg from Kentucky to attend William and 
Mary. While there, he noted in a letter to his brother that he planned to “extend 
[his] knowledge in the science of Law” but also “become acquainted with some of 
the first characters in Virginia, and possibly by a lucky throw of fortune 
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recommend [himself] to their favor.” 129 William hoped that the connections he 
would make through his participation in the youth culture of Williamsburg would 
“at some future date be advantageous to [himself].”130 William saw his decision to 
attend school in Williamsburg as a strategic social move meant to benefit him 
later in life.  
Just like young men, young women were strategic about their interactions 
with the opposite sex in order to gain what they felt was age-appropriate social 
leverage. For example, Harriet Manigault confided in her diary in 1815, that her 
and her friends were “determined to make [them]selves scarce, & oblige those 
young men to prize [their] company when they get it.”131 In 1847, Sarah Duval 
recorded her interactions with young men and noted her carefulness of not 
leading a particular friend on. “I shall never say or do aught to encourage him,” 
she wrote, “I highly value his friendship but can never return his love.”132 Other 
young women “collected” beaux as a way to strategically gain popularity, just like 
Isaac and Benjamin. On the inside cover of her diary, eighteen-year-old Virginian 
Eliza Barksdale titled a list “my boys,” which included the names “Sam Baldwin, 
Isaac Coles, John Bouldin, James Read, Crenshaw Miller, George Hansman.” At 
the bottom of the page she included an ominous warning: "all of these are my 
boys by right, if any body dare disputes the fact, let them come forward and do it 
to my face that I may give them what they deserve."133 Both sexes viewed 
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courtship strategically, as it could leverage them into more elite social circles or 
even result in an advantageous marriage.      
 
For many youth, marriage seemed like an important end goal and the end 
of youth culture. Marriage marked their transition from youth to adult, and many 
young women wrote about the interruption in youthful friendships that marriage 
caused.134 For example, Jane Charlton asked Sarah if she had seen “Mrs Ann E 
Callaway when she passed thro' Lynchburg” because she had “not received a 
letter from her for two months, and she generally answer[ed her] letters very 
quick.” Jane wondered if “perhaps matrimony ha[d] made as great a change in 
her sentiments [as] in Eliza Mayo's” and concluded her letter: “I hope it will not 
alter my dear Sarah.”135 Another unknown letter writer lamented to her friend, 
Virginia Early Brown, “the idea of my friend’s marrying makes me feel sad, it 
seems to me that when one marries, they form new connections, other thoughts 
and feelings occupy their minds, and this forming so many new associations, the 
remembrances of other friends glides impecetly [sic] from them.”136 Mary Telfair 
put it simplest: “once I had a friend I adored but she married and forgot me.”137  
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Young people expressed the notion that marriage removed them from 
youth culture and transitioned them into “adult” society; but it also legally 
transitioned a person into adulthood as well. Furthermore, the legal act of 
marriage was transformative regardless of age. For male minors, marriage 
usually transformed them into legally adult men; but for adult women, marriage 
was transformative in that it stripped them of any legal independence they had 
acquired by reaching the age of majority and made them dependents again, only 
this time as wives.138 Writing from Texas in 1852 where the legal age to consent 
to marriage for women was eighteen, nineteen-year-old Lizzie Scott soberly 
acknowledged this reality in her diary: “a few more weeks will pass away and I 
will become a wife-- a great responsibility. My identity, my legal existence will be 
swallowed up in my husband.”139  Lizzie spoke plainly about how marriage would 
affect her from a legal standpoint and, as seen in the examples of Charles 
Plummer and Elizabeth Ruffin discussed at the start of this chapter, she was not 
alone in recognizing how nineteenth-century laws represented transformative 
moments for young people.  
As this chapter has shown, young people in the Early Republic actively 
participated in defining age and in creating the social boundaries that delineated 
youth from adulthood. They took their cues from advice literature and legal 
statute on what was appropriate behavior at what age, but they also adapted 
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these prescriptive ideas to their own unique, regionalized experiences and 
contexts found within the youth cultures of their schools and neighborhoods. The 
fact that young people took time to reflect in their diaries about how they 
strategized, qualified, and even quantified their relationships with fellow youth 
demonstrates how significant youthful interactions and a sense of generational 
belonging was in a young person’s life. But just as young people wrote actively 
about youthful belonging, they also wrote actively about when it was appropriate 
to marry and transition socially and legally into adulthood. The following chapter 
will explore the ways in which young people perceived the relationship between 
age and marriage as well as begin to incorporate the outside voices that 


















“Insisting on their capacity and right of choosing”:  
Negotiations of Age and Marriage 
 
 In 1810, Mary Brown explained to her close friend Margaret Steele that 
despite being “very rich,” “an old bachelor” in her neighborhood was 
unsuccessful in courting a local young woman. According to Mary, this was 
because the young woman was not old enough to give her “own consent to 
become an Old Mans darling.”140 Mary's phrasing is significant for two reasons. 
First, it demonstrates that she had an awareness of the impact legal definitions of 
age had on the actions of young people. In this example, the law prevented a 
young woman from consenting to marriage. Second, her words expressed 
disapproval of the age difference in the match, an opinion informed by her social 
understanding of marriage. This dual commentary is important to acknowledge 
because although marriage is a legally binding contract, it was also the 
cornerstone of family building in early America that was regulated and evaluated 
by society. In other words, marriages did not exist in one realm or the other, 
within a legal context or social one, but within both realms simultaneously. Mary’s 
comments are significant because they perfectly illustrate this intersection of 
legal and social perceptions of age and marriageability.  
 
In his recent book American Child Bride: A History of Minors and Marriage 
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in the United States, historian Nicholas L. Syrett traced the origins, evolution, and 
differences in American marriage laws as they restricted minors from marrying 
from the colonial era to present day.141 One of Syrett’s central arguments is that 
because nineteenth-century Americans had a “functional,” “kin-based 
understanding of childhood rather than one focused on age,” early statutes that 
designated an age for marriage without parental consent “had less to do with the 
child’s youth than that the child was somebody’s son or daughter.”142 American 
consent laws, borrowed from English statute, were meant to “enshrine filial 
obedience in statute” by requiring parents to approve their children’s 
marriages.143 Americans, Syrett explains, “did not believe that there were 
																																																						
141 Nicholas L. Syrett’s synopsis and analysis of the Early Republican and antebellum periods 
has been particularly helpful for this chapter. As Syrett argues, marriage laws “demonstrate 
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143 Quote: Syrett, 19. As Holly Brewer has explained in By Birth or Consent, Marriage Law 
reforms linked to chronological age first appeared in England in 1753 with “An Act for the 
Better Preventing of Clandestine Marriages,” popularly known as the Hardwick Act. In 
response to parental concern regarding “young heirs and heiresses who married beneath their 
rank,” the law enabled parents to void the marriage of their children if they were under the age 
of twenty-one in addition to invalidating all clandestine marriages. By passing this act, 
lawmakers raised the minimum age of marriage and required parental consent in order to give 
greater control to parents, not to establish precedents regarding consent and capability. 
Although the Hardwick Act established a legal precedent for limiting youthful marriage, in 




particular ages at which a person should go to school, start working, or get 
married. These things happened when a person was large enough or able 
enough or financially prepared enough, and those moments might come at 
different times for different people.”144 Consequently, although laws were passed 
to limit the young from marrying, a disregard for age made youthful marriage 
common because in the Early Republic many Americans “had not yet embraced 
the notion that young people in their teenage years were unfit for marriage” as 
they did by the end of the nineteenth century.145    
Syrett’s work is critical to understanding the motivation behind marriage 
consent laws in the nineteenth century. Laws passed to limit youthful marriage 
following the American Revolution continued to bolster parental control over their 
children but they were also meant to reflect consent as the “basic criterion for 
determining marital capacity.”146 English common law specified that girls could 
legally marry at the age of twelve and boys could marry at the age of fourteen. 
However, most states passed statutes that required both sexes to have a 
guardian’s consent to marry until they reached the age of eighteen or twenty-
one.147 As American society became increasingly concerned with linking 
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chronological age to the intellectual and reproductive capacities to undertake 
responsibilities associated with marriage-- namely sexual reproduction and 
financial independence-- the law followed closely behind, attempting to address a 
social concern.   
Although youthful marriage remained fairly common, studies suggest that 
in the Early Republic the average age at marriage did rise. For young men the 
average age shifted from early twenties to mid-to-late twenties, and for young 
women the average age shifted from late teens to between twenty-one and 
twenty-five.148 The new marriage laws may have had some impact on the decline 
in youthful marriages but historians have also pointed to a variety of social 
reasons to explain this trend. For example, the education of both young men and 
women was of new importance in delaying marriage ages into their twenties.149 
Additionally, antebellum men typically married at later ages than their female 
counterparts because it took increasingly longer to establish themselves 
financially and have the means to provide for a family.150 Historians have also 
																																																																																																																																																																	
Syrett, girls were able to give their consent to marriage without their parent’s permission 
earlier than boys because legislators viewed women’s only purpose as that of wife. By 
allowing girls to marry younger, they were allowing women to transition into adulthood quicker. 
See Nicholas L. Syrett, “Statutory Marriage Ages and the Gendered Construction of Adulthood 
in the Nineteenth Century” in Age in America: The Colonial Era to the Present, ed. Nicholas L. 
Syrett and Corinne T. Field, (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 112-113. 
148 See Ellen Rothman, Hands and Hearts: A History of Courtship in America (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), 22-23; Anya Jabour, Scarlett's Sisters: Young Women in the 
Old South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 90; Susan E, Klepp, 
Philadelphia in Transition (New York: Garland Science, 1990), 10, 74.  
149 Experimenting with new forms of democratic participation, the rhetoric of the Early 
Republican period called for an increasingly educated citizenry. Education was also a marker 
of gentility that granted access to elite social circles and became a prerequisite for 
advantageous marriage matches later in life. For more information on the rise of education in 
the Early Republic see: Mary Kelley, Learning to Stand and Speak: Women, Education, and 
Public Life in America’s Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Linda 
Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997) 




pointed to the concept of the “companionate marriage” ideal, which came into 
vogue in the early nineteenth century as a reason for delayed marriage.151 
Rejecting monarchical relationships based on deference, Americans may have 
sought relationships and marriages based on romantic love and mutual respect 
between peers. This new style of marriage required longer courtships and 
increased levels of maturity and reasoning to successfully select one's ideal 
mate. Additionally, marriages based on “mutual respect” implied that pairings 
occur between individuals of similar age. Although the idea of finding a true 
“companion” certainly may have influenced marriage choices for certain 
individuals and slowed the rush to the alter, historians have shown that during 
the Early Republican period the majority of elites were still making strategic 
calculations before committing to marriage.152 
 Despite a consensus about the statistical rise in marriage age in the Early 
Republican period, historians have largely failed to consider how families and 
young people themselves negotiated legal definitions of age and consent against 
personal and communal expectations of marriage. For example, by focusing on 
legal definitions (and statistical analyses) of age at marriage, they have 
overlooked the ways in which people might have considered social and cultural 
standards. Additionally, individual sentiments regarding appropriate age at 
																																																																																																																																																																	
University Press, 2010) and E. Anthony Rotundo, American Manhood: Transformations in 
Masculinity from the Revolution to the Modern Era (New York: Basic Books, 1994). While self-
sufficiency before marriage was the expectation for young men, in reality there are numerous 
examples of young men attempting to negotiate with parents to provide for an earlier 
marriage.  
151 See Anya Jabour, Marriage in the Early Republic: Elizabeth and William Wirt and the 
Companionate Ideal (Baltomore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998) 
152 See Lindsay Keiter, “Uniting Interests: The Economic Functions of Marriage in America, 




marriage, or even the ability to consent to a marriage, typically accounted for 
class, inheritance, and individual maturity. From a legal standpoint, once a 
person reached the age of majority, he or she could consent to marriage; 
however, socially, this was not always the case. Age and the ability to consent for 
oneself in regards to a marriage was in constant negotiation during the Early 
Republic. 
This chapter adds to the historiography on age and marriage, and 
challenges parts of it, by contributing a discussion of the complicated 
negotiations over age and marriage that took place within communities. More 
specifically, I argue that although the function of consent laws in the early 
nineteenth century may have been to strengthen parental rights, mention of one’s 
specific age repeatedly shows up in informal discussions and observations about 
marriage. This suggests that Early Republicans had a degree of age 
consciousness that historians have overlooked. To illustrate this point, I examine 
discussions of age and marriage in three contexts: church records, divorce 
cases, and diaries and letters written by and to youth.  
Marriage records from Philadelphia’s Gloria Dei church demonstrate not 
only how church officials navigated social custom and legal definitions to 
determine the proper age of consent, but also how frequently young people 
resisted legal definitions of age in relation to ability in efforts to assert their 
independence. Divorce petitions highlight the ways in which parents and 
guardians utilized the court system in their effort to legally negotiate age and 




informal negotiations of age, status, and marriageability that took place within 
families and peer groups and show that social definitions of age and 
marriageability did not always align with legal definitions of consent. Taken 
together, these sources provide evidence that throughout the Early Republican 
period, young people and authority figures carefully negotiated the significance of 
chronological age and capability in determining marriageability.  
 
 Pennsylvania, like many states in the Early Republic, required written 
parental approval for all marriage applicants younger than twenty-one years of 
age.153 This legal mandate prompted Reverend Nicholas Collin, the overseer of 
Gloria Dei, Philadelphia’s most popular church for weddings, to keep detailed 
records of those he married and those he refused in an effort to protect himself 
from action by angry guardians who had not approved the betrothal of their 
dependents.154 Beginning in January of 1794, Collin set aside a portion of the 
marriage register for a section he titled “Remarkable Occurrences Concerning 
Marriage,” where he explained his reasoning for refusing to marry particular 
																																																						
153 Nicholas Syrett points out that although Pennsylvania had an equal minimum age for consent 
for men and women, in reality their minimum age for marriage with parental consent was still 
unequal, with girls being able to marry with consent at 12 and boys at 14. See Syrett, 
“Statutory Marriage Ages and the Gendered Construction of Adulthood in the Nineteenth 
Century,” in Age in America, 119.   
154 In the Early Republican period, Gloria Dei Church, also called “Old Swedes’ Church,” was 
Philadelphia’s most popular location for weddings because it was considered “especially 
lucky” to be married at the Lutheran temple. Reverend Nicholas Collin oversaw some three 
thousand marriages during his tenure at the church. For more information on Gloria Dei 
Church, see: Susan Klepp and Billy G. Smith, “The Records of Gloria Dei Church: Marriages 
and “Remarkable Occurrences,” 1794-1806” in Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic 
Studies, Vol. 53, No. 2 (April, 1986), pp. 125-151.  Collins explained the reason he created the 
“Remarkable Occurrences” section was because “the continuance of licentious manners and 
defective laws renders necessary the recording of such incidents as may prove the prudence 
of my conduct against blame for cases against which no caution can secure, and also to 
instruct my successor on the rules of proceeding.” Reverend Nicholas Collin, “Remarkable 




couples.155 Collin’s records are significant for two reasons. First, these records 
offer a unique perspective on how church officials understood legal definitions of 
age, consent, and marriage in the Early Republican period as well as how some 
officials took it upon themselves to negotiate social perceptions of class and age 
to determine one’s marriageability regardless of the law.156 Read another way, 
Collin’s records also show how young people made sense of the legal restrictions 
concerning consent and marriage and attempted to negotiate or assert their own 
independence in efforts to get around marriage laws. Despite a couple’s 
insistence or the legal statute, in these cases, Collin was the ultimate authority in 
determining who actually had the capacity to marry and who did not.   
Collin included illuminating passages in which he referenced age or lack of 
consent.157 Although actual and perceived youthfulness certainly factored into 
																																																						
155  Historians have used these records to establish understandings of the “conditions and 
attitudes towards  
        marriage and personal relationships” among Philadelphians in the Early Republican 
period. Richard Godbeer and Clare Lyons, specifically, have used Collin’s records to establish 
the frequency of premarital sexual activity and irregular marriage practices among the lower 
classes. Katie Jorgensen Gray briefly mentions Collin’s records in her chapter on youthful 
autonomy. Gray points to Collin’s records to show evidence of how some genteel young 
people attempted to assert their independence by marrying without parental consent. Her 
larger point is that Collin’s records “are indicative of a larger cultural tension over the degree of 
deference owed by the younger to the older generation.” (Gray, 96). See Richard Godbeer, 
Sexual Revolution in Early America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2004); Clare 
A. Lyons, Sex Among the Rabble: An Intimate History of Gender and Power in the Age of 
Revolution, Philadelphia, 1730-1830 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); 
and Katherine Jorgensen Gray, “Mixed Company: Elite Youth and Heterosociability in 
Philadelphia, 1750-1815,” Ph.D. Dissertation, John Hopkins University, 2011.  
Between the years 1794 and 1806, Collin turned away four interracial couples, seventeen 
couples due to drunkenness, two because he suspected they already had a spouse, and 
fifteen because they showed up late at night. He also recorded instances of children out of 
wedlock, attempts by couples to receive antedated marriage certificates, and the physical 
altercations he got in over his refusal to marry these individuals. 
156 This is some what surprising given that most clergy would be interested in avoiding 
immorality that might occur outside of marriage if they refused to perform the ceremony than 
to be tried for breaking state statute as Collin was. 
157 Between January 1794 and 17 November 1818, Collin made hundreds of entries in his 
“Remarkable Occurrences” database. However, the bulk of his comments fall between 




Collin’s reason to refuse a marriage, he also denied pairings based on the 
suspected elite status of those he encountered and because of large age 
disparities.158 Of 170 denials that took place during these twelve years, Collin 
mentioned relative or specific age in 56 percent (96 out of 170) of his entries.159 
Collin’s care to verify age, and thus an individual’s ability to consent, in these 
requests for marriage demonstrates how strictly he interpreted the law and its 
minimum age requirement. In other words, he was inflexible in his belief that a 
person could not consent before they reached the age of twenty-one.160 At the 
same time, just because a person was twenty-one did not mean Collin 
automatically allowed them to marry. Instead, Collin was influenced by a variety 
of factors including class, family, and religion when he judged a legal adult’s 
																																																																																																																																																																	
years he wrote every week or month while others he wrote a sentence at most for the entire 
year. Even so, the frequency with which he wrote about age, consent, and class between 
1794 and 1806 makes it possible to come to statistical and anecdotal evidence of how he 
understood the three as related to marriageability as well as how they factored into his 
decision to deny a marriage request. 
158 For example, there were two cases in which Collin denied a marriage because of a disparity 
in age. Although in both cases, parental consent was missing as well, by highlighting the age 
difference, he suggested the disparity factored into his decision. On May 13th 1795, Collin 
noted that “A man about 50 years old came to bespeak marriage with a girl of 18. I adviced 
[sic] him to consider better of it,” and as a result, the man “did not return.” A few years later, on 
November 10th, 1801, “A couple… were refused because the girl, not quite 18, had no 
certificate from her parents, and the man was also of very disproportionate age, probably 60.”  
159 In 42% (60 out of 144) of cases, Collin gave a chronological age, while in 58% (84 out of 
144) of cases he gave a relative age, meaning he described a person or a couple as “young,” 
“mature,” “middle-aged,” etc. Collin listed the perceived and factual chronological age for sixty 
individuals, thirty-three women and twenty-seven men. He listed relative age eighty-four times 
total with a break down of twenty-six women, thirty-two men, and twenty-six couples. On the 
surface, these numbers break down roughly equal between the sexes which suggests that 
Collin paid equal attention to recording the age of men and women he refused to marry. 
However, of the thirty-three women Collin ascribed a chronological age to, twenty-five (76%) 
were under the age of twenty-one while only three (11%) of the twenty-seven men were. This 
significant difference might be accounted for by the fact that it was more socially acceptable 
for women to marry at a younger age then men. 
160 Pennsylvania court records from the early nineteenth century are full of cases of parents suing 
clergymen for marrying their minor children without their consent. The frequency in which 
these cases were tried demonstrate not only that parents took their right to withhold consent 
seriously but also how strictly the state took definitions of consent in relation to chronological 
age as parents usually won. This reality explains why Collin erred on the side of caution and 




ability to consent to a marriage. 
Appearance or visual perception of age factored heavily into Collin’s 
decision to grant or reject a marriage. For example, he described “a girl between 
20 and 23, to appearance,” “a young girl, in appearance 17 but [the groom] said 
20,” a “young woman about 19 years old,” a “young man, by his account past 
20,” and recorded instances in which “the bride looked very young,” a bride had a 
“good but young appearance,” and a young woman who insisted she was 
“twenty-one, but looked younger being also small.”161 One couple he “refused for 
want of better evidence, she seemed to be of age,” he explained, but he was not 
convinced enough to take the risk of marrying the pair.162 Collin’s decision to 
include qualifying terms like “in appearance,” “looked,” “about,” and “by his own 
account,” demonstrates his awareness of how difficult it could be to determine 
one’s actual chronological age.163 Consequently, Collin consistently erred on the 
side of caution and refused any individual he perceived as being possibly 
underage unless he or she produced explicit parental consent. 
Collin’s careful notes on how old individuals looked also suggests the 
frequency with which young people attempted to lie about their age or 
circumstances in order to marry and circumvent parental permission, a reality 
that irritated Collin. One of the most popular justifications young people used to 
																																																						
161 Collin, “Remarkable Occurrences,” 28 October 1794; 6 January 1795; 13 May 1796; 12 April 
1800; 10 March 1805, 13 March 1805, 18 July 1805.  
162 Collin, “Remarkable Occurrences,” 2 November 1795. There were two other instances in 
which Collin suspected the couple might be telling the truth about their age but still denied the 
marriage because of his uncertainty-- May 13th, 1796: “Young though possibly of age…” and 
February 16th, 1806: “Bride might be as she said 21…”. 
163 Collin used the term “about” twelve times before listing a specific age. For difficulty of proving 
age in the Early Republican period see Shane Landrum, “From Family Bibles to Birth 
Certificates: Young People, Proof of Age, and American Political Cultures, 1820-1915,” in Age 




assert their independence and “adult” status was that they had “no parents,” 
which was meant to suggest they were financially responsible for themselves.164 
For example, on October 13th, 1800, “a young couple, he 16 years, and she 1 or 
2 years less, made earnest sollicitation [sic] to be joined.” Collin explained that 
“they pleaded their independence of both parties, her parents being dead, his 
father also, and his mother in the West Indies.”165 This was the youngest couple 
Collin identified by chronological age. Part of the reason he denied them was 
because the bridegroom had a brother whom Collin knew was “a public officer of 
respectable character.” Collin attempted to explain to the pair “the necessity [he] 
was under to seek information from their next friends or kindred” as sixteen was 
simply too young to consent to marriage, even if the individuals had established 
their independence. Regardless of parental death or absence, so long as there 
was a next of kin older than the pair marrying, Collin demanded their permission 
before moving forward.  
Collin’s comments in moments of frustration demonstrate some young 
people’s resistance to legal definitions of age in relation to consent and 
capability.166 For instance, on July 29th, 1797, Collin “refused” a “middle age” 
man and a “woman about 20” who claimed she had “no parents” because he 
suspected they were “probably runaways.”167 After recording the encounter, he 
continued on in frustration, noting that “similar cases happen not seldom: young 
																																																						
164 There were a total of nine times young people claimed their parents had died as a means of 
justifying their agency to marry; 12 July 1794; 24 April 1795; 13 May 1796; 29 July, 1797; 2 
July 1800; 13 October 1800; 18 July 1805; 4 August 1806; 28 October 1806. 
165 Collin, “Remarkable Occurrences,” 13 October 1800 
166 Occasionally, young people outed themselves, for example, on 12 July 1794, Collin noted 
that a “man of mature age” came to marry a bride who was an “orphan,” however, “she 
confessed that her father was living; [and they] were refused.”  




girls, some 15, coming with improper men, as strangers, etc., insisting on their 
capacity and right of choosing for themselves.”168 Several years later he 
complained after refusing a “young couple because she had no certificate from 
her father,” explaining that “they thought [his refusal was] very odd, as many 
others, having no idea of parental authority.”169 By “insisting on their capacity and 
right of choosing,” as Collin points out, young men and women were 
acknowledging legal debates and insisting that the age of twenty-one as a 
marker of ability was arbitrary and should not apply equally to all, especially 
when it came to marriage. The rhetoric of companionate marriage paired with the 
reality that young people increasingly ventured into new careers independent of 
their families may have been a few of the reasons some young people no longer 
understood (or appreciated) why parental consent was required.      
Other times, young people insisted on the negligence of their guardians as 
a justification for making their own choice. For example, on July 2nd, 1800, Collin 
recorded an instance when “a captain of a small vessel, Bostonian, came… with 
a genteel girl, 20 years old.” He explained that the “girl” insisted “that her parents 
were both dead” but “that her step-father was living and took no care of her,” 
causing her to have to keep “house for a gentleman.” Collin noted that he tended 
to believe her but ultimately “ventured not to marry her for fear that her father 
might be one of the Gibs in the city.”170 Similarly, on October 9th, 1804, “about 8 
in the morning, a girl aged eighteen, came [to be married]... She acknowledged 
having a guardian, but said that he was a man of despicable character and now 
																																																						
168 Ibid.   
169 Collin, “Remarkable Occurrences,” 15 July 1804. 




in jail for debt. I nevertheless declared that he must be heard, and the wedding in 
the mean time postponed.”171 
Ten young couples pleaded with Collin to overlook the lack of a parent’s or 
guardian’s consent and marry them secretly.172 Unsurprisingly, Collin always 
refused, but the reasons young people cited for needing a secret marriage, 
specifically family disapproval, are significant because they demonstrate the 
continued active role parents played or attempted to play in making decisions 
regarding their children’s marriage. Families disapproved of marriages for a 
variety of reasons, sometimes because of the groom’s inability to provide 
financially for a family and other times because of the social inequality of the 
match. For example, on February 13th, 1804, Collin recorded that “A young man 
came… he said that he was about 25, in mercantile business: she about 19, from 
Maryland, having a mother there… but that they must get married secretly, 
because he was not able at present to support her in the stile [sic] to which both 
had been accustomed.”173 In Maryland, the legal age of consent for a young 
woman was sixteen years old. By including the young woman’s home state, the 
couple was attempting to argue that they both met the age of consent—a fact 
that Collin did not try to dispute. He easily could have given the excuse that the 
age of consent for both sexes in Pennsylvania was twenty-one. Instead, Collin 
sided with the parents, refusing to marry the couple because of the groom’s 
																																																						
171 Collin, “Remarkable Occurrences,” 9 October 1804. Another example can be seen May 13th, 
1796, “a young man… denied because a nephew of a respectable person in town whom I 
would first consult. The young man said that his uncle never had any regard for him because a 
poor lad.”  
172 Collin, “Remarkable Occurrences,” Collin recorded propositions for “secret marriages” ten 
times: 8 January 1794; 23 May 1795; 29 October 1801; 13 February 1804; 1 November 1804; 
1 January 1805; 29 June 1805; 17 February 1806; 24 May 1806; 6 September 1806. 




financially dependent status, demonstrating the significance of status over legal 
definitions of age and independence.  
The fact that young people attempted to obtain “secret marriages” is 
evidence of one way in which youth resisted parental authority in order to secure 
what they considered a right: their ability to choose who and when they would 
marry.174 In the summer of 1805, a “young man came and requested secret 
marriage because her parents withheld their consent on account of his inability to 
support her.” In this circumstance, the youth provided a solution for the problem 
that prevented her parents from consenting: “he proposed going to Kentucky for 
employment, where his trade of Portrait Drawing had been represented to him, 
by some persons from there, as profitable.”175 In 1806, a twenty-year-old groom 
“who [was] the son of a rich man” hoped to secure a “secret marriage” to “a 
deserving but not moneyed girl” who was 18.176 Evidently the family disapproved 
and refused to offer consent because of a perceived social inequality of the 
match. Presumably all three couples discussed could have proceeded with a 
marriage had they waited until either the groom became more established 
financially or they had reached the age of consent, but their unwillingness to do 
so demonstrates how young people disagreed with their families about wanting 
independent control of their own lives.177  
																																																						
174 For examples of premarital sex as justification for “secret marriage” see: January 1st, 1805: 
“The intended bridegroom, 27 years old, told me in private of his premature intimacy with his 
future bride and of his firm resolution to conceal the time of wedlock from the parents, to save 
her reputation” and October 13th, 1800: “The male witness had… privately… apprized me of a 
premature connection.”  
175 Collin, “Remarkable Occurrences, 29 June 1805 
176 Collin, “Remarkable Occurrences,” 24 May 1806. 
177 Katie Jorgensen Gray argues that in elite Philadelphia, “young people and adults carefully 




The fact that young people used terms like “capacity” and “right to choose” 
in pleading for their marriages to be sanctioned demonstrates that young people 
attempted to assert their own interpretations of age and consent. Chronological 
age meant less than experience or situational reality to these youths. Rather than 
willingly adhere to an arbitrary age at which they legally were deemed “adults” 
capable of reason, these engaged couples insisted that capacity and consent 
should be determined by individual circumstance. If these “minors” provided for 
themselves financially and lived in independent households or had degenerate 
guardians, why should they be obligated to obtain someone else’s consent? 
Furthermore, those who found their independence before the age of twenty-one 
were usually lower-class youths, and in many ways a youthful marriage would 
benefit them economically.  
Collin’s unwillingness to concede that those below the age of twenty-one 
were capable of consent, regardless of circumstance, illustrates how strictly he 
deferred to the legal requirements. The sole reason he refused to marry the 
above couples was lack of parental consent. Of the ninety-six denials in which 
Collin mentioned age, he specifically stated that he denied the marriage because 
of lack of consent from one or more guardians seventy-eight times (81 percent of 
the time when age was referenced, 46 percent of all denials between 1794 and 
1806).178 These statistics reveal both how seriously Collin adhered to the 
																																																																																																																																																																	
autonomy in marriage decisions. At the same time, parents would and did step in if their 
children made the wrong choice. (Gray, 44) For a fuller discussion, see Gray, Chapter 1 “’This 
Extraordinary Degree of Liberty’: Mixed-Sex Friendship Circles, Courtship, and Generational 
Autonomy.” 
178 Collin specified the marriage was denied because of a lack of consent from the mother seven 




Pennsylvania law requiring parental consent to marry minors but also how 
frequently young people attempted to get around it.  
However, for Collin, a lack of parental consent was not always tied to a 
youthful age, and his entries regarding these cases demonstrate how 
chronological age and consent could still be defined and circumscribed by social 
factors. Although according to Collin and the state of Pennsylvania, one could 
under no circumstance consent to marriage below the age of twenty-one, turning 
twenty-one did not automatically give one the ability to marry, suggesting that 
social expectations of familial deference continued into the Early Republican 
period.179 In six cases, Collin denied the marriage based on the individual’s 
religion or family’s status. For example, in September 1795, Collin noted that he 
turned away a couple who were “both of age” because “she was a Friend and 
could not produce an open certificate thereof from her mother, it being against 
the statues of that denomination.”180 On February 12th, 1797, Collin described a 
couple who “came alone,” were of “decent appearance and mature age; he about 
																																																																																																																																																																	
of consent from a master ten times (13%), a lack of consent from both parents fifteen times 
(19%), a lack of consent from a non-described guardian—the couple had no “certificate” 
proving they could marry on their own consent-- twenty times (26%), and because of a lack of 
consent from the father twenty-six times (33%). Occasionally, parents took it upon themselves 
to ensure their children failed at marrying without their consent. For example, Collin’s very first 
entry, on January 2nd, 1794 stated that sixteen-year-old Jane Fletcher’s mother went down to 
the church to explicitly “forbid the bans” her daughter intended to propose with a “very young 
tradesmen.” Seven years later, on May 11th, 1801, “a woman came in the afternoon… to 
prohibit the marriage of her daughter with a seaman. She said that said daughter had, at the 
age of 15, been married by Mr. Turner to one Starke, a kind of Doctor, without her 
knowledge.” Collin then explained, “in the evening a young couple came to get married, after 
previous notice given in the afternoon.” He denied the couple because “on examination I found 
the woman’s name to be Starke, and that she, on close examination, hung her head and 
would not give sufficient information.” Collin, “Remarkable Occurrences,” 11 May 1801. 
Perhaps still angered by her daughter’s initial betrayal at fifteen, this mother was not going to 
allow her child to disobey her a second time. 
179 See Chapter four of this dissertation for a full discussion of the negotiations that took place 
between parents and their children over independence and familial deference.  




30, she about 24.” However, Collin denied the marriage because “the bridegroom 
hesitated on pretense that her parents had not consented,” demonstrating that 
socially, parental consent remained a critical factor in the decision to marry.181 In 
each of these cases, the minimum chronological age was met but social factors 
such as religion and parental blessing prevented Collin from ordaining the 
marriage. With these two cases, Collin demonstrated a flexibility-- albeit only in 
the direction of an even more restrictive interpretation--in his perception of age 
and consent: chronological age was only one factor that Collin took into 
consideration when determining one’s ability to consent to a marriage; religion, 
relationship with parents, and class equally influenced his understanding of one’s 
ability to marry.  
Social class often determined Collin’s decision to grant or deny a marriage 
when both parties were over the age of consent. For example, four of the times 
Collin denied marriage were because he either knew or suspected that despite 
the couple’s age, their elite families might disapprove of the union.182 For 
example in August of 1806, Collin recorded a confrontational encounter with “a 
young couple [who] came with two young persons as evidences.” Collin 
explained that he “told [the groom] that as he was of a good mercantile family, 
[he] would first speak to his mother. This [the groom] refused, saying that he was 
																																																						
181 Collin, “Remarkable Occurrences,” 12 February 1797. 
182 For example, on October 28th, 1805: “A young man, of respectable merchant family, 
proposed getting married to a young woman, whose family had long been intimate with his, 
privately, but said that the match would be agreeable to his parents. Refused.” And January 
1800: “Thomas Snowden proved to be a son of _____ Snowden, in Philadelphia…His bride 
had assumed a false name, proving to be the daughter of_____.... I declared to him that the 




his own master and could, if he chose, kill himself to-morrow.”183 Although 
melodramatic, the groom’s response demonstrates the level of frustration young 
people might have felt when their right to consent was denied and perhaps also 
illustrates why many young couples lied about their circumstances in efforts to 
get around the requirement for parental approval. 
 
Just as many young people pled their cases concerning age and 
marriageability to Collin, others sought to dissolve undesirable marriages. 
Divorce was legal in most states during the Early Republican period.184 The most 
common (and acceptable or expected) reasons a person requested a divorce 
was due to adultery, abuse, and/or abandonment. However, as the nineteenth 
century progressed, a new reason was regularly cited: age, or rather the 
argument that a person was too young at the time of their marriage to have fully 
comprehended their actions and truly have consented to the marriage. Parents 
were usually involved in filing these divorce petitions. Sometimes they filed on 
																																																						
183 Collin, “Remarkable Occurrences,” August 1806. Another example, on May 13th, 1796, “A 
young man… young though possibly of age, [was] denied because [he was] a nephew of a 
respectable person in town whom I would first consult.” 
184 According to Lindsay Keiter, “There were two types of divorce in early America, adopted from 
the English legal system. Divorce a mensa et thoro, “from bed and board,” was a legally 
sanctioned separation, which allowed the couple to live and administer their finances 
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For more information on divorce, see also Glenda Riley, Divorce: An American Tradition (New 




behalf of the child, which was a strategic choice meant to underscore their child’s 
continued dependent status. Other times, they filed against their child’s wishes in 
an attempt to challenge the child’s ability to act as an adult without their 
permission. Like church records, then, court cases involving the dissolution of 
marriages provide insight into the ways in which legal definitions of consent both 
intersected with and challenged social perceptions of age. Furthermore, these 
sources show how some parents utilized new legal definitions of consent 
strategically to undermine the validity of their child’s marriage.  
Four divorce petitions were filed in Virginia between 1780 and 1860, three 
of which referenced either chronological or conceptual age as a justification for 
divorce or plea for leniency. The first was filed by a young woman named 
Catherine Snyder. Fathers David Brown and Job Stanbery filed the other two 
petitions on behalf of their daughters, twelve-year-old Susannah and twenty-
year-old Virginia. Because Susannah and Virginia were both of legal age to 
marry with parental consent, justices upheld the marriages. Furthermore, as 
Nicholas L. Syrett has argued, consent statutes were designed to prevent early 
marriage, not dissolve it, as doing so would create “single, nonvirginal, and 
possibly pregnant girls.”185 Even so, Brown’s and Stanbery’s petitions, when 
compared, reveal the complicated relationship between legal definitions and 
social perceptions of chronological age and marriageability often overlooked by 
historians.  
Catherine Snyder filed her own divorce petition in 1817 and in it she 
attempted to employ new legal understandings of age and marriage by 
																																																						




referencing her youth as a plea for leniency. The petition stated that she married 
James Black in February of 1812 with the “consent of her parents.”186 However, 
after a year of marriage Catherine learned that James had been “married prior… 
to a woman who was living” out of state. After he was exposed for his “offense of 
Bigamy,” James “abandoned” Catherine and she never heard from him again. 
Five years later, Catherine remarried without realizing they needed to secure a 
proper divorce, ironically resulting in a charge of bigamy against her. Her petition 
concluded by pleading with the judges to not “close the door against her” and to 
grant her a divorce from Black and dismiss the bigamy charge so that she would 
not “fall a youthful victim to the penalties of a law which she did not know excist 
[sic].” Catherine’s decision to refer to herself as a “youth” in her final plea for the 
divorce is significant because it shows that the status of “youth” was linked to 
immaturity and a lack of culpability that in turn could affect one’s perception to a 
court. 
David Brown filed a petition May 29th, 1784 requesting that the marriage of 
his twelve-year-old daughter Susannah to Peter Hopwood, her teacher, be 
dissolved. Although legally Hopwood should not have been able to marry 
Susannah without Brown’s consent, he did so with the help of a “Lutheran school 
master” named Peter Mishler. Brown crafted his testimony in a way to highlight 
Susannah’s chronological and developmental immaturity in contrast with the way 
that Hopwood’s seniority allowed him to manipulate the sequence of events that 
led to their marriage. Brown testified that Hopwood began teaching Susannah 
when she was “a child of little more than eleven years of age.” He began to 
																																																						




manipulate Susannah right after she turned twelve, suggesting his awareness of 
marriage law.187 Because Susannah was set to inherit land and money from her 
father and Hopwood was poor, it was a “profitable arrangement for him.”188 
Susannah explained to her father that:  
after she went to school Hopwood [treated] her with severity, gave 
difficult tasks and confined her to the house while the other scholars 
went to play under the pretense that she had not done her tasks[,] after 
sometime he spoke kindly to her and told her if she would promise to 
marry him he would [treat] her kindly which to prevent his severe 
punishment she did promise being then in her twelfth year.189  
 
Brown hoped including this information in the petition would demonstrate that 
Hopwood was able to manipulate Susannah only because she was a child. As 
her teacher, he had authority over her and he wielded this authority by arbitrarily 
punishing Susannah until she “promised to marry him.” But this authority came 
from a teacher-student or adult-child relationship; he kept her from playing with 
the other children and required her to do unnecessary schoolwork—things he 
could not have done with an adult or mature individual.  
A few months later, Hopwood raped Susannah when her parents were out 
of town and then forced the girl to marry him by threatening to expose her. Brown 
testified that: 
after having perpetuated the crime [Hopwood] informed her if it ever 
came to the knowledge of her parents they would treat her with cruelty 
and contempt and make her a waiting ma[i]d for her sister and if she did 
not marry him he would publish her to the world and that she would be 
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188  Holly Brewer discusses this case at length in By Birth or Consent, however, Brewer focuses 
on the fact that Susannah was unable to testify because of her age while at the same time her 
marriage was upheld because she was legally old enough to marry. In other words, Brewer 
uses Susannah’s case as an example of a transitional moment in the court systems in which 
legal definitions of childhood were still being worked out. See Brewer, 150-155. 




d[e]spised by every body and that the devil would get her when she said 
it was entirety among the terror of those threats… that induced her to go 
off with him and prevented her making an immediate discovery of the 
rape.190 
 
Brown intentionally included this evidence in the petition to demonstrate 
Hopwood clearly planned to manipulate Susannah and, again, depended on her 
immaturity as a child. His threats, that her parents would shun her, that she 
would be forced to be a “maid for her sister,” that the devil “would get her,” were 
ones only perhaps a child or a very vulnerable person would believe. Thus, 
Hopwood’s rape of Susannah was a calculated one. Rather than attempt to 
silence Susannah, as most rapists would, Hopwood threatened to expose her, 
which suggests that marriage-- not sex with Susannah-- was Hopwood’s end 
goal. This act of violence, then, which came after months of emotionally abusing 
the girl, was the catalyst meant to force her consent to the marriage.  
 Ultimately Brown lost his case, ironically, because Susannah was deemed 
too young to testify on her own behalf; as a result, Hopwood could never be 
convicted of the rape. As Holly Brewer argued in discussing this case, the fact 
that Susannah was caught between being legally old enough to marry yet 
deemed too young to be a reliable witness does demonstrate a transitional 
moment in the Virginia court system in which justices were legally defining 
capacity in relation to age.191 However, by focusing on Brown’s testimony and his 
repeated use of Susannah’s chronological age as well as examples of 
Susannah’s conceptual age or inability to reason and therefore consent, it 
becomes clear that he attempted to first establish that Susannah was 
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manipulated into the marriage and then second, that she was too young to marry 
at all. This is in turn one example of how parents attempted to use both social 
perceptions of age along with new legal definitions of consent and dependence 
to challenge the validity of their children’s marriages.  
 Job Stanbery attempted a similar approach in his 1839 petition for the 
divorce of his twenty-year-old daughter, Virginia, from her “remorseless villain” of 
a husband William A.R. Crawford. When Virginia was sixteen years old, she 
traveled to “New Orleans under the protection of her aunt and several other 
relatives and friends” where she met William.192 According to Stanbery, William 
“was apparently a gentleman in all the requisites of such a character.” William 
also had “respectable connections and reputed wealth,” which led Stanbery to 
believe he was a suitable marriage prospect for his daughter. Consequently, he 
consented to the union. Within two years of the marriage, however, Stanbery 
learned of William’s fraudulent behavior all over the South and quickly moved to 
secure a divorce for Virginia before the marriage might further damage her 
reputation and standing in society. 
 Stanbery concluded his petition by stating that it was “the most lamentable 
situation” and that Virginia was “the innocent victim to the treachery of a 
remorseless villain.” He pleaded for the court to dissolve the marriage as Virginia 
had already suffered too much with “the whole prospect of life [now] blackened 
and overcast in the very spring time of youth.” He continued that she had been 
“deceived and misled by craft and scheming that successfully played upon men 
of mature years versed and of privilege in the ways of the world, she gave her 
																																																						




trust her confidence and love [at] the tender age of seventeen years.” He 
explained that it was the fault of her “guardians and protectors” for being 
deceived by William, not the “innocent” “child” that was Virginia. “The prayer of 
your memorialist,” he concluded, “is that of a father for the release of a cherished 
child from bonds that have caused her ruin yet left her pure and innocent.”193  
 By repeatedly referencing Virginia’s “guardians” and “protectors,” Stanbery 
was setting Virginia up as a child, someone who needed protection from adults, 
and because she was under the age of twenty-one, this was technically true at 
the time. However, he also used this reality to distance Virginia from the 
responsibility of the marriage—she had not really made the decision for herself, 
her father had. Yet once Virginia was married she was a legal adult and under 
the control of her husband. By filing the divorce petition on her behalf, Stanbery 
was signaling to the court that although Virginia was now twenty, he still 
considered himself her guardian and she his child in need of protection. More 
interesting, though, is that family records place Virginia’s birth in 1817, which 
would mean she was twenty-two at the time of the divorce petition. Yet, Stanbery 
specifically states that Virginia was married in 1836 “at the tender age of 
seventeen,” meaning that she was only twenty at the time of the divorce petition. 
Stanbery may have intentionally misrepresented Virginia’s age in order to make 
her legally a minor based on her chronological age in hopes that it would 
encourage the court to grant her a divorce.  
 Stanbery attempted to paint Virginia as an innocent child, too young to 
know what she had gotten herself into and, in turn, too young to really have been 
																																																						




married; his tactics, however, were unsuccessful. Although the court agreed that 
it was unfortunate that Virginia’s husband turned out to be a criminal (which 
landed him in jail for five years), she chose to marry him and had to live with her 
decision. Though Virginia may have legally been a minor at the time of the 
marriage, she had received parental permission—a fact that could not be 
overlooked. Clearly Stanbery thought Virginia was old enough to marry when he 
first consented, however, once he realized who he let her marry, his attempt to 
misrepresent her age and maturity to the court reveals how parents might see 
age as a tactic when trying to secure an advantageous outcome.  
 When analyzing Brown’s and Stanbery’s divorce petitions side by side, we 
see two examples of parents attempting to negotiate legal perceptions of age 
and marriageability after the fact. Although Susannah’s and Virginia’s reasons for 
marriage and subsequent divorce petitions were completely different, the fact 
that their fathers filed for them was meant to send a message to the courts that 
they were dependent children, not adults, despite the fact they were now wives. 
This is especially significant when taking into consideration that Catherine 
Snyder filed her own divorce petition despite being in a somewhat similar 
situation as Virginia in that she married at a legal age and with her parents’ 
consent. Both Brown and Stanbery repeatedly referenced chronological and 
developmental age as a way to limit their daughters’ perceived abilities of 
consent and culpability in the marriages. Susannah was clearly manipulated in a 
way only a child could be, while Virginia simply followed the advice of her 




Susannah’s and Virginia’s divorce petitions are significant because they 
provide evidence of parents attempting to intervene on their children’s behalf. On 
the other end of the spectrum were cases in which parents or guardians tried to 
dissolve youthful marriages and reassert control over their wayward, minor 
children. One final court case heard in 1844 in Pennsylvania demonstrates how 
parents attempted to utilize legal definitions of consent and age to challenge their 
children’s marriages after the fact. It also provides another example of how 
young people used marriage to claim their independence as well as how legal 
definitions of consent and capability were not as rigidly enforced as previously 
assumed.194 In 1843, legal minor Juliann Bertron married Richard Welch, a man 
she had known for only “three or four days,” without her father’s consent.195 Once 
Juliann’s father found out, he quickly brought a suit against the justice of the 
peace who performed the marriage, Washington Stansbury.196 In his plea, Moses 
Bertron argued that Stansbury “maliciously, illegally, and contrary to… The Act 
preventing clandestine marriages… marr[ied his] daughter (Juliann Bertron), 
under the age of 21 years, to one Richard J. Welch, without [his] consent being 
previously obtained.” Bertron insisted that, “By reason of which malicious and 
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illegal conduct… [he had] sustained material injury and damage.”197 Once Juliann 
married, her father no longer legally controlled her. By highlighting the fact that 
she was married without his consent and that she was under the age of 21, 
Bertron attempted to use the legal definitions of age and consent to dissolve the 
marriage and reclaim what he had loss: the right to his daughter’s labor. 
 Bertron lost the case because of Juliann’s testimony, in which she 
described Bertron as a “drunk” who “frequently turned her out of doors with her 
mother,” forcing the two to regularly “sle[ep] in the stable.” Additionally, Bertron 
had on more than one occasion, “told [Juliann] to go about her business, and do 
for herself.”198 The court determined that “a father who turns his daughter out of 
his house… thereby relinquishes his paternal rights in relation to her person, 
absolves her from filial allegiance, and deprives himself of a right of action under 
the statue against marrying minors without consent of their parents.”199 The 
court’s verdict demonstrated a startling adjustability in legal definitions of consent 
and age but also a consistency in upholding marriages that had already taken 
place, regardless of their legality. They acknowledged that Juliann was under the 
legal age of consent, however, due to her circumstances. Because her father 
was inadequate as a guardian, they determined that she was independent 
enough to consent to a marriage.  
 Juliann’s court case represents how circumstantial legal definitions of age 
and consent could actually be as the court determined it was better to interpret 
the ability to consent, and legally act as an adult, on a situational basis than to 
																																																						






base consent strictly on chronological age. Juliann’s status as a neglected minor 
who was forced to be independent was more important than the fact that she was 
below the legal age of consent. This willingness to overlook chronological 
definitions of consent by the courts might suggest why so many young couples 
attempted to marry in the Gloria Dei church without parental approval. If courts 
occasionally adapted their interpretation of legal definitions of consent and 
marriage, perhaps church officials would as well.  
Just as parents negotiated the maturity, culpability, and capability of their 
children in court cases as discussed above, young people wrote frequently about 
their perceptions of chronological age in their letters about courtship and 
marriage.200 Their words, just as much as their parents’ actions, reveal that 
determining the appropriate age at marriage was a complicated, personal 
decision. Regardless of the individual’s age, marriage represented the end of 
childhood and youth, the formal and permanent transition into one’s adulthood. 
And young people were intensely aware of this reality, causing some to delay 
marriage as long as possible to extend their stay in adolescence while others 
rushed to the altar to gain legal adulthood despite their youthful chronological 
ages.201 Clearly, the age at which one married was a personal choice, one which 
weighed the priority to get married or be legally tied to a particular individual 
against perceptions of life stage, maturity, and the opportunity to gain access to 
wealth or status.  
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As the first chapter showed, young people were often hyper-aware of age, 
both their own and others’. Many young women and men referenced their own 
age around sixteen and seventeen in their writings, the age in which they began 
to seriously engage in courtship and consider marriage.202 At the same time, the 
older a person who remained unmarried was, the more unsolicited advice they 
received regarding the subject. “You are growing older every day,” William Ball 
warned his twenty-one-year-old brother Isaac, “therefore get married as soon as 
You can.”203 Sixty-four-year-old Anne Lewis Hardeman offered similar advice and 
urged her niece Adelaide: “get married before you get old.” “Take my warning,” 
she continued, “here I am left without any resource-- &feel that I am a dreg to 
everybody.”204 Anne was perpetually single, having missed her chance to marry 
in her twenties. She knew that this reality resulted in her life-long dependent 
status upon her family, which she regretted. Anne feared the same would happen 
to Adelaide if she did not marry soon.  
Advanced age not only caused one to potentially “miss out” on marriage 
all across the country, it also apparently made those who did marry at an older 
age self-conscious. For example, in 1812, Mary Pearson lamented to her future 
husband that they were marrying on the “wrong side of 30.”205 Alta Californian 
Abel Stearns, who took a bride twenty-nine years his junior requested that their 
marriage banns not be published because he “wish[ed] to avoid the ridicule 
																																																						
202 See a fuller discussion of young people reflecting on the significance of their own ages in 
Chapter one. 
203 William Ball to Isaac Ball, 24 November 1806, Ball Family Papers.  
204 Anne Lewis Hardeman to Adelaide Stuart, 21 November 1867, John Bull Smith Dimitry 
Papers, 1848-1922, 1943, Duke.  
205 Mary Pearson to Ephraim Abbott, 25 October 1812, Ephraim Abbott Papers, American 




which might arise among the idle young because of the disparity in years, she 
being 14 years old and I being 40.”206 Stearns was actually forty-three at the time 
of the marriage, which means he worked to not only obscure the age disparity in 
his marriage from the public, but also the truth of his own age. 207 This was 
Stearns’ first marriage and clearly he was insecure about his own age, but 
whether it was because of his bride’s youthfulness or because he was an “old” 
groom is unclear.208 Either way, Mary and Abel’s writings suggest that there was 
a stigma associated with advanced age and one’s first marriage. More 
importantly, this awareness seemed to transcend regional cultures and cause 
real anxiety for some individuals. 
Part of this anxiety over age and marriage was likely inspired by 
prescriptive advice literature targeted at young people. Harvey Newcomb’s A 
Young Lady’s Guide to the Harmonious Development of Christian Character, for 
example, advised young women that they should look for a husband “nearly of 
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[their] own age.”209 If her husband were too young, especially younger than 
herself, she would be “tempted to look upon him as an inferior.” Similarly, 
according to Newcomb, a marriage between a young woman and an elderly 
husband was “improper” and “contravene[ed] the order of nature.”210 “The idea of 
marrying a man advanced in years,” he wrote, “[sh]ould be sufficiently revolting to 
the feelings of a young female to deter her from it.” Specifically, because if her 
husband were too old, she would find herself having to act as “a daughter and 
nurse” rather “than a wife.”211 Newcomb’s advice, then, suggests that the age of 
one’s spouse was like porridge; it needed to be just right. Furthermore, as this 
advice literature instructed young people on what age their spouses should be, it 
sent a message that their own age at marriage mattered, too, as others were 
using it to gauge their suitability as a partner.  
Timothy Titcomb’s Titcomb’s Letters to Young People, Single and Married 
differed from Newcomb’s advice in that he was more concerned with individuals 
marrying too young. Titcomb stressed the importance of self-awareness, or 
“knowing oneself” before selecting a spouse. He provided chronological ages as 
rough markers of when a young man or woman would most likely achieve the 
level of maturity necessary to ensure a successful marriage, interestingly, both 
above the age of legal consent. He advised young women that below the age of 
twenty she should “have nothing to do with beaux, nothing to do with thoughts of 
and calculations for marriage, nothing to do but to become, in the noblest way, a 
																																																						
209 Harvey Newcomb, A Young Lady’s Guide to the Harmonious Development of Christian 
Character (Boston: James B Dow, 1841), 301.  
210 Newcomb, 301-302. 




woman.”212 Young men needed to wait even longer as “before a man is twenty-
five years old he does not know what he wants himself.”213 Without the level of 
maturity Titcomb prescribed, young people might marry for the wrong reasons 
and find themselves trapped in an unhappy marriage. This was particularly true 
for men who, Titcomb asserted, continued to “grow and mature” in ways after 
marriage that women did not due to a wife’s preoccupation with “family cares.”214 
“In ten years from the date of his marriage,” Titcomb explained, a young man 
“becomes, in reality, a new man. Now, if he was foolish as to marry a woman 
because she had a pretty form and face, or sweet eyes, or an amiable 
disposition, or a pleasant temper, or wealth, he will find that he has passed 
entirely by his wife, and that she is really no more of a companion for him than a 
child would be."215  
Anxiety over one’s advancing age and decreased marriageability was not 
unfounded as young people did regularly express a cultural bias against older 
men and women. For example, in 1857, Susan McDowall expressed disgust that 
an “old bachelor of 36” would visit herself, “a girl of sixteen” while twenty-nine-
year-old Mary Starnes was similarly offended when an “old widower 60 years old” 
attempted to court her.216 But young people did not only write about their own 
experiences of being courted by “old” men, they also commented on others’ 
experiences. The letters of Laura Henrietta Wirt, the out-spoken and 
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cosmopolitan young woman active in the elite social circles of early-nineteenth-
century Washington D.C. discussed in chapter one, are filled with line after line 
about her unique perspective on age, courtship, and marriageability. Laura’s 
letters offer an opportunity for a small scale, intensive study of how one young 
woman interpreted and internalized the significance of age at marriage. 
In an 1823 letter to her close friend Louisa Cabell, Laura discussed 
Catherine Bacoamin, an individual who had begun to age out of youth culture 
and potentially the marriage market.217 Laura described Catherine as her “best 
friend” and then explained that “altho she is twenty-seven, that does not 
depreciate her the least in my eyes. I should never have supposed she was more 
than twenty, unless she had told me herself.”218 A few months later, Laura wrote 
again about a “Miss Goodwin” who was “a fine, intelligent, accomplished 
woman.” “She is still young,” Laura explained, “and attractive enough to eclipse 
all the competitors she would find in Baltimore. She cannot be more than twenty-
six or twenty-seven I should think, and does not look older than twenty-three.”219 
By specifying that Catherine and Miss Goodwin were in their later twenties, Laura 
suggested that they were growing too old for youthful circles, and, more 
importantly, the prospect for an advantageous marriage. But in both cases she 
also explained that these women appeared to be in their early twenties, 
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suggesting some flexibility based on perception and appearance in determining 
youthfulness and, consequently, marriageability. 
 Laura's letters also reveal an awareness of the other end of the spectrum, 
individuals who were perhaps too young to marry. Although it was generally 
expected that most people would officially enter youth culture and could entertain 
the prospect of marriage around the age of eighteen, this did not mean that all 
were ready for marriage and the status of adulthood that came along with it. For 
example, in August of 1823, Laura wrote a letter to Louisa from St Petersburg in 
which she explained that she had the “honor of dancing with the richest man (or 
rather, Boy, for he is only eighteen).”220 By specifying that her dance partner 
should really be considered a “boy” despite his wealth and status, Laura 
suggested to Louisa that eighteen was too young to be considered an eligible 
marriage partner. Two months later, Laura wrote more explicitly the ways that 
age affected marriageability in her discussion of young man named Christopher 
Greenup. “He is a charming fellow and I love him with all my heart,” she wrote, 
“but really, if he were four or five years older and established in his profession, I 
believe I should love him in good earnest.”221 It is unclear how old Christopher 
was at the time she wrote about him, but for twenty-year-old Laura, he was too 
young and not well enough established to be considered an appealing suitor.  
 Laura expressed a similar judgment about the relationship of chronological 
age, social belonging, and marriageability when she wrote to Louisa in 1824 
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about Cora Livingston, an eighteen-year-old “belle.”222 Laura explained to Louisa 
that Cora was well educated, “fashionable,” and her “manners [were] elegant and 
highly polished.”223 By identifying Cora's positive traits, Laura communicated to 
Louisa that Cora belonged in the same social circles and youth culture as 
themselves. These same positive attributes that secured Cora a place in youth 
culture would have also made her an ideal prospective wife for any elite Southern 
gentlemen. Yet Cora's maturity was questionable: Cora's “character,” Laura 
explained, was “the most simple and naïve possible.” Cora was also “distrustful 
of herself and look[ed] continually to her mother for support.”224 A similar 
example of linking age and experience in determining marriageability can be 
seen in 1853 when Alice Winston Cabell gossiped to her cousin about an 
acquaintance. “It was reported that Nannie Read was to be married soon,” she 
wrote, “but I have heard nothing of it lately, she is very young and has been very 
little into company as yet so I hardly expect it so.”225  
 Although Cora was eighteen, old enough to participate in “society” and 
legally be married, Laura's comments (and Alice's) demonstrate that young 
people believed that chronological age often indicated one’s maturity and in turn 
their marriageability. Laura reiterated this idea about the relationship between 
maturity and the progression of chronological age in July of 1820 and again in an 
undated letter. A young woman named “E[liza].C.” and Louisa's “cousin Ed” were 
engaged to be married but broke off the courtship rather quickly. “I cannot blame 
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Eliza,” Laura explained, “I believe she was too young and inexperienced to know 
her own feelings.”226 Laura's description of Eliza as “too young” and 
“inexperienced” were meant to justify the “young girl's” inability to go through with 
a marriage. Expressing a similar sentiment in an undated letter, Laura wrote: 
“Two years... make a great difference in the maturity of a young girl's judgement 
[sic].”227 Clearly Laura had a sophisticated sense of age consciousness that 
informed her opinions on the appropriateness of marriage for certain individuals.  
Finally, Laura, and young people like her, often expressed distaste for 
large differences in age between spouses, indicating that Abel Stearns was right 
to worry that “idle young” might gossip about the age difference between himself 
and his bride. Sometimes letters writers were specific and listed the age 
difference of couples while other times they were vague and referenced the 
difference of life stage between spouses.228 For example, in 1823, Laura wrote 
about “Ct. Biroldingen” who “brought back a wife who is at least twenty years 
younger then himself, if not thirty. Prodigious!” she exclaimed. She also wrote 
about a young woman named “Zeniede” and “that old (forty seven!) husband of 
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hers.”229 Twenty-one-year-old Georgian Maria Bryan wrote to her sister in 1829, 
describing their twenty-nine year old cousin's wife as “a young childish creature 
of sixteen.”230 Twenty-year-old Elizabeth Ruffin, however was more general 
about her disapproval. In 1827 while on a visit to Saratoga Springs, Elizabeth 
noted with disgust in her diary that she had interacted with “some of the oddest 
and most ill-matched couples; young husbands groaning under the galling rein of 
an old wife... young wives [who attempted to] mak[e] their old husbands look 
suitable and young.”231 In each of these letters, writers highlighted age disparities 
as one way of expressing their criticisms of the marriages. 
The increased awareness of marriage consent statutes as well as how 
these laws defined capability and maturity by age likely prompted the negative 
attention and disapproval of large age disparities we see in advice literature and 
personal papers. Yet young people still married spouses much older than 
themselves, usually because of the opportunities that marriage provided. As 
mentioned at the start of the chapter, marriage brought with it new 
responsibilities in life, especially a transition in one's legal status-- from child to 
adult. This caused some youth to use marriage as a vehicle to early adulthood. 
Stansbury v. Bertron, discussed earlier, was one clear example of a young 
person seeking out marriage to escape filial dependence. But marriage was also 
viewed by both parents and young people as an achievement. Finding the right 
spouse could have significant consequences for not just the person getting 
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married but their entire family as well. Consequently, a spouse’s age, although 
an important factor, was only one among many that individuals had to consider 
when choosing a husband or wife.  
Many young women, and a few young men, articulated their 
understanding of how marriage would transform their lives. For example, Eleanor 
Parke Custis's discussion of her own marriage reiterated this theme of a 
reorientation of identity from “young person” to “adult.” Nelly highlighted the 
identities that would come from her marriage, she would transform into a “wife” 
and “mistress” of her own home. “Cupid... took me by surprise” she explained, ... 
I had made the sage and prudent resolve of passing through life, as a prim 
starched Spinster [when Cupid] called in Lawrence Lewis to his aid.”232 Nelly 
explained that she resisted the romance for sometime before she “was obliged to 
submit & bind [herself] to become the old fashioned thing called a Wife.”233 She 
went on to add “you may expect a letter from Mrs Lawrence Lewis soon” and “I 
indulge the pleasing hope that I shall one day... have the happiness of seeing my 
Dear Betsy in a House of which I shall be the mistress.”234  
 Other youths, such as twenty-two-year old Thomas Jefferson Withers and 
seventeen-year-old Martha E. Foster, wrote more explicitly about the transition 
they would undergo after marriage, changing from children to adults regardless 
of chronological age. In 1826, Thomas lamented to a friend that marriage meant 
that “boyish trifles are to yield to the scenes of manhood.”235  Two decades later, 
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Martha wrote in her diary: “I am continually haunted with the idea of being 
married. To change from a girl to a woman.”236 She saw this transition as one-
directional; once she was married, she would “take a step which [could] never, 
never be recalled.”237 Of course a marriage could end in either divorce or 
widowhood, but their transitions from “child” to “adult” could never be undone. 
Although legally Martha was still a minor in the state of Alabama, because she 
was only seventeen, her statement that once married she would become a 
“woman” demonstrates that marriage status superseded chronological age in 
determining one's position as an adult or as a child. 
 In each of these discussions of marriage the writers expressed a 
hesitancy of leaving behind childhood, however, many young women sought out 
marriages as way of escaping their dependent status as a child. Lizzie Scott, the 
nineteen-year-old young woman who had confided in her diary about her 
eagerness to marry as a way to escape her parents' household and become a 
wife discussed in chapter one provides one such example.238 Lizzie knew that in 
order for herself to be taken seriously as an adult, her newly formed family of 
husband and wife would need to be financially independent. Consequently, Lizzie 
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agonized over her future husband’s ability to provide for the couple after 
marriage, causing her to delay the marriage twice before finally going through 
with it.239 “Will is poor,” she wrote, “Pa and Mother seem to have a great many 
fears that we will come to them, to be supported by them. But no, I would suffer 
in penury and want all my life before I implore their aid.”240 She reiterated this 
fear again on April 14th, 1852, confessing: “I have a thousand misgivings whether 
I should marry or not. Will is a new beginner in the Law and may not get practice 
and I must have something to live on... I will not be dependent on my parents. 
Never! Never!”241  
 Sarah Starnes offers an additional example of this strategy. In 1845, Mary 
informed her friend that her older sister Sarah was “tempted to accept” an offer of 
marriage to a widower with children because “she [was] tired of a life of 
dependence” and wanted to “get a home of her own.”242 (Both Mary and Sarah 
were orphaned and lived with their older brother William.) When a young woman 
married, her dependent status shifted from that of her guardian to her husband; 
to suggest that by marrying, Sarah would no longer be a dependent, Mary was 
saying that what Sarah wanted was to become an adult with “a home of her own” 
and no longer be a child. Sarah ultimately turned down the proposal because she 
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had “concluded six children [was] most too many to begin housekeeping with.”243 
The examples of Sarah Starnes and Lizzie Scott demonstrate how young 
women weighed the opportunity of becoming a wife, and in turn an “adult,” 
against the status of their potential husbands. In Sarah's case, the ability to 
become a wife and an adult could not justify becoming a stepmother to six 
children; however, in Lizzie's case, marriage, even with the prospect of poverty, 
was more attractive then remaining a dependent in her parents' household. Lizzie 
became so motivated to leave her parent's household that she began to 
brainstorm ways she might contribute so that she could ensure the marriage's 
financial success, listing things she could sell as well as where she might teach 
school to ensure additional income.244 Lizzie was aware of the seriousness in 
marrying Will and by thinking through back up plans if Will were not able to 
provide for their family, she was being thorough in her decision making. Lizzie’s 
back and forth during the engagement demonstrates that youth understood the 
consequences of their actions in moving forward with a marriage, especially one 
without parental consent.  
Widowerhood was another status that was often discussed in tandem with 
age. Some young women saw the advantage of marrying a widower with wealth, 
regardless of age difference, because it meant they could become a wife and an 
adult. In 1815, Martha Brandon Osgood Genet articulated this sentiment to her 
nineteen-year-old sister, Susan Osgood: "My love to aunty W + tell her I do not 
join with her in advising the girls not to get married, for I advise them just the 
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contrary-- to get married as soon as possible, even if it is to a widower with five 
children."245 Martha had followed her own advice, marrying a widower twenty-four 
years older than herself.246 Between Martha's words and actions, it is clear that 
she was willing to accept her husband's older age and status as a widower 
because obtaining the status of wife was of first priority to her, especially given 
that she was nearing thirty.  
 Mary Baker's 1859 letter to her friend Mary E. Compton further illustrates 
the benefits of marrying a widower and highlights the negotiation of statuses, 
including age, in determining one's marriageability. “I have picked out such a nice 
beaux for you when you visit me, he is a widower with four little boys,” Mary 
Baker wrote, “but do not think from this he is very old for he is only thirty four or 
five.”247 According to Mary Baker, he was “very handsome... he has a beautiful 
residence ten miles from St Louis and is considered well off.” She continued, 
“excuse me for recommending a widow to you but widowers... take better for they 
have wealth.”248 A similar listing of statuses can be seen in Anne Addison Carr 
Conrad's letter to her sister-in-law in 1841, relaying news of a marriage between 
Roberta E Young and “Genl. [Albert Gallatin] Brown.” Conrad described the 
twenty-eight-year old Brown as a “member of Congress from Mississippi, [a] 
young widower without children, handsome, rich, and clever.”249 
 Both Baker and Conrad's letters highlight the significance of age and 
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status in designating someone as an appropriate suitor. Furthermore, both 
widowers’ numerous statuses show the nuanced judgments young people made 
in determining marriageability. Mary Baker, for example, began her introduction 
of the widower by indicating his single status, his status as a father, and then his 
chronological age. Next, she commented on his appearance, his wealth, and 
then lastly, reiterated his wealth. The significance of the ordering of his statuses 
tells us about what Mary Baker, and perhaps young women like her, prioritized in 
looking for a husband. Age was clearly important to her, and presumably Mary 
Compton, since she knew to specify that despite his status of a widower and a 
father of four, he was not “very old” as one might assume.  
 For Mary Baker and Mary Compton, mid-thirties evidently was an 
appropriate age to still socialize and possibly court young women active in youth 
culture even though for young women, such as Susan McDowall discussed 
earlier, it was much too old. Mary Starnes, repulsed by the “old widower,” went 
on to marry a different widower with several children, one only two years older 
then herself, further demonstrating the negotiation that went on over statuses 
and age in determining marriageability. Women did not always find the status of 
widower and father appealing in a prospective mate; however, young women 
could overlook these statuses so long as the prospective suitor was still relatively 
“young” and wealthy.  
 Although less common, ambitious young men also strategically pursued 
marriages with widowed women. New Orleanian teenager Charley Bradbury 




news of Charley’s engagement to “a widow—with 2 Children,” Mary Anne Taylor 
Hamilton.250 Cornelius disapproved of Charley’s age and motivation for the 
marriage, writing angrily, “I am really astonished, not however at your folly & 
madness, but that a woman… sanctioned any advances from You, (a lad in your 
teens).”251 Cornelius continued:  
“A widow too, said to be rich, true, but what signifies that to you, I know 
that with you, that is the moving string, the ground attraction. What 
signifies her fortune to you, do you suppose that her money is to be at 
your control? No Sir if she has any, she will understand your motive & 
your rations in the article you will find very soon meeted out to you. 
Suppose she dies, where is her fortune? Not at your Controul I 
guarantee—and where is our gentleman then? A Widower—a poor 
Gentleman—a poor Widower—out of business, out of funds—out of 
employment—out of habits of business & out upon the World… Marry 
and your fate is seal’d. You never rise in the World if at this time & under 
the circumstances. There is time for all things. Think of this.”252  
 
To be clear, Cornelius was not concerned with Charley’s strategy of using 
marriage as a means of benefiting himself financially. Rather, he thought that 
Charley was too young and inexperienced to do it well. Cornelius delivered a final 
insult to Charley via his wife, Sarah, “she had not thought you among all the 
Bradburys were one who would be willing to place your dependence for daily 
support upon a woman.”253 This statement gets at the heart of Cornelius’s 
problem with the marriage. Because Charley had yet to establish himself 
financially as an independent man, he would be dependent upon his wife’s 
money to do so, undermining his status within the community as well as his 
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position of authority within the marriage.  
For Charley, the marriage was a clearly strategic decision. Consequently, 
despite Cornelius’ warnings, Charley went through with the marriage on February 
12th, 1837. As his brother guessed, love was not what drove Charley down the 
aisle.254 Circumstantial evidence suggests that Mary Ann was a “chronic invalid” 
and Charley expected her to die young, or, at the very least, be incapable of 
making financial decisions with her late husband’s money.255 Additionally, 
Charley had a long-term mistress, Madeline Selima Edwards, who wrote 
regularly to him and “raised the possibility of [Mary Ann’s] early death several 
times.”256 In the end, Charley’s strategy worked and he lived out the majority of 
his life economically secure and free to spend his wife’s money as he pleased.   
Single youth were not the only ones to actively negotiate for their beliefs 
regarding age at marriage; parents also regularly considered chronological age 
as an important factor in the marriageability of their children. Sometimes parents 
supported youthful marriages if they were between equally matched youths. 
Other parents had more fixed expectations of when their children would marry 
and were unwilling to negotiate. Because perceptions of age and marriageability 
were deeply personal, parents disagreed regularly over their expectations-- with 
their children, with other parents, and with the courts. Like the court cases 
mentioned previously, letters written among parents pursuing or rebuffing their 
children’s marriage prospects demonstrate that parents, like young people, 
regarded age as only one among many factors to consider when deciding to 
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consent to their children’s marriages or not.  
Historians have argued that in the Early Republic, young men typically 
married at increasingly later ages because of the need to advance themselves 
professionally before starting families. For elite men, wealth made marriage 
available whenever their parents deemed it appropriate. For example, in 1813 
Thomas Massie composed a letter to James Steptoe, the father of his future 
daughter-in-law Sally, explaining that his son William was not to “marry before he 
arrived at twenty-one.” However, because Massie “believe[d William] was to be 
sincerely enamored with [Steptoe's] daughter,” Thomas would “establish” William 
immediately in order to secure the marriage.257 William and Sally married shortly 
after Thomas Massie’s letter, when William was eighteen and Sally was fourteen. 
 Thomas Massie's letter demonstrates that despite growing efforts to 
legally restrict youthful marriages, economic status could still supersede 
chronological age in determining one's marriageability and access to marriage.258 
It also shows that some parents were willing to overlook their own feelings about 
age and marriage if it meant making an advantageous match for their children. 
This was the case with the Hughes Family; Amanda M. Hughes wrote to her 
fifteen-year-old daughter Mary Hughes in 1857 about Mary's sister Ellen. Ellen 
was seventeen and had recently married twenty-four-year-old widower and 
father, Andrew J. Allensworth. “Ellen left yesterday to go housekeeping,” their 
mother wrote, and although she hoped for Ellen's “happiness,” she felt “much 
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anxiety about” Ellen leaving home. “[S]he is so young, so child like,” she 
explained; yet despite the concern over Ellen's age and maturity, their mother 
continued “I think it will be the best for her.”259   
 Like Thomas Massie, Alice Izard wanted her daughter, Georgina, to wait 
until she turned seventeen before marrying forty-year-old Joseph Allen Smith but 
ultimately she agreed to an earlier marriage because of the opportunity she 
perceived it to be. Alice first reported the engagement on March 5th, 1809 to her 
son, Ralph. “I have given my consent to their union,” she wrote, “the difference of 
age is great, & as I told him yesterday, he must be a father, as well as a Husband 
to her. His answer was yes, he would study to be everything that could conduce 
to her happiness.”260 The fact that Alice acknowledged both the age disparity and 
the difference in levels of maturity indicated by the need for Joseph to act as a 
parent to Georgina, demonstrates that parents also viewed age as one of many 
statuses to consider in marriage prospects. The reason Alice agreed to a 
speedier marriage likely had to do with an accident, a nasty fall from a horse that 
crippled Georgina’s health. Alice explained to Ralph that Joseph “was devotedly 
attached” to Georgina and given the uncertainty of Georgina’s future health (and 
in turn marriage prospects), Alice may have been motivated speed up the 
wedding up to capitalize on this devotion before Joseph reconsidered.  
 Other parents were less flexible in their opinions about age and marriage, 
revealing highly individual interpretations of appropriate age for marriage. 
Lorenzo Lewis, for example, was set to inherit his family’s estate when he turned 
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twenty-three.261 Lorenzo would legally become an adult once he turned twenty-
one, however, the Lewises believed the extra two years would allow Lorenzo to 
finish his education and became mature enough to run the estate. According to 
his mother, Eleanor Parke Custis Lewis, by the age of twenty Lorenzo was “so 
susceptible... [to] continually falling in love with someone” that his parents were 
forced to intervene.262 She explained to a close family friend: “at 17 1/2 he was 
actually engaged to be married.” Even more concerning was that “the damsel 
[was] 3 years older & resolved to marry him.” Instead of letting him make the 
mistake of marrying at too young an age, Nelly explained that they “sent him to 
N[ew] E[ngland]-- & when he reflected how painful it was to us, he wrote to her & 
they released each other.”263 Although the Lewises were in a position to settle 
their son before he reached twenty-three, they chose not to. His mother implied it 
was because Lorenzo was too young in their eyes, but it may also have been 
because they disagreed with the match. Regardless, they expressed a need for 
Lorenzo to become more mature before he married, which would take time, 
experience, and a full education. 
 Because most viewed marriage as their “destiny,” young people and their 
parents had to make decisions about what statuses were most important to them 
in finding a spouse.264 Age was always a central concern in determining 
marriageability, but other factors including personal maturity, wealth or the ability 
to provide, and the status of widow or widower and parent were equally 
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important. By incorporating informal discussions of age and marriageability that 
took place on the communal level into wider understandings of legal definitions of 
consent and culpability, it becomes clear that Early Republican perceptions of 
appropriate age at marriage were constantly negotiated and determined on an 
individual and familial basis.  
 
Consistent references to chronological or conceptual age in relation to the 
rejection, formation, or dissolution of a marriage show that legal definitions of 
consent did not always align with social perceptions of one’s marriageability. 
Legally, young people could not consent to marriages before the age of eighteen 
or twenty-one, and historians have attributed these changes in legal definitions of 
consent to the rise in marriage age over the early nineteenth century. Age at 
marriage could be problematic because a person was too young, but it could be 
equally problematic because a person was too old. Age in relation to 
marriageability could also be overlooked when a variety of other statuses 
including class, family relationships, economic resources, religion, age 
disparities, etc., were factored into one’s circumstances. This was not only true 
within communities, as seen in letters and diaries with passages about marriage 
and courtship, but also on the state and institutional levels, as seen in the Gloria 
Dei church records and court cases discussed earlier in the chapter.  
Recent studies on marriage and age have established that an important 
shift occurred after the Revolution in which chronological age became 




culturally. One final court case illustrates this point most effectively. In 1836, 
Frances Nixon married Robert Wood without her guardian’s consent. Two years 
later, Robert sued Frances’ guardian on her behalf, arguing that because they 
had been “lawfully intermarried,” the guardian was required to “deliver… all the 
goods, effects, and property, belonging to [Frances],” which he had yet to do.265 
Frances’ guardian argued that because “at the time of the intermarriage, the said 
appellants were minors and still are such,” they legally required a guardian to 
manage their estate. However, according to statue, “the powers and duties of… 
guardian[s], over the person and estate of the ward shall cease… at the age of 
21, or be lawfully married.” Consequently, the court ruled in favor of Frances and 
Robert; although by definition of law both were still minors, their married status 
superseded their chronological ages, transforming them both into legal adults 
deemed capable of managing their own estate. 
By looking at institutional and state records as well as informal sources 
like letters and diaries, it becomes clear that conceptions of age, status, consent, 
capability, and marriageability were continually negotiated and redefined to serve 
different circumstances. Whether it was a thirty-year-old man hesitant to marry 
his twenty-four-year old bride without her parent’s consent, a minor who married 
to escape her drunken father, or a person who was perceived to have aged out 
of marriage prospects, these examples demonstrate how fluid conceptions of age 
remained and how unrepresentative legal definitions of consent were of social 
understandings about marriageability. Wood and Wife v. Henderson represents 
an excellent transitional point as it illustrates how legal definitions of age, 
																																																						




dependence, and the need for a guardian intersected with an ability to consent to 
marriage. If one was deemed capable of consent, then that same person was 
capable of legal adulthood and no longer needed a guardian; consequently, 
guardianship arrangements, the subject of the next chapter, could be challenged 
























“Forget what age and law have entitled me”:  
Guardians, Wards, and Age  
 
Shortly after her twenty-first birthday, Elizabeth Ruffin lamented to her 
brother and legal guardian, Edmund Ruffin: “This legal independence—what a 
mistaken notion is entertained of it: what an undesirable possession it is in my 
opinion.”266 In a second, undated letter, she broached the subject again: “if you 
would just forget what age and law have entitled me and act precisely as my 
guardian still… I should deem it a peculiar favor.”267 Elizabeth’s request 
demonstrates that she-- like the young couples who asserted their right to 
consent to marriage in the accounts of Reverend Collin discussed in the previous 
chapter-- was both aware of and challenged the laws that defined the age of 
dependence and capability as twenty-one.268 Furthermore, Elizabeth’s assertion 
that she felt the age of twenty-one was too young to be independent and without 
a guardian illustrates the disjuncture that could exist between cultural and legal 
expectations of age and dependency in the Early Republic.  
The cultural and legal relationship between guardian and ward in the first 
half of the nineteenth century has been left largely unexplored by historians. 
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Scholars have established the legal parameters of guardianship relationships 
prior to the Revolution and how these relationships changed to become more 
uniform (and modern) by the end of the nineteenth century, but little has been 
written about the period in between.269 Although the law of guardianship was 
becoming more uniform during the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
requirements and expectations of formal guardians varied significantly from state 
to state. Much of the variation had to do with the fact that American law was 
derived from English common law, which was “locally variable in nature.”270 Such 
legal variation allowed for each state (initially colony) to shape their laws to 
bolster the economic, social, and demographic qualities unique to their 
location.271 But by ignoring the significance of guardianship relationships from 
both a legal and a cultural perspective, much is lost in understanding how age, 
dependence, and capability were mutually constructed within the individual 
circumstances in the Early Republic.272 
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understanding how English definitions of guardianship evolved over the course of the 
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Holly Brewer, By Birth or Consent: Children, Law, and the Anglo-American Revolution in 
Authority (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), specifically Chapter 7 
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Chronological age linked to perceptions of maturity and life stage operated 
as a baseline for guardianships; however, as was the case with marriage, other 
factors and statuses could and often did mitigate age as an absolute boundary. 
American laws of guardianship, like the English customs that proceeded them, 
had focused on the protection of personal or real property; Early Republican 
statutes mirrored those traditions. However, debates surrounding the connection 
between intellectual capacity and chronological age gave birth to new ideas 
about childhood. Reformers argued that children needed to be morally guided 
and protected during this influential stage in life in order to ensure they would 
become virtuous adults.273 Although statutes remained concerned with the 
economic conditions of guardianship, these new cultural concerns of childhood 
infiltrated the court system and represent the start of the shift toward modern 
notions of guardian-ward relationships that appear at the end of the nineteenth 
century.  
This chapter begins with a survey of legal treatises and law dictionaries 
published in the United States at the start of the nineteenth century. American 
concepts of guardianship in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were 
derived from English legal practices but, as American legal scholars were eager 
to point out, differed in significant ways.274 The chapter then shifts to a discussion 
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274 The English Law of 1660 set into motion an increasingly well-defined understanding of 
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of court cases to explore how American lawyers actively debated guardianship-
ward relationships. More specifically, this chapter looks at cases that appeared in 
the state Supreme Courts of Delaware, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, 
Washington DC, and Maryland between 1775 and 1860.275 The vast majority of 
these cases dealt with financial settlement disagreements between ward and 
guardian; however, a number of cases considered and discussed the 
reassignment of guardians, issues of consent, and the culpability of wards. The 
fact that guardianship cases appeared with relative frequency at the state 
Supreme Court level demonstrates how seriously guardianship responsibilities 
were taken. 
Guardians and wards sorted out their differences within the court system; 
however, they also attempted to reason with one another through less public 
																																																																																																																																																																	
welfare of the child. According to Holly Brewer, the Law of 1660 “marked a pivotal transition in 
legal norms about guardianship and custody.” The Law established “the father’s right to 
designate a guardian for all of his children until age twenty-one, extended the institution of 
guardianship to cover most fatherless children, lengthened the span during which most 
guardianships lasted, gave fathers more power, and set a more uniform principle of custody.” 
(Brewer, 250) By the mid-eighteenth-century, the American colonies began following English 
precedent of guardianships being appointed by fathers and lasting until twenty-one, but 
children with guardians were mostly still heirs. (Brewer, 254-255) According to Brewer, 
guardians, unlike parents and masters, had less control of their child wards. Guardians were 
required to post a bond for the management of the ward’s estate and special orphan courts 
supervised the physical, financial, and emotional treatment of their wards. Masters had the 
most control over their wards, like parents they were able to legally “chastise” children for bad 
behavior. Furthermore, once children reached the age of fourteen, they could leave a parent 
or guardian and choose new ones, children could not however chose to leave a master until 
the term of their contract was up. Given that most elite orphans had guardians and most poor 
orphans had masters, we can see how custody arrangements and the ability of minors to 
assert their independence were subject to class inequalities. (Brewer, 258-260) For more 
information on the history of Anglo guardianship practices see Holly Brewer, By Birth or 
Consent—Chapter 7. Justices of the peace usually bound out orphan children who were not 
heirs until they reached the age of eighteen or twenty-one; more children were given masters 
than guardians. For more information on poor orphan children and master relationships see 
Ruth Wallis Herndon and John E. Murray, Children Bound to Labor: the Pauper Apprentice 
System in Early America (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009).  
275 Based on my total calculations about 2,166 cases exist that mention guardianship in some 
respect between 1775 and 1860; Delaware had 128, Pennsylvania had 804, Virginia had 351, 




means. This chapter concludes with a discussion of personal letters and diaries 
written in the Early Republican period regarding guardianships to see how young 
people attempted to informally redefine or renegotiate their dependent 
relationships despite age-based legal restrictions. These relationships were not 
always positive, and the historical record is full of the sometimes complicated, 
sometimes unorthodox arrangements that existed between guardians and their 
wards. As Elizabeth’s request that her brother continue acting as her guardian 
demonstrates, chronological age, legal status, and personal expectations of 
dependence were continually negotiated in the early nineteenth century on a 
case-by-case basis, especially in regards to guardianship-ward relationships.  
 
The work of John Bouvier and Tapping Reeve regarding American 
guardianship law are two of the earliest examples of legal commentary on the 
American law of descents and their works reveal much about precedents and 
deviations from English legal practices.276 According to Reeve’s 1825 A Legal 
Treatise on the Law of Descents in the Several United States of America, 
American practices quickly evolved from their aristocratic English antecedents: 
“having rejected the English law of descents,” Reeve explained, “each state 
passed laws to regulate the descent of real property for itself; all of them differing 
greatly from this branch of the common law of England, and each state differing 
from the others.”277 Inheritance practices were naturally linked to cases of 
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guardianship and the lack of uniformity in legal practices regarding laws of 
descents that Bouvier and Reeve explained a similar lack of uniformity in legal 
constructions of guardianship-ward relationships in the United States during the 
same time period.  
The biggest discrepancies between English and American laws of 
guardianship were derived from these differences of inheritance practices and 
more specifically who was considered an “heir.” For example, according to John 
Bouvier’s legal dictionary, A Law Dictionary Adapted to the Constitution and 
Laws of the United States of America, there were hypothetically five types of 
guardian in nineteenth-century America: “guardians by nature; guardians by 
nurture; guardians in socage; testamentary guardians; and guardians ad litem.” 
Testamentary guardians and guardians ad litem were appointed by the court 
system; testamentary guardianships “extended to the person, and real and 
personal estate of the child” while guardians ad litem were appointed to defend 
“infants… with action[s] brought against [them].”278  
Guardians in socage, nature, and nurture were concepts derived from 
English law, but as Bouvier pointed out, guardianship in socage never took root 
in America. Consequently, these types of guardianship became either obsolete, 
or their definitions were changed to suit American practices. In English law, the 
“guardian in socage is the guardian of the person of the ward, as well as of his 
estate,” however, a “guardianship in socage can scarcely exist in any part of the 
																																																																																																																																																																	
(New York: Collins & Hannay, 1825), ii.  
278 John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of 
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United States; for it is a necessary qualification, that the person entitled should 
not be able, by possibility, to inherit the estate.”279 Bouvier elaborated on this by 
stating “this species of guardianship has become obsolete, and does not exist in 
this country; for the guardian must be a relation by blood who cannot possibly 
inherit, and such a case can rarely exist.”280 The initial purpose of this type of 
guardianship in England was to protect the ward and his inheritance (which could 
include a royal title) by avoiding a conflict of interest. More plainly put, if the 
guardian could never inherit the ward’s estate or standing, the guardian would 
not have an incentive to “disappear” the ward. With no invested interest in what 
happened to the ward, it was assumed the guardian would do what was in the 
best interest in the ward’s person and inheritance.  
Guardians by nature and nurture were two types of guardianship that 
“extended only to the person.” In England, “only the heir apparent, and not the 
other children; not even the daughters, when there [were] no sons” were given 
guardians by nature.281 Conversely, all other “younger children; not the heir” were 
given a guardian “by nurture.” According to Reeve, guardianship by “nature 
extends only to the heir. It follows… that in the United States, it must extend to all 
the children; for they are all heirs. What the eldest son is in England, all the 
children are here.” Consequently, “there can be no room for… [a guardianship by 
nurture] in our country; for all children are heirs, and subjects of the guardian by 
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nature.”282 Bouvier reiterated this idea by explaining that in the United States, 
guardians “by nurture” had “become obsolete.”283  
In addition to highlighting differences between types of guardianships in 
English and American law, Reeve and Bouvier tell us much about the ideal 
relationship that would exist between guardian and ward in the Early Republican 
period. More specifically, both authors help clarify for modern readers what made 
someone fit to be a guardian.284 According to Bouvier, guardianship was defined 
as “the power or protective authority given by law, and imposed on an individual 
who is free and in the enjoyment of his rights, but which his weakness on 
account of his age, renders him unable to protect himself.”285 Guardians were 
“divided into guardians of the person… and guardians of the estate” and they 
were to “perform the duties imposed upon him by his office.”286 Guardians were 
to be “capable,” and therefore an “idiot [could not] be appointed guardian.”287  
Additionally, guardians were to “stand in the place of the father,” with the 
relationship between guardian and ward mimicking that of “parent and child.” 
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Brewer, By Birth or Consent and Grossberg, Governing the Hearth. 
285 Bouvier, Volume 1, 453. Conversely, a ward was defined as “an infant placed by authority of 
law under the care of a guardian… while under [this] care… the ward [was] under the 
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put, guardians were to protect “infants,” or generally those under the age of twenty-one years, 
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286 Bouvier, Volume 1, 452. A guardian of the person was one who had been “lawfully invested 
with the care of the person of an infant whose father [was] dead,” and a guardian of the estate 
was one who had been “lawfully invested with the power of taking care and managing the 
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287 Bouvier, Volume 1, 452. According to Bouvier, an “idiot” is defined as “a person who has 
been without understanding from his nativity, and whom the law presumes never likely to 




Consequently, guardians could only be appointed to “an infant whose father” had 
died. Although a guardian should act as a father, he was not “entitled to the 
ward’s services” nor was he “bound to maintain him out of his own estate” as a 
father was.288 Reeve added to this definition by clarifying that guardians could be 
removed from their position “for any abuse of the ward, as well as for misconduct 
respecting his estate; also, when any event renders him incompetent to manage 
the concerns of the ward, as lunacy, gross intemperance, or other profligate 
immorality, or bankruptcy.”289 
Gender factored into early constructions of guardianship law via 
conceptions of dependence, capability, and chronological age. These gendered 
biases affected both the guardian and the ward. Due to their sex and marital 
status, adult women were limited in their ability to act as guardians, even for their 
own children. For example, according to Reeve, “if there are several [potential 
guardians], who are next of kin, both males and females, the males are entitled 
to the guardianship, in preference to the females.”290 Bouvier added that “when 
the father dies without leaving a testamentary guardian, at common law, the 
mother is entitled to be the guardian of the person and estate of the infant until 
he arrives at fourteen when he is able to choose a guardian.”291 While both 
Reeve and Bouvier made clear the gendered bias regarding choice of male over 
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female guardians, neither explained why this bias exists-- most likely because 
they felt the reasoning was self-evident.292  
The reason male guardians were preferred over female guardians was 
because of the legal identity of coverture women assumed once married. 
Moreover, culturally women were expected to marry or remarry after they were 
widowed.293 State statutes were more explicit about this point. In Virginia, for 
example, mothers could obtain guardianship of their children upon the father’s 
death “so long as she remain[ed] unmarried.”294 A like provision existed in the 
District of Columbia as well.295 When a female guardian married, she lost her 
legal independence and her identity became literally “covered” by that of her 
husband. To the courts, this dependent identity made a woman an unfit guardian 
and required a reassignment of guardianship for the ward. Female guardians, 
especially mothers, could request that their new husbands assume their 
guardianship roles; however, courts did not always grant these requests.296  
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Early Republican constructions of gender also influenced the opportunities 
and expectations of wards. For example, female wards had more opportunity to 
make life choices at younger ages than their brothers because of their assumed 
future position as wives.297 According to Bouvier, fourteen for boys and twelve for 
girls were considered to be “the age at which children… ha[d] discretion,” or the 
“ability to know and distinguish between good and evil, between what is lawful 
and what is unlawful.”298 In addition to “having discretion,” the law saw these 
ages as linked to puberty. Marriage was associated with the ability to reproduce 
and because girls entered puberty earlier than boys, it only made sense that they 
could agree to marriage sooner.299 Underlining this gendered distinction 
regarding age and capability as well as the assumption that females would marry 
quickly is the fact that Bouvier included in his dictionary a term “anni nubiles” 
which is defined as “the age a girl becomes by law fit for marriage, which is 
twelve.”300  No such term exists to describe the time in life in which a boy 
becomes “fit for marriage.” 
Once children reached twelve or fourteen, depending on their gender, they 
could be legally married with a parent’s or guardian’s consent.301 However, as 
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discussed in chapter two, the age of majority varied between states.302 For 
example, both North Carolina and Virginia law established that “every orphan, 
who hath no estate… shall by order of the court… be bound apprentice by the 
overseers of the poor, until the age of twenty-one years if a boy, or of eighteen 
years if a girl.”303 Interestingly, by allowing young women to legally consent to 
marriage earlier than boys, lawmakers were empowering themselves as 
husbands while at the same time limiting themselves as fathers. Essentially, the 
legal difference was meant to expand and facilitate the opportunity for adult 
males to gain access to land via marriage rather than provide opportunity to 
women.304  
Still, for women, marriage expanded their opportunities as wards. 
According to Reeve, “if a female ward marr[ies], the guardian’s power must 
cease,” especially if the female ward “marrie[s] an adult; for such husband has a 
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right to her person, with an uncontrollable right to her property.”305 If a female 
ward married a minor, her identity still became subsumed under his. However, if 
a male ward with an estate married, “marriage does not vary his situation. His 
guardian retains his usual power over his estate; and if he married a female 
ward, as her property has become his, his guardian’s power extends to that 
also.”306 In other words, marriage terminated a female’s need for a guardian, 
while it had no impact on a male’s guardianship arrangement.307  
Although many state statutes included provisions in their guardianship 
codes that terminated female guardianships after marriage, court cases that 
contested such terminations still occurred. In Pennsylvania, in particular, 
numerous suits arose after the passage of the “Act to Secure the Rights of 
Married Women” in 1848. The Act’s main goal was to protect married women’s 
property rights and it declared that all “property which may be owned by or 
belong to any single woman, shall continue to be the property of such woman, as 
fully after her marriage as before.”308 More importantly, the law specified that a 
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married woman had to willfully “consent” to transfer her property to her husband 
and it had to be proven that “such consent was not the result of coercion on the 
part of her said husband, but that the same was voluntarily given and of her own 
free will.”309  
The law created issues for the Pennsylvania courts regarding female 
wards’ ability to terminate guardianships upon marriage and to consent to the 
transfer of their property. An 1849 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, Appeal 
of Albert S. Cummings, provides an excellent example of how courts resolved 
such conflicts. Albert S. Cummings married his infant wife, Louisa, and argued 
that as a result of the marriage, “the relation of guardian and ward ha[d]… been 
dissolved and that he [was] entitled, in virtue of his marital rights, to assume the 
care and management of his wife’s property.”310 More importantly, he insisted 
that “Louisa [was] willing and desirous that he should take charge of her 
property… as [was] witnessed by her written consent.” The trial court rejected his 
claim on the grounds that Louisa was a minor and incapable of giving consent to 
transfer her property despite her change in marital status.  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed that judgment and it made 
clear that the statute was meant to keep married women’s property separate 
from their husband’s: “although the application is stated to be made with the 
appropriation and consent of his wife… it is very obvious her assent gives no 
additional validity to the claim, for, being a minor, she is incapable of giving 
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consent.”311 Consequently, the state Supreme Court held that the testamentary 
guardian should retain control of her estate “until she acquires by time a legal 
capacity to act for herself.” Perhaps most significant about their ruling was their 
declaration that because of the new Act, there was no longer a  “difference 
between male and female wards” who inherited property and married as minors: 
both required a guardian to maintain their estates until they reached the age of 
majority.312 
As can be seen in the Appeal of Albert S. Cummings, around the mid-
nineteenth century, states began to move toward a more uniform expectation of 
guardianship-ward relationships that disregarded gender. Part of the reasoning 
for these changes had to do with new republican definitions of family, childhood, 
and marriage.313 Marriages were meant to be more egalitarian and children were 
to be nurtured and sheltered from the outside world until they became adults. 
Although this was certainly not the case for all (or possibly even most) families, 
this rhetoric increasingly influenced first, court rulings and eventually, legal 
statute. Consequently, the rising concern for child welfare encouraged the later 
legal innovation that equalized guardianship-ward relationships between the 
genders.    
Early Republican state statutes fluctuated on how gender affected 
guardianship-ward relationships, however, when it came to defining guardianship 
responsibilities, they adhered rather closely to definitions of guardianship found 
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in legal dictionaries and legal treatises of the time. Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Washington DC, and Maryland early Republican statutes all defined 
guardianship responsibilities based on the need to protect the estates of their 
wards. North Carolina law explicitly defined guardianship in relation to the 
wellbeing of the ward. As early as 1773, North Carolina statutes allowed the 
courts to appoint a new guardian when original guardians were found to “abuse 
the Trust reposed in [them], by misusing the Child or Children so committed to 
[their] Tuition… in being about, or intending to marry such child or children in 
disparagement, neglecting the care of their Education suitable to their” social 
standing.314  
While North Carolina was the only state to include concern for the welfare 
of the ward in guardianship statutes, occasionally courts heard cases which 
attempted to reassign guardianships based on complaints of moral child 
endangerment or considerations for the ward’s emotional wellbeing. Two 
examples are David B Hitchin’s Case argued in the Orphan’s Court in Delaware 
and Nicholson’s Appeal ruled on by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Both 
illustrate how social expectations of guardianship could clash with legal 
definitions and, in turn, how malleable legal constructions of guardianship could 
be.315  
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In Delaware’s David B Hitchin’s Case, filed in 1819, a custody dispute 
developed between the surrogate parents of Hitchins and his uncle, Peter 
Hitchins. According to court testimony, David lost both of his parents when he 
was only a few weeks old. Presumably neighbors or friends of Hitchins’s parents, 
Charles Smith and his wife quickly took the baby in and acted as his parents. 
Smith attempted to secure guardianship of David because he “and his wife had 
formed a strong attachment to the child… and it [was] presumed the child was 
equally attached to them.”316 Because Smith could not secure the bond 
necessary to ensure his guardianship, David’s uncle, Peter Hitchins, challenged 
a lower court decision giving them custody of the child.317  
The uncle ultimately won the guardianship case but, as the court 
explained, “with the utmost reluctance by the court.” Legally, Peter was entitled to 
the guardianship as David’s uncle and he had the financial ability to secure the 
bond. However, the court knew that David, who was now four years old, had 
“from the time [he] was six or eight weeks old always lived with Smith,” and that 
reassigning guardianship might be emotionally damaging to the child. The 
Chancellor of the court concluded his ruling by stating, “he would not have 
removed Charles Smith from the guardianship, if the law had not obliged him.”318 
While the court ultimately followed the legal requirements for guardianship, it is 
																																																																																																																																																																	
moral status of the guardian” when approving or denying guardianship. J.G. Woerner, A 
Treatise on the American Law of Guardianship of Minors and Persons of Unsound Mind 
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.,1897), 105 and 113. 
316 David B Hitchin’s Case, 2 Del. Cas. 468, (1819). 
317 The lower court had awarded Smith custody in 1816 after he gave a guardian bond. 
However, it was quickly determined both his surety, Sovereiga Davis and himself were 
“insolvent and lacked sufficient security.” The court then requested that at the next Orphan 
Court meeting, Smith was to provide “other and better security” but Smith could not comply.     




evident that judges were reluctant to do so; demonstrating how social concerns 
linked to child welfare were creeping into legal negotiations of custody laws.  
A similar custody case concerning the emotional wellbeing of children and 
guardianship occurred in Pennsylvania in 1849 between a legally appointed 
guardian, Andrew Nicholson, and the biological family of his five wards. 
According to the wards’ maternal uncle, E.B. Ward, “two of the children were 
then in his family, he having assumed the expense and care of their maintenance 
and education. That one other of the children was residing with the guardian, and 
two others in the family of [another] uncle in Erie County.”319 Ward insisted that 
Nicholson should be relieved of guardianship duties because he “had not 
discharged his trust, as related to the mental and moral culture and the pecuniary 
interests of the children.” Additionally, “one female [ward], who resided with 
[Nicholson], was employed in domestic services unsuitable to her condition and 
tender age, and that her education was neglected; and that he had refused to 
allow her to receive clothing purchased by [Ward (the uncle)] for her use.” Ward, 
as well as the rest of the biological family, were concerned “knowing that the 
children were not enjoying the care and attention they ought to have” and so they 
pleaded with the court to reassign guardianship to Ward.320  
The trial judge removed Nicholson as guardian of two of the minors, 
illustrating how flexibly the law could be enacted. Interestingly, the two children 
he lost custody of were both females. State Supreme Court justices sided with 
the lower court, saying that although they did not believe Nicholson intentionally 
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harmed his wards, they felt that “he seem[ed] to have utterly misunderstood his 
duty.”321 Justices concluded: “it was surprising that he was not removed from the 
whole trust,” because although he may not have intentionally injured his wards, 
“it matters little to an orphan child whether his interests [were] sacrificed and his 
prospects blighted by well-meaning ignorance or by willful malice. Either is within 
the definition of misconduct, a word which applies not to the motive but to the 
act.”322 The fact that justices were concerned solely with the children’s day-to-day 
lives, such as access to proper education and family, demonstrates how newly 
forming cultural expectations of child welfare were increasingly creeping into 
court cases and undermining legal definitions of guardianship responsibility by 
the mid-nineteenth century.  
Together, the two cases demonstrate how cultural interpretations of 
emotional dependence and moral responsibility began to influence Early 
Republican legal thought. The rulings that came out of both courts acknowledged 
that the overall “well-being” of a child factored into a proper guardianship-ward 
relationship.323  This is significant because, legally, and despite the four decades 
separating these cases, guardianship responsibility in Delaware and 
Pennsylvania only mandated proper estate management on behalf of the ward. 
																																																						
321 The court also stated they were unsure why Nicholson rejected the biological family’s help, 
speculating that perhaps “his decision may have been caused by his reluctance to part with 
them, by a desire to retain their services, or by the mistaken opinion that a thorough education 
would injure them… either way he was wrong.” Appeal of Nicholson. 
322 Because of the nature of the appeal, the court could only uphold the lower courts decision, 
not reassign guardianship of the remaining three wards. 
323  Appeal of Eichelberger is an additional case that suggests judges and justices were 
considering the moral well-being of a ward when reassigning or assessing guardianship. In 
Pennsylvania in May of 1835, where the state Supreme Court ruled that John Smyser, 
guardian of George F. Eichelberger, endangered his ward by establishing the minor in the 
“business of a tavern-keeper.” According to the court, this was a “risk” to the ward because the 
profession required “habits of temperance to have been previously formed and established” 




Although David B Hitchins’ Case adhered to the law of guardianship-ward 
relationships by choosing the guardian who was most capable of managing the 
ward’s estate financially, the court’s reluctance to do so suggests changes were 
beginning to occur in basic definitions of child welfare. The ruling of Nicholson’s 
Appeal and cases like it, help explain how guardianship and custody law 
eventually changed by the end of the nineteenth century to place the child’s 
emotional well-being over that of their inheritance.  
The priority of the courts was to ensure that guardians protected the 
financial interests of their wards; however, they were also concerned with 
guardians fulfilling basic legal, social, economic, and moral duties. Consequently, 
there were two ways in which courts ensured that guardians were held 
accountable. The first required the guardian to have regular contact with the 
courts and provide records of a ward’s estate for review. State laws varied on 
how often guardians had to check in; for example in 1819, Virginia and 
Washington D.C. law required guardians to check in “once in every year” while 
Pennsylvania law dictated “once in three years.” 324 Nearly every state in the mid-
Atlantic region required guardians to have a “separate book” for keeping track of 
the ward’s estate. The purpose of these mandatory review of records was to 
ensure that guardians were not only successfully managing a ward’s wealth, but 
also spending the proper amount on the “maintenance and education of the 
orphan [with] regard being had to the future situation, prospects, and destination 
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of the ward.”325 If guardians were found to have “mismanaged” the estate or 
“neglect[ed] to educate or maintain” the ward, the courts could (and would) 
discharge them and assign a new guardian.326 
Occasionally, courts intervened too late as was indicated in the case of 
Hardy H. Boyett v. James R. Hurst, Adm’r. heard in the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina in 1854. The purpose of the trial was to force the guardian to provide a 
detailed report of why at the end of the guardianship, he claimed his ward owed 
him $500. The trial transcript also provides a look at how guardians sometimes 
failed their wards. In 1842, James K. Hill became the guardian for eighteen-year-
old Hardy H. Boyett, an illiterate young man who owned two tracts of land and 
between fifteen and twenty slaves. If his estate had been properly managed and 
his person properly cared for, Boyett should have come into his majority as an 
educated and wealthy young man. Instead, Hill allowed Boyett to do as he 
pleased, including manage his own inheritance, which ended in the loss of the 
estate. Moreover, Boyett got married and had two children during his infancy. 
Justices were outraged at Hill’s negligence and declared that “the purpose of the 
law in requiring guardians to be appointed, has failed of its object.”327  
Once wards turned twenty-one all states required guardians to provide a 
full account of the estate and to begin the process of transferring it into the 
ward’s care. However, courts recognized that simply turning twenty-one did not 
automatically make a person capable of understanding the intricacies of their 
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inheritance and determining whether their estate was managed correctly. The 
Pennsylvania Digest of Codes explicitly stated that “the law looks with a jealous 
eye upon settlements made by infants soon after their arrival at age, and before 
they were fully acquainted with their affairs.” One case, Say’s Executors v. 
Barnes, illustrates this point and provides another example of how legal and 
social expectations of guardianship-ward relationships were negotiated within the 
court system.  
In 1818 a Pennsylvanian, Barnaby Barnes, sued the estate of his 
guardian, Benjamin Say, arguing that his account was settled too hastily and he 
had not received the full interest the estate had accrued while it was under Say’s 
management.328 According to Barnes, “he was at the time in very delicate health, 
and was advised by his physician, that it was necessary to try the effect of a 
milder climate.”329 “On arriving at age,” Barnaby explained, “he was anxious to 
come to a settlement with his guardian, in order to procure money to bear his 
expenses abroad [and his] guardian appeared equally anxious for the settlement 
as he was at the time laboring under a consumption which he died in about 
twenty months after that period.”330At first, everything seemed to be handled 
correctly, Barnaby testified: “the account which [Say] exhibited was admitted to 
be fair and honest, but the interest during this long minority was the subject on 
which a difference of opinion arose.” Even so, they eventually came to an 
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agreement and on “23d November 1811, the account was settled, the papers 
delivered… and the balance of cash paid to him [in full].”331  
Anxious to leave for Europe to recover his health, Barnaby chose to “not 
make a final settlement” for his sister’s account, deciding that it should “be 
adjusted when she should arrive at age.”332 While away, his sister’s account was 
settled and “under the direction of auditors,” she was “allowed more interest than 
had been allowed” her brother. Barnaby quickly “wrote a letter to Mr Say, in 
which he complained the settlement between them had been made with 
reluctance on his part, and at the time when he was ignorant of his rights, and at 
the same time informed him that he was willing to abide by the principles on 
which his sister’s account had been settled.”333 Say died before they could come 
to a new agreement and Barnes was forced to sue Say’s Executors. Ultimately, 
the court agreed with Barnes and awarded him a new settlement with the correct 
interested calculated.  
Legally, wards were entitled to their inheritance as soon as they turned 
twenty-one, however, as the above case illustrates, there was an expectation 
that guardianships would end gradually. The ruling on Say’s Executors v. Barnes, 
heard by the state Supreme Court, reveals how justices negotiated legal rights 
and against other expectations related to age, maturity, and capability. Legally an 
infant became an adult as soon as they turned twenty-one, and justices 
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acknowledged that it was the legal right of the ward and guardian to settle the 
account as soon as this happened. However, justices also asserted their opinion 
that “settlements made with [wards] soon after coming to age” were problematic 
because “it should always be remembered that when a young man comes of 
age, he must necessarily be ignorant of his affairs, and the information which he 
receives must come principally from his guardian.”334 In other words, the age of 
twenty-one as a marker of maturity and capability of understanding was 
somewhat arbitrary and guardians were expected to assist wards in transitioning 
into their adult status as controllers of their inheritance.  
Another, more explicit example of a guardian taking advantage of a ward 
when settling accounts can be seen in Waller v. Armistead’s Adm’rs. The case 
was tried in Virginia in 1830, twenty years after the original deception. Robert 
Armistead became the guardian of his sister, Lucy, in 1792, and continued until 
she married Aylet Waller in 1801. According to Lucy, “Robert… made no 
settlement of the accounts of his guardianship, or agency for his sister, and he 
retained in his own hands the estate she was entitled to, though she had attained 
to full age.” Furthermore, “on the very day of her marriage, a few minutes before 
the ceremony… in the absence and without the knowledge of her intended 
husband,” Robert pressured Lucy into signing two contracts. The first, “without 
exhibiting any account, or stating in particulars,” established that Lucy “acquitted 
[her] brother of all demands, and acknowledged full satisfaction of whatever he 
might owe her.”335 The second contract, “which had also been prepared by her 
																																																						
334 Say v. Barnes 




brother, but which was not explained to her, nor did it appear that she had any 
knowledge of its contents or object” was “purported to be a deed of gift, in 
consideration of natural love and affection, to her nephew John D. Armistead,” 
Robert’s son. The deed relinquished “all her right, title, interest, and proportion, of 
the proceeds of the sale of the tract of land” she had inherited.336  
Due to the circumstances surrounding the settlement of her account, 
justices ruled that Lucy’s guardian had taken advantage of her and voided the 
deeds.337 Although the case occurred decades after Lucy was wronged, the 
ruling contributes to our understanding of how Early Republican justices 
interpreted the role of guardian and ward. Guardians were expected to act as 
protectors of their ward’s best interests—both financially or morally. Wards, by 
virtue of their age, lacked the capacity to navigate basic adult responsibilities and 
had a diminished capacity. As a result, wards, like Lucy, were never held 
accountable when their actions were detrimental to themselves. Consequently, 
courts carefully monitored guardians in an effort to weed out those who might 
manipulate their wards for their own gain.  
The other way in which courts ensured that guardians fulfilled their legal 
and social obligations was to allow wards over the age of fourteen to have a say 
in who was appointed their guardians.338 For example, in Pennsylvania in 1854, 
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nineteen-year-old Sarah Ferguson requested that her guardian, George Arthurs, 
be removed because “she and her guardian were not on good terms, which 
rendered it impracticable to have any amicable communication with him, which 
was essential to her interests and welfare.”339 Arthurs insisted, “he had managed 
the estate well, and alleged that there was no bad feeling on his part towards his 
ward.” Initially, the “court refused to dismiss the guardian, because no reasons 
had been shown for his dismissal.”340 However, the ruling was contested on the 
grounds that it was “the naked legal right of the ward to choose her guardian at 
any time after she arrived at the age of fourteen years.” Consequently, the 
appeals court approved the request and appointed Joseph S. Morrison as 
Sarah’s new guardian, setting aside the lower court’s ruling. 
While most wards could challenge their guardianships once they turned 
fourteen, in certain states, this was only the case when the parent had assigned 
the guardianship via their will. In Pennsylvania and Maryland, when orphan 
courts assigned guardianships, their appointments remained until the ward 
reached their majority. Yet, even in circumstances or states in which wards over 
fourteen could challenge their guardianships, they were not always successful in 
doing so. This inconsistency of allowing infants to change guardians 
demonstrates the flexibility courts had when interpreting the law regarding 
guardianship-ward relationships as well as the legal rights of infants:  Mauro v 
Ritchie illustrates this point.  
																																																						





In May of 1827, the Washington DC’s Circuit Court heard the case Mauro 
v Ritchie. The case contested the ability of an “infant” over the age of fourteen to 
choose their own guardian.341 The orphan court’s ruling initially granted fourteen-
year-old John Ott’s request to switch from his court appointed guardians, Joseph 
Forrest and Philip Mauro, to his own choice, John Ritchie. However, Mauro and 
Forrest requested an appeal of the decision, which the Circuit Court granted. The 
Circuit Court ruled that guardians assigned via orphan courts remained until the 
infant reached their majority. The ruling itself, however, is less revealing than the 
explanation that accompanied.  
The language used in the ruling of Mauro v Ritchie demonstrates how 
social conceptions of age could inform legal decisions regarding the rights of 
wards. According to the ruling, “the age of fourteen, the infant begins to be 
restless and ungovernable, and the salutary restraints of the guardian are 
irksome. The infant is apt to think his guardian penurious and tyrannical. He 
wants greater indulgences; and there are always artful and insinuating men 
enough, who are eager to grasp all the property they can lay hold of; and who, 
taking advantage of these dispositions in the infant, will stimulate his 
restlessness, excite his suspicions, undermine the authority of the guardian, and 
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finally prevail on the infant, in his simplicity, to place his property in his hands.” 
Consequently, the court concluded that “the chance of evil resulting from the 
infant’s right of election, seems greater than the chance of good; and the choice 
of the court is more likely to be judicious than that of the infant.”342 In other 
words, the court viewed the age of fourteen as particularly problematic. Infants 
were of an age they considered mature enough to make decisions for 
themselves, yet were realistically still naïve enough to be taken advantage of. 
Although it had long been the practice of allowing fourteen year olds to have a 
say in their guardianship arrangement, the courts were beginning to view this as 
risky to the ward.  
 Guardians’ actions were not only policed by the legal system; communities 
also paid close attention to the relationship between guardian and ward. Henry 
Lee IV, the scion of the Lee family of Virginia, and his illicit relationship with his 
ward and nineteen-year-old sister-in-law, Betsy McCarthy, became a famous 
example of a community’s response to a guardianship gone wrong.343 In 1820, 
Betsy became pregnant with Lee’s child and fled to a relative’s house, which 
made the affair public. In addition to the affair, it was discovered that Lee had 
squandered Betsy’s funds while he controlled her inheritance. Lee failed as a 
guardian on the two most important responsibilities: protecting his ward 
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financially and morally. Consequently, the Virginia court system stripped Lee of 
his guardianship and proclaimed “Henry Lee hath been guilty of a flagrant abuse 
of his trust in the guardianship of his ward Betsy McCarty.”344  
 Henry’s removal from the guardianship was not the only punishment he 
faced for his actions; he was also socially shamed and politically ostracized. His 
community’s reaction demonstrates how seriously Early Republican society took 
the responsibilities of guardians. Henry faced years in chancery court and 
eventually lost his family’s estate, Stratford, as Betsy and her advisors sued to 
reclaim her mismanaged inheritance.345 He also damaged his entire family’s 
reputation and destroyed his own.346 More than a decade later, he lamented to a 
friend that the affair had caused “some [to] persecute and others [to] desert 
me.”347 Henry expressed frustration that he was rejected from politics and was 
convinced that his public shaming stemmed from committing adultery and a 
misinformed Virginian statute that defined sexual relationships between in-laws 
as incest. However, as Henry himself pointed out, “Mr. Jefferson” and numerous 
other “married gentlemen” politicians had affairs, which were “known to [have] 
occur[ed]” without “consequence.”348 It was Henry’s additional sins of corrupting 
and taking advantage of his ward that resulted in such severe ostracizing.  
 Although American laws of guardianship were derived from English 
precedents focused on protecting inheritance, as the nineteenth century 
																																																						
344 Westmoreland County Court Records, 27 February 1821. 
345 Thomas, 40.  
346 For example, a decade after the affair, Eugenia Calvert’s father objected to her marriage to 
Lee’s nephew, Charles Henry Carter because he feared the scandal might damage her 
reputation. (Glover, 130.)  
347 Henry Lee to Richard T Brown, 24 August 1833, Jessie Ball du Pont Memorial Library.  




progressed legal rulings on the expectations of guardian-ward relationships were 
increasingly influenced by new conceptions of age, capability, and dependence. 
American courts and eventually states began to revise their ideas about what 
made for a “good” guardian and how gender factored into guardian and ward 
rights. There remained significant flexibility in how guardianship was interpreted 
throughout the nineteenth century. Consequently, in order to understand how 
expectations of guardianship evolved, it is necessary to explore discussions and 
negotiations of guardianship that occurred within families and communities as 
well as between guardians and wards.  
Occasionally, fathers passed away without designating a guardian. 
Usually, a guardian would be assigned in the orphan court, however, some 
families took it upon themselves to informally decide upon a guardian for their 
underage kin. This was the case for nineteen-year-old Thomas Eugene Massie; 
letters passed between his uncle, William, and his older brother, Henry, shed 
insight on how families discussed proper guardianship as well as how cultural 
expectations conflicted with legal ones over what made a good guardian. 
Thomas and Henry’s father died sometime in late 1840 and Henry, twenty-five at 
the time, quickly assumed he would become his brother’s guardian. But his 
actions surrounding the potential guardianship suggested he lacked the 
experience, maturity, and legal know-how to successfully take on the position. In 
January of 1841, Henry wrote to his uncle informing him that he had “qualified as 
Tom’s guardian” and asked for “rec’t for the legacy” as William was the executor 




you have proceeded in the right way[?],” he wrote, “your [sic] no lawyer & do not 
pretend to know much about such matters.”349 William continued, “it appears to 
me that the ward has authority to go into court & chose his own guardian, nor am 
I certain that the court can under such circumstances legally appoint a guardian 
without his being chosen by the ward… prudence requires that the law in such 
cases be complied with before the legacy can be paid.”350  
More concerning to William, however, was Henry’s attempt to claim a 
“rec’t dated the 31st of Dec 1840, some 15 days before [he] could have possibly 
have held any authority to write such a rec’t.” This mistake, at the very least, 
signaled to William that Henry had most likely not secured the legal designation 
of guardian and that he fundamentally did not understand how the legal system 
worked when it came to settling estates and establishing guardianships. It might 
also have raised concerns over whether Henry was attempting to take advantage 
of his brother and potential ward. Consequently, William insisted that Henry 
needed to provide the “certificate of the clerk of the court in which you qualified 
showing that you had qualified as guardian” before he was willing to issue the 
legacy. At no point did William outright say that Henry was not qualified to be a 
guardian, but his letter implied that Henry lacked the maturity and competency to 
be able to successfully take up the job.351 
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From a legal standpoint, Henry was qualified to be Thomas’s guardian; he 
was twenty-five, over the age of majority, and an independent male relative. 
However, as William’s comments show, Henry’s lack of judgment and legal 
knowledge regarding guardianships was concerning. If Henry did not know he 
had to have Thomas legally request him as a guardian, how would Henry be able 
to manage Thomas’ estate competently? One did not need to be a lawyer to be a 
guardian, but William’s comments demonstrate that a successful guardian had to 
have at least a basic understanding of how the law operated and how to operate 
within the legal system. Henry’s ignorance of the law might have been due to his 
youthful age. At only twenty-five years old and having never studied law, he 
simply lacked the life experience to be an effective guardian. At the same time, it 
is important to note that among the reasons the Reeve and Bouvier, wrote their 
guides was to instruct readers whether they be judges, lawyers, or laymen. 
 Not all guardianships were formalized in law. Some guardianships were 
purely informal arrangements meant to provide opportunities for youth away from 
home.352 Letters between parents and temporary guardians appointed to oversee 
children while they were away at school add to our understanding of what made 
a good guardian from a social and cultural perspective. Such informal guardians 
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were meant to “provide additional guidance” and act as surrogate parents.353 For 
example, Alexander Morson asked a friend in New Haven to “advise, council & 
direct” his son who was away at school at Yale; “in every want act towards him 
as a Father,” he requested.354 Nelly Custis asked her close friend Elizabeth 
Bordley Gibson if her husband would be willing to take on her son, Lorenzo as a 
“student of Law.” In addition to training Lorenzo in a future career, the 
arrangement would work as a social guardianship as well. “We think that Mr G’s 
example & advice as to Law, & reading, & morals, & conduct, w[ould] be of a 
lasting advantage,” she explained. Furthermore, the “society of [Elizabeth] & 
other female friends” in Philadelphia would make Lorenzo “emulous to improve 
that he may be a more agreeable companion.”355 Both Alexander Morson and 
Nelly Custis wanted their children to benefit from relationships with their informal 
guardians, demonstrating the expectation that these guardians would be moral, 
positive influences, and invested in their wards’ education and future.  
 Wards had their own expectations of what constituted a good guardian. 
Philadelphian Isaac Mickle expressed frustration in his diary over his legal 
guardian’s lack of attention.356 In the Spring of 1841, at the age of eighteen, 
Isaac decided to “do for [him]self what the business of my uncle and guardian will 
not afford him time to undertake.” He explained, “for a year back it has been fixed 
that I should read law; for a year back my guardian has delayed to see to 
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procuring me a place; and for a year back, in consequence, I have led a life of 
uncertainty and unpleasantness.” Unwilling to wait on his guardian any longer, 
Isaac proclaimed April 2nd as the “Day [he] resolved to end [his] perplexity; and 
so called upon Colonel Page, introduced [him]self, and asked [Colonel Page] if 
he was willing to receive a student at law.”357 After arriving at Colonel Page’s 
office, Isaac quickly realized his mistake by coming alone, unprepared and 
without advice from his guardian. Isaac guessed that his “dress… had some part 
in prompting” an initial rejection from Colonel Page. “I had neglected my toilette 
most unpardonably,” Isaac explained, “I had on my oldest pantaloons, a vest 
frayed with hard service, and a shirt by no means the cleanest that ever was.” 
Realizing that Colonel Page mistook his poor dress for “poverty [and] from my 
poverty, a brainless head,” Isaac quickly alerted Page that he had a guardian, 
thus establishing his elite status. Isaac recorded in his diary that “when I 
mentioned ‘Captain Mickle, John W Mickle of Camden,’ the negotiation received 
a new face. ‘O yes,’ said he, ‘I know him, know him well—very well! Call again, 
and bring him with you.’”358  
Isaac’s experience is revealing because it demonstrates the social utility of 
a guardian. Although it was not legally required, Isaac expected his guardian to 
be more involved in his future and was disappointed when his guardian failed to 
act on his behalf despite his persistent requests. However, even without this 
explicit form of assistance, Isaac quickly realized how he benefited from his 
guardian’s positive reputation and social connections. Colonial Page admitted 
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Isaac as a law student only after his guardian’s name was revealed. From a legal 
perspective, Isaac’s guardian did everything expected of him and managed 
Isaac’s estate well. Yet Isaac’s frustration illustrates how the social expectations 
of guardians and wards had to be negotiated when they did not always align.  
Another example of the social and legal negotiations that occurred 
between guardian and ward can be seen in their disagreements. “Bad wards” 
frustrated their guardians with the implications of their disagreements. 
Sometimes these disagreements appeared in the legal record and other times 
they played out in long sagas via letters, as was the case with Edmund Ruffin 
and his sister and ward, seventeen-year-old Juliana Ruffin as well as William 
Page and his ward, Benjamin Carter. Together these examples illustrate how 
guardians internalized and struggled with their positions as individuals tasked 
both legally and socially with protecting the young people under their care.  
Between 1822 and 1823, Juliana wrote four letters to Edmund, first asking 
permission to marry and then informing him that she changed guardians. Juliana 
understood that her father designated Edmund as her guardian, but she also 
knew that once she turned fourteen, her choice superseded that of her father’s 
and she attempted to use this legal reality to her advantage. In her first letter, 
Juliana appealed to Edmund’s emotions and pleaded for his permission to marry 
Carter Harrison Coupland, most likely knowing it was better to work things out 
with her brother than to go to court and change guardians, which might alienate 
her from the Ruffin side of her family. Initially full of flattery, her letter informed 




[she] so affectionately loved and esteem[ed would] approve [her] choice” for 
marriage.359 She explained that she was “determin[ed] to marry Mr Coupland” 
and that the marriage needed to happen quickly as he was leaving the state in 
the next few weeks. At the same time, she made clear that if Edmund did not 
give his “consent,” she would find other means of marrying Coupland. She 
concluded the letter with one final plea, but more importantly with a threat: “If thy 
bosom retains any traces of affection and feeling for thy sister… oh grant [her 
wish] and force her not to do that at which every felling of her heart revolts, oh! 
drive her not to the only resources left of accomplishing her purpose…”360  
Edmund forbade the marriage, most likely because Juliana’s intended 
husband was ten years older, in debt, and would be the only one of the two to 
benefit financially from the marriage. Angered by Edmund’s decision, Juliana 
carried through with her threat. A few months later, Juliana wrote a brief letter to 
Edmund notifying him that “it has been ascertained beyond a doubt that I can 
choose another guardian. Tomorrow… I shall go to court and choose Cousin 
Walter Cocke who will be here this evening to accompany me.”361 Juliana’s 
decision to change guardians once her brother refused to consent to the 
marriage illustrates that wards understood their legal rights once over the age of 
fourteen. Furthermore, Juliana’s choice of Walter Cocke was a calculated one. 
Cocke was slightly older than Edmund and a family member, so he would seem 
to be an acceptable new choice. However, Walter was also married to Carter 
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Coupland’s sister. This reality combined with the fact that Walter was related to 
Juliana via her mother, and so more loyal to Juliana than Edmund, explains why 
he was so favorable to the match. By allowing Juliana to marry Carter, Walter 
was facilitating an inheritance transfer from the Ruffin side to the Cocke and 
Coupland families. This had been part of Edmund’s fear and reason for refusing 
the marriage.  
Shortly after the guardianship was transferred, Juliana and Carter married. 
Unsurprisingly, Edmund was furious and doubted the legality of Juliana’s actions. 
Edmund explained to Juliana’s mother that he was fairly certain that “the last 
court in appointing a new guardian to my sister was without legal authority. I now 
am induced to believe that it can have no effect.”362 He continued, “I shall seek 
the best advice of the subject, if my opinion prove correct, [I] shall contest the 
point before the next court.” Edmund was concerned with the legality of the 
guardian reassignment because of the resulting marriage and property transfer. 
He explained that if he was right, if Juliana’s guardianship reassignment was 
“without legal authority,” then “a legal marriage in this state cannot take place.” 
He continued, “even if that can be effected, if I have the right, I shall retain the 
property in my possession until my sister is of age—this will prevent it being 
wasted & secure it to herself, instead of the heirs of her husband.” He concluded 
his letter with “please give this notice to my sister.”363  
Edmund’s letter demonstrates that his greatest concern in retaining the 
guardianship of Juliana was in retaining control of her inheritance until she “[was] 
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of age.” Edmund’s acknowledgment that once Juliana turned twenty-one, she 
was a legal adult, entitled to choice and her inheritance, suggests he adhered to 
legal definitions of age rather strictly. However, until she reached that age, 
Edmund saw it as his “duty” to protect his sister and her best interests, not give in 
to her demands. Juliana understood her legal rights as a ward, and, since she 
was over the age of fourteen, she used them to her advantage. Although 
Edmund attempted to block the reassignment, legally Juliana was in the right and 
so he failed.364  
  Another example of a “bad ward” can be found in the letters of William 
Page regarding his ward, Benjamin Cater. Like Isaac Mickle, discussed earlier, 
Benjamin expected his guardian to help establish him in his career. In 1814, 
Benjamin demanded, “Procure me a place in a Counting house or whole sale 
store, without a further procrastination.”365 Benjamin had a long history of 
challenging Page and demanding things of him. Page struggled with his 
responsibility of raising Benjamin “as [he] would [his] own child” and continually 
expressed disappointment upon finding out about Benjamin’s bad behavior while 
he was away at school.366 Yet Page never relinquished his responsibility, even 
upon finding out that Benjamin “charged coats [to his account] that he resold to 
classmates for pocket money” and “impregnated a servant in his boarding 
house.”367 The commitment that some guardians felt to their wards, despite the 
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constant frustration they might have felt, illustrates that guardianship was not 
always a simple legal relationship but had significant social and familial 
sentiments attached to the responsibility. 
Finally, often overlooked in the historical scholarship on youth is the fact 
that guardianships occasionally shifted from a legal to a social necessity. 
Although wards may have been adults under the eyes of the law, they could still 
be considered dependents socially. Charles Carroll of Homewood represents an 
early example of this phenomenon. Charles Jr. was the heir to the Carroll family 
fortune, but he was also a violent alcoholic whose reputation increasingly 
preceded him in Baltimore society. For example, Charles Jr. was said to “drink 
between one to two quarts of brandy a day, besides wine,” he began drinking “as 
soon as he w[oke], and at night, the effect [wa]s never off.”368 Charles Jr.’s 
situation was so hopeless that one night he resorted to drinking “cologne water” 
when he ran out of proper alcohol.369 Charles Jr.’s perpetual drunkenness not 
only prevented him from carrying out the responsibilities of a patriarch, it also 
caused him to become violent towards his family and act out in public. 
Charles Jr’s conduct concerned his family, largely because his actions 
threatened them socially. Despite being in his forties with a wife and children of 
his own, because of erratic and socially unacceptable behavior, Charles Jr. was 
stripped of his ability to act as a patriarch and adult, rendering him a symbolic 
child in need of a social guardian. After Charles Jr’s wife and children moved out 
of the home, his father hired handlers, Captain James Craig and his wife. In 
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1816, Charles Sr. sent “directions” to Captain Craig, explicitly stating that he 
“place[d Charles of Homewood] under [their] direction & controul [sic].”370 The 
Craigs were to help Charles Jr. control his “fatal vice of ebriety [sic]” by ensuring 
the “total abstinence from all fermented liquors” and restraining him from “ardent 
spirits, either, eau de Cologne, wine & strong beer.”371 The instructions 
continued, “he must not give dinners; or entertain company… [and] he must be 
prohibited from the indulgence of high seasoned dinners.”372  
The example of Charles Carroll of Homewood is revealing as an example 
of how families (and communities) were more concerned with capability then 
chronological age when it came to ascribing status and responsibility. The ability 
to care and consent for oneself often correlated with chronological age, but 
sometimes it did not. As the nineteenth century progressed, the legal system 
increasingly acknowledged this reality and expanded its definition of 
guardianship to protect not only those with the inability to possess discretion 
based on chronological age, but also those who were seen to lack the ability 
based on mental capacity.  
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 Charles Carroll of Homewood was stripped of his status as a functioning 
adult and assigned a social guardian by his family because his addiction to 
alcohol caused him to be incapable of fulfilling the duties ascribed to his life stage 
as a husband and father.  By contrast, Elizabeth Ruffin requested her legal 
guardianship remain intact despite reaching her majority and turning twenty-one. 
Both examples demonstrate how capability and personal preference trumped 
chronological age when negotiating guardianship arrangements outside of the 
court system. This social flexibility in perceptions of life stage, dependence, and 
chronological age increasingly bled into the court system, altering legal 
expectations and understandings of guardianship-ward relationships. Although 
the Early Republican period began with legal definitions of guardianship 
concerned only with the protection of the ward’s inheritance, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, they had expanded to accommodate newly formed cultural 















“Attend to the advice of your mother”:  
Parental Assertions of Control 
 
In 1840, Alexis de Tocqueville published the second volume of his study of 
American society, Democracy in America.373 In it, de Tocqueville dedicated a 
chapter to explaining “the influence of democracy on the family.” He interpreted 
American families as fundamentally changed by the democratic revolution and 
wrote that “it has been universally remarked, that, in our time, the several 
members of a family stand upon an entirely new footing towards each other.”374 
More specifically, “that the distance which formally separated a father from his 
sons has been lessened; and that paternal authority, if not destroyed, is at least 
impaired.”375 Rather than a relationship built on “deference,” “fear,” and the 
expectation of a “social bond,” American relationships with their children were 
based on “intimacy,” “affection,” “tenderness,” and a “natural bond.”376 De 
Tocqueville labeled this new family formation “the democratic family.”377  
The concept of obedience is antithetical to the democratic family model as 
depicted by de Tocqueville, and yet obedience of children was a regular theme of 
middle-and upper-class Early Republican parenting advice literature. “Children 
should be obedient—must be obedient, habitually and cheerfully so, or they 
cannot be well educated in any respect” announced the 1834 parenting advice 
																																																						
373 Volume 1 of Alexis de Toqcueville’s Democracy in America was published in 1835.  
374 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume II, translated by Henry Reeve 
(Cambridge: Severe and Francis, 1863), 233.  
375 De Tocqueville, 233. 
376 De Tocqueville, 236, 237. 




manual, A Father’s Book.378 Similarly, Letters to Mothers-- published in 1838 just 
two years prior to de Tocqueville’s assertion of the “democratic family”-- 
instructed mothers to “watch for the time your little one first exhibits decided 
preferences and aversions. The next letter in the alphabet is 
obedience…Establish your will, as the law,” the author warned readers, “Do it 
early, for docility is impaired by delay.”379 The very concept of obedience 
mandates a one-directional power dynamic where the parent has complete 
authority over the child. Consequently, the correlation between children’s 
obedience with “good parenting” that advice manuals stressed directly 
contradicted de Tocqueville’s assertion of the prevalence of the democratic 
family model. In turn, this raises important questions about how Early Republican 
families actually functioned.   
Still, some historians have found de Tocqueville’s interpretation of the 
newly affective Early Republican family persuasive, arguing that “by the end of 
the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, the American family 
had been transformed from a public institution whose functions were primarily 
economic into one whose major role was to rear children and provide emotional 
support for its members.”380 The Early Republican period has been identified by 
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historians as a transitional time for family relationships, and, when compared to 
colonial families, Early Republican families have been described as more 
“private,” “sentimental,” and “child-centered.”381 Substantial evidence exists to 
show that an ideology of the democratic family was certainly present and 
influenced the day-to-day as well as long-term decisions families made. Susan 
Klepp, for example, has shown a rise in family planning and lowered birth rate at 
the turn of the century, while Linda Kerber has discussed the increased focus on 
children’s education.382  
Yet to suggest that all families switched to this model or even that 
individual families consistently acted within this framework, is a misconception; 
the notion of the “democratic family” was more of a nascent ideal that appealed 
to few rather than a universal reality. The “traditional” colonial family model, 
based around deference and hierarchy-- two concepts challenged and reshaped 
by the sentiment of the American Revolution-- continued to influence the 
dynamics of Early Republican families. This is not to say that the American 
Revolution did not have ramifications for parent-child relationships. It did, but age 
and consent laws meant to protect minors, empower legal adults, and redefine 
family relationships were often ignored as often as they were acknowledged.383  
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 Gender (of both parent and child) factored heavily in to how parents and 
their children negotiated the nature of their relationship. Shaped by the traditional 
family expectations of female dependency, the law also reinforced hierarchical 
relationships between daughters and their parents. To start, many states had 
unequal ages of legal independence depending on gender, with girls reaching 
legal adulthood before their brothers. In theory, these gendered age differences 
were based on the understanding that girls reached puberty two to three years 
earlier than boys and so were ready for marriage that much earlier as well. 
However, as historian Nicholas L. Syrett has pointed out, the lower age of 
consent for women also “served to move girls more smoothly as dependents 
between different men’s households and to ensure that a male head of 
household always governed their property.”384  
Young women, then, were never expected to attain full independence as 
reaching the age of adulthood offered them no rights or opportunities other than 
the ability to consent to contracts, specifically marriage. Instead, daughters were 
supposed to marry by the age of legal adulthood and be subsumed under their 
husband’s identity or remain at home as dependents (and servants) of their 
families until their inevitable marriage. Although evidence of this reality exists 
anecdotally in family papers, the prevalence of seduction suits and loss of 
services cases filed by parents regarding their adult daughters demonstrate how 
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serious families were about the continued deference and dependence of female 
family members.385 Legally, these women were adults, yet family members, as 
well as the jurors and justices involved in these cases, believed there was the 
opportunity for legal redress when adult daughters fell pregnant outside of 
marriage. Early Republican parent-child relationships demonstrate how capability 
and dependence were negotiated within a gendered, family context, regardless 
of the child’s chronological age.  
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first provides a survey of 
prescriptive advice literature and legal writings to gain insight into the gendered 
messages parents (and children) received on the “ideal” social and legal 
contours of parent-child relationships. The second section examines family 
letters between parents and children in order to test how reflective advice 
literature actually was of these relationships. More specifically, letters provide an 
intimate look at the compromises and ultimatums parents made when dealing 
with their children’s challenges to expectations of deference, dependence, and 
autonomy--as well as how the gender of the parent or child influenced the 
outcome of these negotiations.386 Some parents certainly internalized the 
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messages they received from “experts,” but most weighed these suggestions 
against their own familial needs and expectations of their children. These letters, 
then, tell a story about the plurality of family relationship styles which undermines 
the claim of the Early Republican “democratic family.”   
The third and final section of this chapter drives this point home with a 
discussion of seduction suits and loss of services cases that were tried and 
appealed in the first half of the nineteenth century in order to highlight how 
parents regularly challenged legal definitions of age and independence, 
especially when an illicit pregnancy caused the loss of an adult daughters’ labor. 
Most of the time, the courts backed parents and upheld community expectations 
of female dependence. However, a number of cases exist where rulings strictly 
upheld newer legal definitions of parenthood, age, and independence regardless 
of gender, diverging significantly from “traditional” and familial expectations. The 
court cases discussed are significant because they provide hard evidence of the 
way in which some families disregarded statutes assigning an age to the status 
of adulthood, while other families and individuals attempted to utilize legal 
definitions of age and dependence to their advantage. Traditional expectations of 
female dependence complicated new legal definitions of age and independence 
which, in turn, influenced (and were influenced by) specific parent-child 
relationships.  
 
The turn of the nineteenth century ushered in a renewed discussion and 
																																																																																																																																																																	





inspection of family relationships, this time within the new American national 
context. Prescriptive literature and state laws attempted to shape the relationship 
parents would have with their children, acting to increase anxiety and attempt to 
quell the anxiety of a new nation who had rebelled against its own parent, mother 
England. If children could be raised “correctly” and guaranteed independence, 
then they would become ideal citizens, perfectly poised to take over the task of 
steering America towards the path of enlightened governance and civic 
participation. De Tocqueville’s perception of family structures was thoroughly 
intertwined with his understanding of the form of society they existed within. As a 
result, he failed to see the plurality of family types that could exist within the Early 
Republic; and, most importantly, that many families maintained traditional 
deferential relationships between parent and child after the Revolution.   
Perceived social changes related to work and mass production brought on 
by the industrial revolution offered evidence to bolster de Tocqueville’s 
interpretation of the “new” American family model.387 The new middle-class 
aspiration was for labor to be the realm of adult males, it was to take place 
outside of the home and be based on wages. Concurrently, parenting styles were 
to shift from “extensive,” where a larger number of children were overseen by 
family and neighbors, to “intensive,” where parents, specifically mothers, focused 
on the care and nurturing of their own children exclusively.388 Consequently, as 
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literacy rates soared and printed materials proliferated, middle-class parents 
increasingly sought out parenting advice from a rising class of “professionals.”389 
Although parenting advice manuals date back to the seventeenth century, 
historians have identified the nineteenth century as the start of a golden age for 
these types of publications as “educators, physicians, and clerics issued a torrent 
of books, pamphlets, and magazine articles on child rearing.”390 As a result of 
these publications, middle-class parents were the targets of an “intensified sense 
of responsibility for the proper upbringing of their children.”391 This was especially 
true for mothers, who were increasingly singled out as responsible for the 
“primary socialization and education of children.”392  
 Advice literature contributed to the anxiety parents felt. However, as 
historian Julia Grant argues, these publications had a wider societal impact as 
they also “presented diverse approaches to rearing children that set the 
framework for future debates about the nature of the child.”393 “Rationalists,” 
inspired by the late seventeenth century philosophical writings of John Locke, 
believed that children should be “systematically disciplined and educated if they 
[were] to become civilized adults.”394 Those who favored the eighteenth-century 
writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, known as “romantics,” wanted to “preserve 
children’s innocence and natural virtue, which they saw as threatened by 
industrial society.”395 Romantics opposed any kind of routine or structure while 
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rationalists “sought to tame children and prepare them for their future role as 
adults.”396 In reality, romantic and rationalist perspectives of childhood 
represented two sides of a spectrum, with most parents (and many advice 
manuals) falling somewhere between the two child-rearing approaches.  
De Tocqueville’s writings also offer an example of the types of messages 
Early Republicans received regarding how new legal definitions of age, 
capability, and dependence were supposed to shape their family relationships.397 
De Tocqueville’s passage on the influence of a democratic system on the 
relationship between father and son is particularly revealing. For example, de 
Tocqueville wrote: 
as soon as the young American approaches manhood, the ties of filial 
obedience are relaxed day by day: master of his thoughts, he is soon 
master of his conduct. In America, there is, strictly speaking, no 
adolescence: at the close of boyhood, the man appears, and begins to 
trace out his own path. It would be an error to suppose that this is 
preceded by a domestic struggle, in which the son has obtained a sort of 
moral violence the liberty that his father refused him. The same habits, 
the same principles, which impel the one to assert his independence, 
predispose the other to consider the use of that independence as an 
incontestable right. The former does not exhibit any of those rancorous 
or irregular passions which disturb men long after they have shaken off 
an established authority; the latter feels none of that bitter and angry 
regret which is apt to survive a by-gone power. The father foresees the 
limits of his authority long beforehand, and when the time arrives, he 
surrenders it without a struggle: the son looks forward to the exact period 
at which he will be his own master.398  
 
De Tocqueville’s description of the father-son relationship mirrored that of the 
democratic government America had established: power was limited and 
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transferred peacefully once the child reached a certain age. For de Tocqueville, 
family relationships were microcosms of the societies they lived in. 
Comparatively, he explained that “amongst aristocratic nations, social institutions 
recognize… no one in the family but the father; children are received by society 
as his hands; society governs him, he governs them.”399 This deferential, one-
way relationship between the father and children continued regardless of the 
child’s age. According to de Tocqueville, this resulted in a strained relationship 
between parent and child, one in which the love the child had for their father was 
always “tempered with fear.”400 Furthermore, interactions between parents and 
children were “always correct, ceremonious, stiff, and so cold that the natural 
warmth of the heart can hardly be felt.”401 De Tocqueville argued that “in 
proportion as manners and laws become more democratic, the relation of father 
and son becomes more intimate and more affectionate.”402  
De Tocqueville also wrote about his perception of the effect democracy 
had on the “female character;” and his description of American daughters 
suggests that, from his perspective, young women were raised with the same 
democratic values and expectations as their brothers. “Long before an American 
girl arrives at the marriageable age,” de Tocqueville wrote, “her emancipation 
from maternal control begins: she has scarcely ceased to be a child, when she 
already thinks for herself, speaks with freedom, and acts on her own impulse.”403 
De Tocqueville’s word choice was significant, “emancipation” and “freedom” were 
																																																						
399 De Tocqueville, 235.  
400 De Tocqueville, 236.  
401 De Tocqueville, 237.  
402 Ibid. 




loaded terms, especially in the Early Republican period. Employing the use of 
these terms in his discussion of young American women indicates how idealized 
de Tocqueville’s perception of the relationship between gender, dependence, 
family, and youth was. In reality, women had no legal rights and were perpetually 
dependents, even after they became legal adults.   
By relating fathers to sons and suggesting that young women slipped 
away from “maternal control,” de Tocqueville indicated a gendered expectation of 
who parented who—fathers were to parent sons, and mothers were to parent 
daughters. Gender did factor in the construction of parenting roles and the 
treatment of children as articulated in advice literature, but it was in the context 
that mothers had certain roles, fathers had other roles, and daughters and sons 
had to be parented differently due to their temperament and sex. For example, 
mothers were expected to run the family household, provide the majority of 
childcare and education, and act as a moral compass for their sons and 
daughters. Fathers were expected to be the financial provider as well as a moral 
compass. Despite gendered differences, parenting advice literature urged both 
mothers and fathers to take active, equal roles in their sons’ and daughters’ lives. 
Theodore Dwight Jr., author of the The Father’s Book, conceded that “although 
so large a share of the care of children devolves upon the mother, let the father 
be careful not to underrate his own duties or influence.”404 L.H. Sigourney, the 
author of Letters to Mothers, asserted: “let mothers beware of adopting the 
opinion, that though they may do much for daughters, yet sons are beyond their 
																																																						




control. This is a false, and fatal conclusion.”405  
Mothers and fathers were advised of the particular difficulty teenage boys 
could pose to parental authority, demonstrating a gendered perception of 
adolescence that may have shaped how parents interacted or expected to 
interact with their sons. Sigourney warned mothers that because of “society” and 
“innate consciousness of being born to bear rule” sons “will sooner revolt from 
the authority of woman” than their sisters.406 Consequently, mothers needed to 
work harder and “begin earlier” to gain (and maintain) authority over their sons.407 
Mothers were not alone in dealing with difficult young men, fathers were also 
instructed to pay attention to how and with whom a son’s time was spent in order 
to restrict a young man’s interactions with “company who mislead him.”408 “The 
father must sustain his authority and control over his son,” The Father’s Book 
instructed, “or he will expose himself and his family to a thousand evils.”409 The 
advice to mothers and fathers regarding handling their teenage boys was 
essentially the same: they needed to maintain dominance over their sons at all 
times, which was a much harder task for mothers because society undermined 
female authority.  
 Daughters, on the other hand, were described as having more “pliant” 
temperaments and were naturally more productive than their brothers.410 Dwight 
argued to fathers the importance of putting children to work, explaining that 
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“daughters are usually better furnished on this score than sons: that is, they may 
more easily find useful employments and healthful exercise.”411 Daughters 
efficiently incorporated “needlework and knitting” into their nightly routines, 
“without interrupting conversation and reading,” while boys were more apt to 
engage in mischief in their free time.412 Sigourney also urged mothers to teach 
their daughters the domestic arts and encourage them to contribute to the 
household labor as early as possible.413  
 Advice literature targeted at youth contradicted de Tocqueville’s assertion 
of the democratic family model and sheds light on the message children received 
about the anticipated relationship they should have with their parents. Harvey 
Newcomb’s How to Become a Man and How to Become a Lady each contain a 
chapter entitled “Filial Piety;” the first several pages of which are identical. 
Newcomb appears to have been a “rationalist,” as he instructed both sons and 
daughters to “honor” their parents through “obedience” and “submission to [their] 
authority.”414 Newcomb’s works were religiously rooted, and he likened the 
relationship between parent and child to that between God and man; “to disobey 
parents is to disobey God,” he wrote, as “God gave parents authority over 
children.”415 This religious bent to his work explains the traditionalist insistence 
on children’s obedience and submission to parental authority; like Sigourney and 
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Dwight, at no point did Newcomb write about the “mutual respect,” “affection,” or 
“intimacy” that de Tocqueville had defined the new democratic family by. 
Although Newcomb specified that his work was geared toward children between 
the ages of eight and sixteen, he never suggested that this deferential, one-way 
relationship should end once a child reached their majority.  
In his advice to youth, Newcomb indicated that sons and daughters were 
expected to have different types relationships with their parents because of their 
gender. Although Newcomb literally copied the first several pages of his advice 
on “filial piety” from one of his books to the other, he concluded each chapter by 
addressing the genders separately. In How to Become a Man, Newcomb linked 
the importance of obedience as a child to a man’s success as a citizen. He 
suggested, however, that it was more effective to convince a parent to discipline 
a child than to convince a child to obey his parent. “Nothing has, perhaps, a 
greater influence upon the character of the man than the trait of [obedience.]. 
The boy that is obedient and submissive to parental authority will make a good 
citizen. He has learned to obey, from his childhood; and he will be obedient to the 
laws of his country; he will be respected in society, and may rise to posts of 
honor. But the disobedient boy, who is turbulent and ungoverned at home, will 
make a bad member of society.”416 But Newcomb knew his audience, which were 
anxious, ambitious, and motivated youth; by linking filial obedience to productive 
citizenship and manhood, he was right on target in his effort to control the 
youthful behavior of young men with middle-class aspirations.    
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Newcomb also addressed the issue of defiant sons seen in A Father’s 
Book and Letters to Mother, in turn, underscoring Early Republican gendered 
perceptions of adolescence and parental authority. “Boys of certain age are 
frequently disposed to show their importance,” by challenging parental authority, 
he explained, “this is particularly the case with respect to the authority of the 
mother; they feel too big to be governed by a woman.”417 “I can scarcely think of 
anything more unmanly than this,” he continued.418 Newcomb’s decision to 
include this message specifically to young men indicates how common it was for 
sons to take their mother’s authority less seriously as they grew older. As 
suggested in Sigourney’s Letters to Mother, young men were taught that they 
would be the head of their households with absolute legal and social authority 
over their wives. This reality sent a conflicting message to sons about when their 
position of male dominance would begin and when their submission to women as 
their mothers would end. Newcomb’s insistence that filial obedience meant 
submission to both fathers and mothers was an important attempt at equalizing 
the authority of parents regardless of gender.   
In How to be a Lady, Newcomb took a different approach and appealed to 
daughters via their appearance and social reputation. “Filial piety adds a peculiar 
charm to the female character; while the want of it, in females, makes them 
appear like monsters.”419 He continued that “disobedience,” makes young women 
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“appear very unlovely… No matter how beautiful she is—this defect will be a 
black spot on her pretty face… no matter how genteel she may be in her 
behavior to others—the first step in gentility is respectful obedient carriage 
toward parents,” he warned. Clearly, Newcomb thought a young woman’s goal 
should be to find a husband and nothing else; and in reality, girls did not age into 
citizenship the same way boys did, so to link filial obedience to a concept of 
independent “womanhood” would not have made sense. Consequently, for 
Newcomb the best way to control a daughter’s behavior towards her parents was 
by linking filial obedience to one’s attractiveness as a prospective wife.    
Along with parenting advice literature, legal literature was an easily 
accessible and widely read medium that informed Early Republicans on the 
“proper” parent-child relationship. As American laws sprang up to both limit and 
bolster parental control over minor children, legal dictionaries and treatises 
written for laymen proliferated along with them. John Bouvier’s A Legal Dictionary 
Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States... and Tapping 
Reeve’s The Law of Baron and Femme; Of Parent and Child are two such works 
that defined the terms “mother,” “father,” “child,” and “parent” within a legal 
context. Through these publications and others like them, Early Republican legal 
scholars helped institutionalize, codify, and redefine the intimate relationship 
between parent and child to that of a technical one—a relationship that could be 
objectively put on trial and ruled upon within the court system.  
John Bouvier’s A Legal Dictionary, first discussed in the previous chapter, 




defined a father and a mother as simply “a man [or woman] who has a child.”420 
Conversely, a “child” was “the son or daughter in relation to the father or 
mother.”421 Bouvier defined the phrase “in relation” to mean a relationship “by 
blood or by marriage,” which implied that a biological relationship between parent 
and child usually existed but that it was not necessary.422 The mortality rate in the 
Early Republic remained relatively high, which made stepparents common.423 As 
historian Lisa Wilson has noted, stepfathers, specifically, “had no legal obligation 
to support the offspring of another man, though he could choose to take on the 
role and act in loco parentis.”424 Similarly, although stepmothers had no 
obligation to their stepchildren, during the “antebellum age of reform… a good 
stepmother could become a new mother, raising her stepchildren with the 
memory of their mother intact.”425 
The difference between a mother and father, according to Bouvier, had to 
do with primary control and financial responsibility regarding the child. A father’s 
duties included “maintaining and educating [his children] during their infancy,” 
regardless of whether the child had an outside inheritance from which he could 
support himself. This was not the case for mothers, as they were only obligated 
to provide for their children so long as the children could not provide for 
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themselves.426 In turn, a man’s rights as a father were “to have authority over his 
children to enforce his lawful commands, and to correct with moderation his 
disobedient children.”427 Additionally, until the age of twenty-one, fathers were 
“entitled to the services of his children.” According to Bouvier, “during the joint 
lives of the parents, the father is alone responsible for the support of the children; 
and has the only control over them, except when in special cases the mother is 
allowed to have possession of them.”428 Bouvier reminded audiences that if a 
father died, the mother gained legal control of their minor children but she was 
limited the same way a guardian would be.429  
This difference in parental responsibility reflects the assumption that 
women were expected to be perpetual dependents and so not able to support 
families on their own. As Michael Grossberg explains, “prerepublican Anglo-
American law granted fathers an almost unlimited right to the custody of their 
minor legitimate children. Moored in the medieval equation of legal rights with 
property ownership, it assumed that the interests of the children were best 
protected by making the father the natural guardian and by using a property-
based standard of parental fitness.”430 In most states, women could not own 
property, and thus, they were unfit parents compared to fathers. As custody was 
dependent on support, and widows were assumed to be “drains on the 
community,” guardianship was rarely granted to mothers even in the event of the 
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father’s death.431  
Interestingly, both parents were responsible for the financial support of 
adult children if they became “chargeable to the public.” The same expectation 
held for adult children with regard to support for their indigent parents; this mutual 
responsibility demonstrates one of the ways in which legal definitions of age, 
dependence, and independence were arbitrary.432 A parent’s financial 
responsibility to their child was expected to end once their child turned twenty-
one and, in-turn, a parent’s legal ability to benefit from their child’s service ended 
at the same age. Yet poverty could extend these obligations in perpetuity, 
illustrating how traditional expectations of parent-child relationships continued 
well into the nineteenth century irrespective of any statutes which declared 
independence.  
Bouvier echoed Tapping Reeve’s 1816 publication, The Law…. On Parent 
and Child, which goes into much more detail on the expected legal 
responsibilities of parents after the Revolution. Reeve explains that parents were 
to provide for their infant children because “whoever is the instrument of giving 
life to a being incapable of supporting itself is bound by law of morality to support 
such being, during such incapacity.”433 “When such incapacity ceases,” he 
continued, “the obligation is to end.”434 In order to “prevent uncertainty on this 
subject, the law has fixed the time of minority until the child arrives at the age of 
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21 years.”435 Yet, if the child is “unable to maintain himself at the expiration of 
that period,” the parent is “liable for his support.”436 Reeve explained that “this 
duty of supporting adult children [was], in England, enforced by a statute of Eliz.; 
and similar statutes [had] been enacted in most, if not all the States in the 
Union.”437  
Reeve also provided a more thorough discussion of the right of the father 
to “correct with moderation his disobedient children.”438 Reeve explained that “the 
parent has a right to govern his minor child; and as incident to this, he must have 
power to correct him.”439 If a parent failed to discipline his child, then he risked 
allowing his child to become “a victim of vicious habits” who would become a 
“nuisance to the community.”440 Legally, then, parents were expected to 
discipline their children to keep them from becoming moral drains on their 
community the same way parents were excepted to be financially responsible for 
their adult children to keep them from draining community resources. However, 
Reeve acknowledged that what constituted “reasonable” forms or levels of 
discipline and what would be considered extreme or “unreasonable” was a matter 
of opinion that had to be negotiated within the legal system. Furthermore, 
according to Reeve, children had “rights which the law [was supposed to] protect 
against the brutality of a barbarous parent.”441 Reeve published in 1816, 
however, it was not until 1874 that the first case regarding child abuse was heard 
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within the court system, demonstrating the lapse that existed between discussion 
of children’s legal rights and the actuality of them being enforced or strictly 
upheld.442 This offers another example of the disconnect between what legal 
statutes said and what the courts actually did.  
Prescriptive advice literature is useful to illustrate the conflicting messages 
that Early Republicans received about what the ideal relationship between parent 
and child should look like. The democratic revolution as reflected in legal statute 
and de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America indicated to parents and children 
that minors gained rights and control over their own lives as they aged. At the 
same time, advice literature instructed readers, both parents and children, of the 
importance of “filial obedience,” indicating an expectation that traditional family 
relationships of deference were to continue regardless of revolutionary rhetoric. 
Although advice literature does explain some patterns of interaction between 
parents and their children seen in family letters, it was only advice—and advice 
targeted at middle-class families at that. Parents continued to mold their 
relationships with their children as they saw fit.   
 
A close reading of family letters and the relationships that existed between 
parents and children challenges de Tocqueville’s (and historians’) assessments 
of Early Republican family dynamics. Furthermore, gender (of both the parent 
and child) influenced the nature of the relationship between progenitor and 
offspring. For example, mothers worriedly wrote advice to both sons and 
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daughters about the importance of inner character and outer reputation while 
fathers wrote most often about finances and obligations. The difference in the 
tone and topics found in letters from mothers versus fathers suggests de 
Tocqueville was both right and wrong about the “democratic family” model. The 
relationships between mothers and their children did appear more “intimate” and 
egalitarian. However, this was certainly not the case between fathers and their 
children; fathers continued to fixate on financial obligation and control, possibly 
because traditional aristocratic family models had taught them to. 
De Tocqueville’s perception of parent-child relationships was based on a 
literal interpretation of American law, as legally, a “child” transformed into an 
“adult” overnight on his or her twenty-first birthday: “in America,” he wrote, “there 
is, strictly speaking, no adolescence: at the close of boyhood, the man 
appears.”443 However, state statutes which defined age and status were 
incredibly fluid and inconsistently followed. Socially, the transition from childhood 
to adulthood most certainly included a period of “adolescence” in which parents 
attempted to guide their children through the tenuous years of youth. Because 
adolescence is a socially and culturally constructed stage of life, it could, and 
often did, extend well beyond legal adulthood, as will be seen in many of the 
cases discussed at the end of this chapter. More importantly, as suggested in 
advice literature, gender—of parent and child—significantly influenced familial 
perceptions and expectations of dependence and deference.  
It is important to note, however, that for particularly motivated or less 
fortunate youth, adolescence could end before legal adulthood. For example, 
																																																						




parental death or family financial hardship could push a young person to be 
financially responsible for themselves. Philadelphian Reverend Collins, 
discussed in chapter two, recorded a number of legal minors who insisted on 
their independence and right to consent to their own marriages because their 
parents had died.444 Alternatively, some young people, once away from home 
and the watchful eyes of their parents, found their taste for independence too 
intoxicating to give up. This was the case for twenty-year-old John Coffee and his 
fifteen-year-old brother Alexander, who both quit college against the wishes of 
their family to start their independent lives in 1836.445 Due to a multitude of 
factors, all of which were out of parental control, young people transitioned out of 
the stage of adolescence and made their way to adulthood before and after the 
age of twenty-one, as well as with and without their families’ approval.    
Through a close look at a number of Early Republican family papers that 
contain correspondence between parents and children, it is possible to identify 
common topics and strategies parents employed to influence their “adolescent” 
children’s decision-making via letter writing. Because mothers seemed to be 
most concerned with their children’s inner character and outer reputation while 
they were away from home, they often cited the vulnerability of youth as a 
justification for imposing their advice. Fathers, comparatively, seemed most 
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invested in their child’s spending habits and often utilized the restriction of 
financial aid and physical goods or resources as a method of control that could 
easily extend beyond legal adulthood. Interestingly, both mothers and fathers 
alluded to and provided evidence of having sources who informed them of their 
children’s appearance and behavior. The intentional anonymity of these 
surveillance reports aided parents in maintaining control over their children’s 
behavior while away. Finally, when looking at these letters collectively, they 
provide evidence of the plurality of filial relationship types, complicating any easy 
assumptions about the sentimental, democratic family.  
 
Acknowledging the excitement of being away from home for the first time, 
apprehensive mother Jane Henry Garland advised her two teenage daughters, 
eighteen-year-old Sally and fifteen-year-old Mary, to “not let the amusements of 
Richmond ingross too much of your precious time.”446 “Endever to improve in 
virtue and knowledge… [and] find time for solid improvement.”447 Jane’s 
reminders to focus on the task of “improvement” were not groundless. Many 
young people found being away from the watchful eye of their parents to be 
excitingly liberating and full of potential distractions. As twenty-four-year-old 
Sallie Graydon warned her teenage cousin Lou Madden, who was away at 
school, at the top of the list of distractions were interactions with the opposite 
sex. “Do not think too much about the beaux,” Sallie wrote, “wait until you are 
done going to school… some girls you know when in love with a young man can 
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study nothing else.”448 This mixture of excitement, freedom, distraction, and 
youth made parents nervous. It sent many mothers in a writing tizzy, hoping they 
could continue to shape their children’s inner character and protect their outer 
reputation through the advice they provided by way of mail.  
Widowed mother Mary Eppes Cocke articulated the stress and concern 
many antebellum parents, especially mothers, experienced while their children 
were away. For example, on October 6th, 1840, Mary sent the first of several 
letters to her sixteen-year-old son, Richard, who was attending the University of 
Virginia.449 “Attend to the advice of your mother,” Mary begged, “who feels all the 
anxieties for a dear son at College for fear of his morals being corrupted.”450 The 
mother of Sarah C. Watts, a young woman who attended LeRoy Anderson’s 
Female Academy in Williamsburg, Virginia, expressed a similar sentiment as 
Mary Eppes Cocke: “[I] feel a thousand fears, and anxieties, which I never 
experienced, till at so great a distance from you. Nothing but the improvement of 
your mind, could have reconciled me, to so long a separation, particularly at your 
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time of life, when a Mothers presence is so necessary.”451 As can be seen, 
attending schools or visiting extended kin far from the family home was an 
expected part of elite Early Republican adolescence for both young men and 
women, however, this physical distance was also a serious source of anxiety for 
parents.452  
Parents fears were not unwarranted.453 The most common concerns 
surrounded their children’s potential involvement in debt, dueling, illicit sex, 
and/or pregnancy.454 Consequently, mothers often recounted negative examples 
of behavior in hopes that it would influence their children to make better social 
and character choices. For example, Mary Eppes Cocke mentioned a friend of 
Richard’s who had gotten himself into trouble with debt. Mary prefaced her news 
with: “I think you young men behave very badly in spending so much money.” 
She then explained to Richard that, “He had not any business to get in debt for I 
am sure he was allowed enough money for his expenses or his Father wouldn’t 
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have sent him [to school].”455 A few months later, Mary wrote again, this time 
about news of a duel, “I hope you were not concerned in that disturbance which 
happened at the College… [I] think that young man that refused the challenge 
showed his good sense.”456 By commenting on the behavior of Richard’s peers, 
whether it be condemning his friend who got into debt or praising a young man 
for refusing to duel, Mary was signaling to Richard what she expected of him.  
In addition to implying what she expected of Richard, Mary also explicitly 
pleaded with him to take her advice. She worried about Richard’s academic 
reluctance and proclivity toward “idleness,” but more importantly the toll these 
two traits might take on his reputation and status as an elite member of Virginian 
society. For example, just one week after the start of Richard’s semester, Mary 
wrote, “I am sorry to find that you don’t like your situation… I would advice you 
not to quite it for one twelve month, for if you do I am afraid that there will be a 
great deal said about it.”457 Two years later, Richard attempted to quit school 
again, this time because he was “tired and wornout with [his] studies.”458 He 
floated the idea of returning home to manage the Eppes estates that had 
transferred back to his mother after his father’s death in 1836. Mary responded 
with a firm no, “nothing on earth would give me more pleasure than to have you 
with me at home attending to the farms,” she wrote, but “I think you are too 
young to manage such servants as ours for they would torment you out of your 
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Youth and the vulnerability that came along with this stage of life, as Mary 
Eppes Cocke alluded to, was a regular theme in her own and other mothers’ 
letters to their children. For example, of the ten letters Mary wrote to Richard 
between 1840 and 1843, she referenced Richard’s youthfulness in seven of 
them, usually in the context of reminding him to be a “good child” or that his 
youth made it possible to easily reinvent himself if he had slipped into “idleness” 
as a result of his “dissipated” peers.460 “Compose your mind and reform whatever 
bad habits you have contracted for you are young and can easily do it,” she 
wrote on January 22nd, 1841.461 A few months later, Mary expressed severe 
disappointment in Richard for carelessly criticizing his peers via written 
correspondence. “You are entailing misery on yourself and perhaps dislike by all 
your acquaintances,” she warned. Mary feared that others would see the words 
that Richard wrote and cautioned him to “think more and write less.” She 
concluded by noting with disappointment that: “you are young and 
thoughtless.”462  
This fear, that their children acted, spoke, or even wrote before thinking 
due to their youth, was a regular topic that appeared in parents’ letters. Perhaps 
sensing her son’s recklessness, Mary Eppes Cooke had suggested to Richard a 
few months prior “confide in your mother… for she will never betray you.”463 In 
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1807, Sarah C. Watts received similar advice. “It is a sentiment natural to young 
minds to believe every body good and of course our friends as we are not 
conscious of having done any thing to make them otherwise,” her mother 
warned, but “daily experience proves how few there are who deserve the name 
of friends, in me, you have a friend whom you may trust, and one who will never 
betray you.”464 These mothers expressed an identical concern: that their children 
would be naively trusting of their fellow youth, confide in the wrong person, and 
as a result, their reputation would be ruined.  
Jane Henry Garland expressed the same concern about youth, naiveté or 
vulnerability, and love when writing to her two teenage daughters, Sally and 
Mary. Jane’s inability to spell seems not to have impeded her ability to 
communicate concerned motherly advice: “You are now, my Daughters, at a time 
in life that the Hart is susceptible to tender passhun—let me beg of you to gard it 
well, and let it not be taken by outward appearances alone… I only wish to give 
you a caution in time for perhaps when once you have given place to that 
passhean it will not be so easy to get rid of it.”465 By “passhun” Jane meant 
emotions or intense feelings associated with potential suitors. Because her 
daughters were away, Jane was unable to control who they interacted with and 
how often; consequently, Jane was rightfully concerned the girls might engage in 
a courtship with an unsuitable young man. 
 Finally, Philadelphian French ex-patriot Margaret Izard Manigault wrote to 
her close friend, a fellow mother, Josephine du Pont in 1814 about the frustration 
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she felt regarding her nineteen-year-old son, Charles, and his inability to see 
consequences due to his youth, in this particular case regarding his attitude 
about the War of 1812. Margaret explained that “all this chain of events amuses 
him. What seems frightful to us is only a game to the young…. At his age 
temperament is not formed.”466 Margaret saw her son’s excitement for war as 
ignorant and linked his callowness to his age. Furthermore, Margaret’s 
comments are representative of the widely-shared parental awareness of 
adolescence as an in-between stage where mature opinions and careful 
considerations of one’s actions did not necessarily come naturally. Consequently, 
the awareness of youth and adolescence motivated parents to write letters to 
provide their children with a guiding hand.  
 The advice parents offered their children was all encompassing, ranging 
from who to confide in to proper appearance. Eighteen-year-old Sally Garland 
received advice from her mother in 1819 to make sure that she was dressed 
“fashanable (so far as is prudent)” but also to have a “degree of elegance to [her] 
apperence and much neatness.”467 Interestingly, nearly thirty years later, Sally 
passed along similar advice to her nineteen-year-old son William: “I sometimes 
hear you are not as clean as I would wish you, your employment I know is a dirty 
one and you must get cloths enough to change often… I wish you at all times to 
appear neat and genteel.”468 Mary Eppes Cocke also wanted her son, Richard, to 
appear genteel, explaining to him the importance of paying more for quality: “you 
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seem to think that you gave too much for the Cape but I do not for I had much 
rather you should be comfortable and genteel than otherwise.”469 Outward 
appearance, which included the right clothing and proper hygiene, was an 
important part of the performance of gentility and elite status. Without being able 
to see how their children looked every day, mothers worried that they were not 
physically presenting themselves well, which in turn could hurt their reputations.  
In order to have the right clothing for making a good appearance, along 
with the ability to gain access to the other trappings of privilege, young people 
needed money.470 Consequently, money was a point of discussion parents 
regularly raised in their letters to children (and vice versa). More significantly, 
fathers often centered the entirety of their correspondence with their children on 
finances. Some fathers flexed their authority via their purse strings, while others 
simply acknowledged their child’s financial request and provided it. This was the 
case with Sally and Mary’s father, David Garland, who wrote only one brief letter 
to the girls while they were away in Richmond. David’s letter quickly granted the 
girls permission to attend a ball “if [they had] suitable Company” before shifting 
the focus of the letter to finances.471 “Inclosed you will find $20…. If you want 
more perhaps your cousin William can let you have what you want.”472 Mothers 
also discussed money in their letters to their children, but usually in the context of 
thrift linked to one’s moral character. For example, in 1847, Sally Garland Waller 
reminded her son William that while he had “money enough to buy any thing [he] 
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wanted,” he should “keep a memorandum of how [he] spen[t] his money” so that 
she could guide him in his financial decisions both “minute as well as large.”473  
Letters written from seventeen-year-old George Blow to his father, 
Richard, provide an excellent example of the way fathers could, and did, use 
financial resources as a method of control from afar. George’s father frequently 
questioned his son’s spending habits while away at the College of William and 
Mary. This prompted George to provide lengthy, detailed lists (including receipts) 
of his expenses in most letters home in an effort to demonstrate to his father that 
he was not a frivolous spendthrift. “You accuse me of spending too much 
money,” George wrote, “I confess that my expenses have been great, but I must 
also declare that $10 have not been squandered by me this course.”474 Evidently, 
George’s father did not believe him and began holding out on George to test his 
theory.475 On March 13th, 1805, George got desperate and pleaded with his 
father to send his rent and food money. George reminded his father that after he 
agreed to a price for room and board at a local boarding house, George 
“immediately wrote to” him “and requested [his father] remit [George] the money 
to pay” the landlady. “But,” George continued, “you have disregarded my request 
and suffered my feelings to be greatly mortified, by suffering me to present 
myself every day before one to whom I have violated my promise. I really feel so 
ashamed of myself whenever I go to breakfast or dinner that I almost appear like 
a criminal convicted of a crime. I beseech you to rescue me from this 
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Another example of how monetary dependence was a tool parents 
implemented to assert control of their children can be found in letter from mother 
Nelly Parke Custis Lewis to her close friend Elizabeth Bordley. Nelly and her 
husband used the promise of inheritance and financial support to control their 
son, Lorenzo. In 1823, Nelly mentioned to Elizabeth that their family home and 
ancestral lands “[would] be [her] sons when he [turned] 23.”477 Most inheritances 
transferred once a child turned twenty-one, to assign the age of twenty-three 
would have been unusual and purposefully done by the family, possibly to extend 
their ability to control the young man. Evidently this tactic worked because in 
1824, after Lorenzo was twenty-one, Nelly told Elizabeth that “Mr Lewis has 
consented to Lolen’s return to Philadelphia, & I hope he will go in a few days-- & 
be very attentive to his studies.”478 As a legal adult, Lorenzo should have been 
able to do as he pleased, but with the inheritance not yet his, he still required his 
father’s consent before making decisions for himself.  
John Clark, a father and resident of Petersburg County, Virginia, provides 
one final example of a parent’s attempt to control their child’s behavior through 
monetary incentives but from beyond the grave. In 1822, John filed a will with the 
court that explicitly stated that to his “eldest son William Clarke [who] hath highly 
offended and disobeyed me I give and bequeath unto him the sum of five 
hundred dollars to be paid on or before he arrives at the age of twenty years.” 
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However, at the end of his will, he attached the following note: “I hearby 
empower my executors that in case my eldest son William shall conduct himself 
in such a manner as will entitle him to their confidence and approbation, that so 
soon after he becomes of age, as they may think proper and right, they may pay 
him the further sum of five thousand dollars.”479 William’s younger brothers were 
to receive equal shares of the remaining estate, so although John was not willing 
to fully reincorporate William back into his inheritance, by upping William’s sum 
from $500 to $5000, he offered a huge incentive for William to turn his life around 
in accordance with his father’s wishes.  
The diary of nineteenth-year-old Lizzie Neblet expressed the frustration 
children, especially daughters, occasionally felt about parental control over 
access to money. Lizzie’s relationship with her parents was an abusive one. In 
1852, Lizzie got engaged as a means of escaping her parents’ house, yet she 
was concerned about her future husband’s ability to provide for the two of them. 
“I will not be dependent on my parents. Never! Never!,” she wrote a few months 
before their marriage. Revisiting the topic days before the wedding, Lizzie 
exclaimed: “I’ll work my fingers off before I’ll be dependent on him and if Will and 
I do sepperate, I’ll never come back to him. I’ll support myself.”480 Lizzie was not 
concerned with being a dependent; she had readily accepted that she would be a 
dependent of her future husband Will once they married. What Lizzie did not 
want was to be dependent on her parents, her father specifically, any longer and 
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she identified that dependence was a result of the need for money.  
 One of the most effective tools that both parents used to ensure their 
children’s appropriate behavior regardless of gender was the suggestion of 
anonymous surveillance. Both Sally Waller and Richard Blow implied to their 
children that they were being watched even while away from home. In 1847 Sally 
chastised her son William about his appearance, writing: “I sometimes hear you 
are not as clean as I would wish you… you were always careless in your person, 
you are now old enough to pay more attention to it.”481 By commenting on 
something specific such as hygiene, Sally sent a clear message to William that 
others were surveilling him and reporting back to her. George Blow’s father, 
Richard, evidently had a similar arrangement. In 1804, George wrote to his 
father: “it is extremely mortifying to my feelings to be under the necessity of 
vindicating myself to you; but the impressions you have lately received & the 
reports you (I suppose) have heard of me, oblige me undertake this disagreeable 
duty.”482 George did not know who had informed on him, but Richard’s 
information was evidently accurate enough that George felt compelled to explain 
himself and clarify the turn of events. “You have heard that my roommate has 
been implicated in a duel, & that I was his second…” George wrote, “This is not 
true, he indeed was about to fight, but he did not choose me as his second.”483 
The bottom line was that George received the message, his father had eyes and 
ears on George, and if he slipped up or lied, his father would know about it.  
The forms of parental control discussed through out this chapter, whether 
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they be emotional or financial, had nothing to do with actual age and so could 
easily extend into the child’s legal adulthood. Parents were aware of this and 
used the ambiguity surrounding the end of adolescence to their advantage. For 
example, Eliza Whitfield, an unmarried thirty-two-year-old North Carolina woman 
who lived with her mother, remained deferential despite her legal independence. 
In 1842, Eliza wrote to her cousin, Louisa Sills, explaining that because of rumors 
spread about her within their community, her mother would never let her “visit 
Belford [North Carolina] again unless she can know who it was told them lies.”484 
Two years later, Eliza again wrote to Louisa about another controversy she was 
embroiled in, this time when she refused to attend a local wedding because the 
father of the bride had “not acted gentlemen like in his conduct towards our 
Mother.”485 Explaining that had she attended the wedding, she would have 
“treated [her mother] with very little respect.” Eliza's recognition of her mother's 
control of her movements, despite the fact she was in her thirties, confirms that 
she deferred to her mother when making personal decisions, limiting her ability to 
do as she pleased.486  
Letters between traveling Virginian judge Joseph Prentis Senior and his 
twenty-two-year-old son, aspiring lawyer Joseph Prentis Junior, provide a more 
thorough example of an extension of parental control beyond a child’s legal 
independence.487 Joseph Senior regularly referred to Joseph Junior as “my boy” 
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and stated numerous times how important it was that Joseph Junior thought 
through his actions as he was “just entering into life.” Despite the fact Joseph 
Junior was twenty-two years old and so a legal adult, both father and son clearly 
viewed Joseph Junior as in the stage of adolescence. Like many of the mothers 
discussed previously, this father also warned against the danger of a “youthful 
mind,” writing in July of 1805:  
 “The road is beset with Dangers on all sides, every step should be 
trodden with caution. Various are the temptations to depart from that 
path, which leads to Happiness; and in a youthful mind too often it will at 
first become irksome and difficult to persevere in virtuous actions. From 
that cause perhaps it may reasonably presumed that a youth at your time 
of Life may be too careless and inattentive to that great object, 
Reputation or Character. They pursue with unabated zeal the plans 
formed by themselves with the ardour of youth, and confiding in their 
own knowledge, become indifferent as to the opinion of others; at the 
period of Life hurried into irregularities from youthful Zeal they sometimes 
suffer from impressions made and fixed on their character which a life of 
prejudice is received where truth has not the least foundation.”488 
 
Joseph Junior seems to have taken this advice to heart, writing two years later 
(and thus when he was two years older) about the fear he felt over potentially 
making the wrong choice because of his youth. “I trust, however, that from the 
great advantages from being brought up under the eye of such a parent as I had, 
that I shall avoid those vices and immoralities, which the youthful mind falls into 
from the want of correction in the earlier part of their lives.”489 This parental 
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flattery may have been calculated as Joseph Junior used the rest of his letter to 
ask for money. “I endeavor so to curtail my wants as to avoid getting in debt,” he 
explained, “yet with all my endeavor, I keep behind with friend Jones-- It would 
be convenient to me for some small aid on the score board, but my convenience 
I hope will not allow to conflict with yours… I know you have a large family to 
provide for, who are more helpless than myself and therefore require greater 
attention.”490 Joseph Junior’s deferential tone combined with the request for 
funds indicates that even at twenty-four he did not view himself as a fully 
independent adult. He concluded his request by musing that one day he might 
“have the same pleasure of administering to the comfort and want of others” as 
his father could, but despite being legally labeled an adult, he was not yet 
there.491  
 These kinds of ambiguity over when adolescence began and, more 
importantly, when it ended could create different kinds of tension in parent-child 
relationships. In elite families, as seen in the letters discussed above, these 
tensions revolved mostly around a desire for independence from parental control. 
Possibly taking cues from advice literature, elite parents expected different things 
from-- and behaved in different ways towards—their children based on their 
child’s gender. But while elite parents expected deference, largely because of 
their continued financial and social support, they did not depend on their children 
for labor or income the way that lower class families did. Significantly, then, lower 
class families’ labor arrangements are a significant place to see the influence of 
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gender on perceptions of deference and dependence. When a family actually lost 
something if they recognized a child’s legal “adulthood,” we see the clearest 
examples of challenges to legal definitions of age and independence.  
The traditional expectation that children’s labor would contribute to the 
household’s productivity seamlessly continued after the Revolution-- though 
despite some shifts in the experience and understanding of work and labor. This 
was particularly true for families that did not rely on wage-based work 
arrangements in addition to many families who did work for wages but still relied 
on family labor to maintain the household.492 Legally, fathers had the right to 
benefit from their children’s labor, male or female, until their child turned twenty-
one. However, culturally, many families expected this arrangement to continue so 
long as their child was unmarried and dependent in some way on the household 
for survival. This was particularly true for daughters, indicating that gender 
influenced how families viewed expectations of dependence and servitude more 
than chronological age did. Evidence of the commonness of these arrangements 
can be found within the court system through seduction suits and loss of service 
cases tried and appealed in the first half of the nineteenth century.  
At the close of the eighteenth century, the number of seduction suits by 
fathers as a means of seeking legal and financial recourse following their 
unmarried daughters’ pregnancies was on the rise.493 The basis for these 
seduction suits was on a claim of loss of service, which originated with the 
English law of servitude that “recognized the loss a master might suffer if another 
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individual improperly ‘seduced’ away one of his servants.”494 English law also 
defined the status of children as legal dependents, or “servants,” to their fathers. 
This in turn offered a legal loophole for fathers to sue for a “loss of service” when 
their unmarried, underaged daughters fell pregnant, even if the daughter never 
actually labored for the household. Used in this way, the law was automatically 
gendered, as only daughters, not sons, could become pregnant. An analysis of 
these cases shows that parents regularly challenged Early Republican legal 
definitions of age and independence and provides evidence that juries and 
justices struggled with when and how to adhere strictly to the law or to uphold 
communal expectations of gendered dependence.  
 The 1822 Pennsylvania appellate case, Hornketh v. Barr, is an example of 
straightforward loss of service case via a seduction suit in which the father was 
awarded damages for the “debauching of his minor daughter.”495 According to 
trial records, sometime in 1816, with his consent, Hugh Barr’s younger daughter 
moved to Philadelphia to work and to live with her older, married sister. While in 
Philadelphia, “the seduction and confinement of [Barr’s] daughter took place… 
before she attained the age of twenty-one years.” The defense appealed the 
case on the grounds that because Barr’s daughter was living with her sister, 
technically her sister was her master, and she should be the one to sue for a loss 
of service. If the girl “did not live with her father, he could not lose for want of her 
services” they argued.  However, as the initial court as well as the appeals court 
ruled, because the girl was a minor, “the father could command the services of 
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his child at any time. Therefore, during her pregnancy and confinement, he lost, 
because he could not have had her services, if he had required them.” The two 
factors that made the ruling in Hornketh v. Barr so clear cut were the fact that the 
girl was under the age of twenty-one and that Hugh Barr was her “natural” 
father.496  
Other rulings for seduction suits and loss of service cases involving 
stepfathers suing on behalf of their minor stepdaughters, or a “seduced” adult 
daughter were much more complicated and circumstantial. Justices (and juries) 
had to balance communal expectations of deference and continued familial 
dependence with legal definitions of age and independence as well as the rights 
(or rather lack there of) of stepfathers. By looking at seduction suits that were 
challenged and appealed, we gain an important insight into how parent-child (and 
stepparent-stepchild) relationships operated outside of legal definitions of age 
and independence as well as how fluid and negotiable legal statutes could be.      
The relationships that existed between stepparents and stepchildren were 
just as complex and individualistic as those between parents and their biological 
children. The main difference were the legal expectations (or lack thereof) that 
undergirded these relationships. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, biological 
fathers were legally obligated to provide for their children during their minority 
while stepfathers had no such obligation. In fact, Early Republican courts viewed 
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stepfathers with suspicion, and a number of laws limited the control stepfathers 
could have over their stepchildren and their inheritance.497 At the same time, 
legal scholars often discussed the concept of “in loco parentis,” when a 
stepfather essentially adopted his stepchildren by voluntarily providing for and 
treating them as “his own.”498 Thus, if a stepfather “held [a stepchild] out to the 
world as part of his family,” then he should also be required to support that child 
as a biological father would be.499 Following the same logic, a stepfather who 
provided for his stepchildren should then also be entitled to that child’s service. 
The key word here is should.  Legal scholars put forth these assertions in their 
publications on common law, but according to statute, stepfathers clearly had no 
obligations and they had no rights.  
Four cases, Bartley v. Richtmeyer, Bracy v. Kibbe, Williams v. Hutchinson, 
Lantz v. Frey and Wife, heard in New York or Pennsylvania in the 1850s, 
collectively illustrate the complicated relationships that stepfathers formed with 
their stepchildren. Each case sheds light on the difficultly courts faced in 
determining what was more important when deciding on a verdict: the 
individualized relationship that existed between stepparent and stepchild or the 
generalized legal relationship? Justices who oversaw the appeals of these cases 
also considered the impact of their verdicts in setting precedents that might 
negatively influence stepparent-stepchild relationships or undermine male 
authority in the ability to control daughters and other female dependents. 
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Together, these cases illustrate the disconnect that occurred between how legal 
statute was expected to work theoretically and how it actually was applied within 
the court system.  
The first case, Bartley v. Richtmeyer, was heard by New York appellate 
justices in 1850. Several years prior to the case, in 1843, seventeen-year-old 
Gitty Ellen McGarey moved out of the New York home she had shared with her 
mother and stepfather, Mr. Bartley. Evidently the relationship Gitty had with her 
stepfather was complicated one; although he had raised the girl since she was 
five, by her late teens he had told “her to leave his house.”500 According to trial 
records, Gitty “abandoned [Bartley’s] house, assumed the exclusive 
management of her own affairs, and was then in the actual employ and service of 
another, under stipulated wages”; for all intents and purposes, then, she was 
acting as an independent adult. Most importantly though, “so far as appeared, 
[Gitty did not have] any intention of returning” to the household--that is until she 
became pregnant two years later. At five months pregnant, Gitty was invited to 
move back to her family home and offered a job working for her stepfather for 
“six shillings a week.” While she lived with her mother and stepfather, she gave 
birth, was “confined there and nursed and attended during her sickness.” At 
nineteen years old, Gitty remained a legal infant, and now that she lived back at 
home, her stepfather saw her as under his control. Consequently, Bartley 
brought a seduction suit against Mr. Richtmyer, the presumed father of Gitty’s 
child, in order to claim damages and seek remuneration for a loss of service.  
Had Gitty been Bartley’s biological child, this would have been a 
																																																						




straightforward case—fathers had a legal right to the service of their minor 
children, regardless of whether their child lived with them or away from them. As 
justices of the Court of Appeals pointed out, regardless of the quality of the 
relationship that existed between a father and a daughter, a father had a “right to 
reclaim the custody of her person and her services” so long as his daughter was 
a legal infant. Stepfathers, however, “had no such right.” Still, a legal precedent 
had been set that allowed for “any one standing in loco parentis” when the “father 
was dead” to prosecute for seduction.501 According to the prosecution’s argument 
in the original trial, Bartley had “assumed the place of a parent, and [Gitty] was 
regarded as a member of his family at the time of the seduction.” Consequently, 
“the dishonor and suffering” caused by Richtmyer’s “seduction” of Gitty “fell upon 
[Bartley] and his household.” This combined with the fact that Gitty had become 
Bartley’s servant while she was pregnant led the trial court to rule in Bartley’s 
favor and award him $1000 in damages.502  
Unsurprisingly, the verdict was appealed and eventually reversed by the 
Court of Appeals on the grounds that Bartley was not Gitty’s “natural father.” The 
case could set a problematic precedent. Justices argued “there is no blood tie 
between him and the girl; and neither owes any duty or obligation to the other. 
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Callanan v. Bedlow, where a stepfather was awarded the equivalent of half a million dollars 




He has not lost a farthing point of estate; and if we may judge from his conduct in 
dismissing the girl from his house, he has probably suffered very little in point of 
feeling. The wrong which he complains was not done to him, his child, or his 
servant. He has no condition to sue; and has done nothing to gain a title to action 
but to employ a pregnant woman, and pay her stipulated wages.” In other words, 
at the time of the alleged seduction, Bartley had no relationship with Gitty: he 
was not her master and he was not acting in loco parentis since she had moved 
out due to disagreements with each other. Even more problematic was the fact 
that the damages awarded to Bartley belonged solely to him, “he [was] under no 
obligation to share it with the girl, or to do anything for her support.” 
Consequently, “if such a verdict be had in such a case, the hiring of a pregnant 
female into one’s service [would] be a profitable business.”503   
 Comparing Bartley v. Richtmyer with a similar case, Bracy v. Kibbe, it 
becomes clear that justices (and juries) struggled with how to balance legal 
expectations with social realities surrounding stepfathers’ rights. Bracy v. Kibbe, 
heard in 1859 also in New York, this time by the state Supreme Court, was a 
seduction case where William Bracy sued Mr. Kibbe for impregnating his fifteen-
year-old stepdaughter, Alvira. In both trials, the justices sought to determine what 
type of relationship existed between stepfather and stepchild prior to the offense. 
The relationship between Bartley and Gitty was a distant one that became 
nonexistent once she left his home. Comparatively, William Bracy had essentially 
adopted Alvira at the age of two, giving her his last name and raising her as he 
would a biological child despite the fact that “she was the illegitimate daughter of 
																																																						




his wife by another man.” As a result of Bracy’s actions toward Alvira, justices 
argued that “he stood, therefore, in loco parentis, and was clearly entitled to 
sustain the action.”504 In the initial trial, Bracy was awarded “$200 in damages,” 
demonstrating that jurors determined the relationship between Bracy and Alvira 
was close enough to that of father and child that he had a right to recoup losses 
as a “natural” father would.  
Ultimately, Kibbe appealed the case, arguing that damages were meant to 
be awarded to compensate for the “supposed loss on the part of the parent of the 
society of a chaste and pure daughter” and according to Kibbe, Alvira was no 
such thing to begin with. Rather, Alvira had “already been impure,” which meant 
that Bracy lost nothing in that regard through Kibbe’s relationship with Alvira. 
Furthermore, there was evidence that suggested that Bracy and his wife 
encouraged Alvira to name Kibbe as the father of her child, even though there 
was chance he might not be. As a result of the concerns surrounding the 
credibility of Alvira’s testimony as well as Alvira’s character prior to the 
relationship, the state Supreme Court justices reversed the judgment and 
ordered a new trial. Essentially, the case was overturned because of the 
successful gendered attack on Alvria’s virtue. Although the case itself was 
retried, it was for reasons that had nothing to do with the legality of a stepfather 
claiming losses for a stepdaughter’s indiscretions. This illustrates just how 
flexible legal definitions of parenthood and responsibility could be.  
Two final cases involving a stepfather and his stepchild adds to our 
understanding of how these relationships and rights were negotiated within the 
																																																						




legal system. It is important to point out that in the first two cases, Bartley v. 
Richtmeyer and Bracy v. Kibbe, stepfathers brought suit, specifically on the 
grounds that their stepdaughters’ pregnancies caused “loss of service.” Although 
obvious, only daughters can become pregnant; consequently, these cases were 
built around a gendered expectation of female dependence, regardless of the 
legal relationship to the child. The next two cases to be discussed involved 
stepchildren suing their stepfathers for back pay, arguing that due to the nature 
of their relationship, their stepfathers did not own their labor and had no right to 
freely profit from it.  
In 1850, the New York Court of Appeals heard Williams v. Hutchinson, a 
court case that pitted a stepfather, Mr. Hutchinson, against his stepson, Mr. 
Williams. Similar to the seduction suits discussed above, the court recorded the 
type and length of relationship that existed between Hutchinson and his 
stepson.505 In 1834, Hutchinson married the plaintiff’s mother when the plaintiff 
was “eleven years old.”506 According to the trial record, Williams had two full-
blooded brothers, Hutchinson had four biological sons, and after the marriage 
“they all lived [as a] family together.” More importantly, “the step-children were 
clothed and schooled and treated in all respects the same as the other children, 
and performed labor for [Hutchinson] suitable for children of their age and 
condition.” Hutchinson seemed to think he was acting as a “natural father” for 
Williams because although he made no “express agreement or understanding 
that [Williams] would receive wages” for the work he did on Hutchinson’s farm, he 
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also did not make any “account for [Williams’] board, schooling, or clothing.” Now 
twenty-seven years old, Williams took Hutchinson to court because he felt that he 
was owed back wages for the labor he performed as a child. Williams argued that 
Hutchinson was not his “natural” father and so Hutchinson was never entitled to 
Williams’ service.  
A referee assigned by the lower court determined that, after “the value of 
[Williams’] board, clothing, and schooling” were factored in, Hutchinson had 
benefited from Williams’ labor by a total of “$146.81.” However, because there 
was never any kind of agreement or implication that Hutchinson would pay 
Williams’ wages for his labor, jurors ruled in Hutchinson’s favor. Williams 
appealed the decision but the Court of Appeals upheld the verdict. Justices of the 
higher court pointed out “that where a man stands in loco parentis, he is entitled 
to the rights and subject to the liabilities of an actual parent, although he is not 
legally compelled to assume that relation.” More importantly, justices argued that 
they would not want to “establish a rule calculated to deter the husband from 
adopting his wife’s children, by a former marriage, into his family…if, therefore, 
the husband voluntarily adopts them, and discharges his whole duty towards 
them as a parent and a good citizen, the law should be liberally construed in his 
favor.”507 
A similar case took place in 1850 in Pennsylvania where the state 
Supreme Court heard a case between a stepfather, Mr. Frey, and his 
stepdaughter, Mrs. Lantz. According to trial records, Mr. Frey married Mrs. 
Lantz’s mother and took the girl in as his daughter until she herself was 
																																																						




married.508 The stepdaughter sued her stepfather for wages “for services 
rendered after attaining full age.”509 It is unclear how long Mrs. Lantz lived and 
worked for her stepfather before marrying but after turning twenty-one; to the 
court, it was irrelevant. State Supreme Court justices identified Mrs. Lantz as a 
“dependent” and explained that she lived with her stepfather and mother in the 
capacity of a daughter, “not a menial or hireling.” Consequently, she could not 
expect wages since no contract was ever formed and she had regularly received 
“shelter, food, clothing, and education” from Mr. Frey. More importantly, though, 
to award Mrs. Lantz wages could set a dangerous precedent that could 
discourage stepfathers from providing “protection and aid to orphan children” of 
their wives.  
Clearly the justices of this case had the same concern as the justices who 
ruled on Williams v. Hutchinson. They were so invested in facilitating the 
rebuilding of broken families (from death or divorce) that they were willing to give 
stepfathers more control and rights over their stepchildren than the statutes 
intended. As Lisa Wilson has argued, during the antebellum age of reform, “the 
importance of having a mother [or father] in a middle-class family overcame the 
ancient prejudices against stepmothers [and stepfathers], making them the ideal 
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trial record.  
509 The fact that Mrs. Lantz was suing for wages that would have been earned while she was an 
adult and the courts denied her because they saw Mr. Frey as acting in loco parentis is 
certainly interesting. However, because no specific details about Mrs. Lantz’ chronological age 
were included, not much can be deduced about age and dependence from this ruling. As will 
be discussed later in this chapter, courts struggled with how to balance social perceptions of 
unmarried female dependence with legal statute which set the age of independence at twenty-




replacement, preferable to servants or overextended relatives.”510 While Wilson 
was referring specifically to the depiction of stepmothers in “children’s literature 
and women’s magazines,” her argument helps explain the favorable treatment of 
stepfathers within the court system.511  
When looking at these four cases in relation to one another, it becomes 
clear that there was a disconnect between how stepfather’s rights were recorded 
in the statute and how they were interpreted within the court system. In each of 
the above cases, jurors and justices sought additional information regarding the 
length and quality of relationship that existed between stepfather and stepchild. If 
there was evidence that the stepfather acted in “loco parentis,” as was the case 
in Bracy v. Kibbe, Williams v. Hutchinson, and Lantz v. Frey and Wife, jurors and 
justices were inclined to treat the relationship as that of a natural parent-child 
relationship-- where the father was legally entitled to the services of their child. 
Clearly, jurors and justices flexibly interpreted the legal rights of stepfathers. This 
flexibility also extended to biological fathers who attempted to push the 
boundaries of legal dependence beyond the age of twenty-one for unmarried 
daughters. 
The traditional expectation that daughters remained at home and 
dependents of their families so long as they were unmarried continued even as it 
became at odds with legal definitions of age and independence. Four court cases 
illustrate this tension between law and tradition that increasingly surfaced within 
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511 Lisa Wilson discusses the impact of the antebellum age of reform on the perception of 
stepmothers. Prior to this period, stepmothers were “demonized.” However, during the 
nineteenth century, “in children’s literature and women’s magazines, the good stepmother 




the court system; two occurring in North Carolina and two in Pennsylvania. The 
two cases that were tried in North Carolina were both filed by the “natural” 
fathers, while the cases heard in Pennsylvania were filed by other family 
members. When looking at legal statute that defined independence at the age of 
twenty-one, it would seem that all four cases would be fairly straightforward, with 
the plaintiffs losing because the “seduced” were legal adults. Yet this was not the 
case; the rulings of the four cases provide additional evidence of how jurors and 
justices weighed the significance of legal definitions of age and independence 
with communal and familial expectations of status, dependence, and gender.  
North Carolinian Jacob Phipps took John W. Garland to court in 1838 for 
the “seduction of his daughter” who at the time was “about thirty years old.”512 
Before offering their ruling, jurors were given information on the living 
arrangements of the daughter. According to the daughter’s testimony, “her 
father’s house was her home; her bed and furniture and all her other property, 
except some clothing, remained there.” However, “with her father’s consent, [she] 
went to live in the house of the defendant’s father… as a hireling, and remained 
there three or four years, performing such services as were required.” On one 
hand, Phipps’s daughter was an acknowledged legal adult due to her 
chronological age. Yet she made clear that she deferred to her father for consent 
on life choices and considered her father’s house as her home, insisting she 
remained a dependent of his. To reaffirm this dependent/servant status, Phipps’s 
daughter testified that she occasionally returned to her father’s home and 
“performed the ordinary duties in his family of washing, cooking, and milking.” In 
																																																						




the original trial, the jury found in favor of Phipps; however, Garland appealed 
and won. 
The outcomes of the initial trial and the subsequent appeal reveal how 
communal and legal interpretations of father-daughter relationships were at times 
at odds with one another. The initial trial was ruled upon by a jury, or members of 
the community that Phipps and Garland lived in. Most likely made up of similarly 
aged and life-staged men, jurors may have taken into consideration their own 
family circumstances and the realities that although children symbolically became 
independent adults at the age of twenty-one, that did not mean that they actually 
did so—especially when these children were unmarried females. However, the 
appeals case was ruled upon by justices who would have more interest in 
adhering strictly to the law. In the appeals case, justices stated that because “the 
daughter was of full age and did not live with her father at the date of the 
debauchery” then there was “no legal obligation on the father to maintain and 
take care of her.” Consequently, Phipps had no right to sue for loss of service.  
 A similar case occurred just six years later, also in North Carolina, when 
Lewis Briggs sued John J. Evans for impregnating his daughter.513 At the time 
she became pregnant, Briggs’s daughter was twenty years old and living with her 
grandmother. One month after conception, she turned twenty-one. It was put to 
the jury to determine what right the father had to sue for a loss of service given 
that the girl was an infant at the time of conception but an adult for most of the 
pregnancy and the subsequent birth. The trial judge recognized the uniqueness 
of the case and “instructed the jury” to decide the following:  
																																																						




before the daughter became of age, the action might be sustained by the 
father in his paternal character for the loss of the services of the 
daughter, and that, after she became of full age, it must be sustained in 
the character of master for the loss of the services of his servant—that in 
this action the loss of some service must be proved, in order to entitle the 
plaintiff to recover any damages at all, but if the evidence satisfied them 
of the loss of any services of the daughter, as daughter or servant, in 
consequence of the defendant’s act of seduction, then they might take 
into their consideration the anguish and disgrace brought upon the 
plaintiff and his family, in order to enhance the damages.514 
 
The jury, again most likely made up of similarly stationed men, found for the 
woman’s father, Mr. Briggs. The case was appealed and made its way to the 
state Supreme Court where justices upheld the original verdict. Evans argued 
that Briggs could not sue for loss of services “without proof of an actual contract 
for services after the daughter became of age.” Justices disagreed, arguing that 
because it was clear that she lived with her family and provided services at the 
time of the seduction, an assumed master-servant relationship existed. Justices 
explained:  
 
Before the child attains the age of twenty-one years, the law gives the 
father dominion over her, and, after, the law presumes the contract, 
when the daughter is so situated, as to render services to the father, or is 
under his control; and this it does for the wisest and most benevolent 
purposes, to preserve his domestic peace, by guarding from the spoiler, 
the purity and innocence of his child. If this were not so, in those cases… 
the unfortunate parent would be without redress, if his daughter were 
over twenty-one years of age.515  
 
The assertion that a legally recognized master-servant relationship was not 
dependent on a contract regardless of chronological age was counterintuitive. 
The ruling in Lewis Briggs v. John J. Evans highlights the arbitrariness of legal 
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distinctions of age and independence, as many families maintained traditional 
relationships that kept unmarried women in perpetual dependence and deference 
to their families.  
Like Jacob Phipps v. John W. Garland and Lewis Briggs v. John J. Evans, 
Logan v. Murray and Wilson v. Sproul were seduction suits and loss of service 
cases heard in Pennsylvania that revolved around a pregnant adult woman 
“dependent.” In these specific cases, the “seduced” was either not the “natural” 
daughter of the plaintiff or the plaintiff was the mother, which weakened the claim 
to her daughter’s service. The outcomes of these last two trials suggest that 
although many families continued their expectations of unmarried female 
dependence regardless of the woman’s chronological age, courts were only 
willing to extend the assumed master-servant relationship beyond adulthood for 
fathers.  
In the first case, heard in 1820, Margaret Logan attempted to sue the man 
who impregnated her daughter, Sarah, on the grounds that the resulting 
pregnancy led to Sarah’s death and ultimately deprived Margaret of her 
daughter’s labor. The lower court ruled that because Sarah was “above the age 
of twenty-one years” and no indenture contract existed between mother and 
daughter, Margaret had “no legal right” to Sarah’s labor and so could not sue for 
compensation.516 Margaret attempted to appeal the case but state Supreme 
Court justices reaffirmed the mother’s inability to file a claim.  
A similar case occurred in 1831 after unmarried, twenty-eight-year-old 
																																																						




Polly Porter fell pregnant. Her brother-in-law, Robert Sproul attempted to sue the 
child’s father, John Wilson for seducing Polly and causing a “loss [of] service.” As 
Sproul explain, after Polly gave birth, “she was nursed by [Sproul’s] wife; was 
confined two weeks, and worked but little for four weeks.” Because both of 
Polly’s parents had died, she was unmarried, Sproul was her brother-in-law, and 
she occasionally worked for him in exchange for boarding, Sproul assumed Polly 
was his dependent.517 Jurors found in favor of Sproul and ordered Wilson to pay. 
However, the ruling was appealed. The justices explained that it was true that 
parents were not the only family members who could sue for a loss of service, for 
example, “an aunt may maintain an action for the seduction of her niece. So, 
also, a person may maintain an action for the seduction of an adopted child.” 
However, “in such cases, the child must be under age, and actually employed in 
the service of the plaintiff.” Consequently, state Supreme Court justices reversed 
the judgment because “the seduced was twenty-eight years of age, and was 
neither the daughter, niece, nor servant of the plaintiff… she paid him for her 
boarding, and was in every respect her own mistress.”518 
 All four cases revolved around the issue of lost service due to pregnancy, 
however, in none of the cases was the unmarried woman in question under the 
age of twenty-one or a legally contracted servant. The fact that these women 
were unmarried was precisely what caused their families to view them as 
dependents, despite the fact they were all legally recognized as independent 
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adults due to their chronological age.519 Clearly, for many families and the 
communities they lived in, one’s marital status and gender was more important 
than one’s chronological age in determining a person’s status in life. Women 
could be well over the age of consent, yet if they were unmarried, they were still 
considered a childlike dependent who owed deference to their families. 
Significantly, jurors and justices consistently upheld the perception of continued 
female dependence if a seduction suit was brought forward by a “natural” father, 
indicating a reluctance by courts to use legal definitions of independence to 
undermine a fathers’ control of their unmarried female children.  
One final court case heard in New York, Bennet v. Smith and others, 
suggests that under extraordinary circumstances, the rights of a father could 
challenge the rights of a husband. According to common law and statute, 
marriage was a transformative act. But, rather than gain the status of an 
independent adult, marriage simply transferred the right to the woman’s custody 
and services from that of her parents to that of her husband. Bennet v. Smith 
attempted to challenge this legal transition of authority by raising issues of 
chronological age, consent, and deviant behavior to undermine a husband’s right 
to the “company” of his wife. In 1856, Mr. Bennet sued his wife’s parents, the 
Smiths, because, he argued, they “seduced” her away from him, “depriving him 
of his wife’s… society and services.”520 The Smiths countered Bennet’s claim by 
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explaining that they had never consented to the marriage between Bennet and 
their daughter, who at the time of the marriage was between “fifteen and sixteen 
years of age.”521 More importantly, all they had done was allow their daughter to 
return to their home and advised her to not go back to Mr. Bennet because he 
was “so immoral and indecent as to render him grossly unfit for her society.”522 
Consequently, by harboring their daughter, the Smiths were acting within their 
legal rights to “protect their [child] from injury” and relieve her from “distress.”523 
Still, Bennet had a valid and rarely challenged argument, that by marrying the 
Smith girl, he had a legal right to the “comfort and assistance of his wife” which 
was “violated” by her parents’ actions of support. 
The heart of the case was determining whose authority and rights 
mattered most and when: a husband wanting access to his wife or a father 
protecting his child? In the original trial, jurors awarded Bennet damages to be 
paid out by the parents. However, the Smiths appealed the decision and justices 
granted them a new trial, determining that the original judge had erred by not 
allowing evidence of Bennet’s immoral behavior to be included in the trial 
testimony. By refusing to hear this, jurors lacked a critical understanding of the 
motivation behind the father’s advice to his daughter to leave her husband. State 
Supreme Court justices who ruled on the appeal case argued that, “the law is not 
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522 According to court records, Bennet was said to have “habits of drunkenness” and “of 
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prostitutes.” He was also “profane, vulgar and lascivious.” Bennet v. Smith and others 
523 The court record specifies that “Parents are under obligations, by the law of nature, to protect 




so unreasonable as to regard mere advice in such a case, prompted by parental 
love, as a wrong, entitling the husband to damages.” More importantly, “the 
rejection of this evidence assumed that a habitual drunkard, a frequenter of 
brothels, and so debased as to boast of illicit intercourse with prostitutes, was 
entitled to the same measure of damages for depriving him of his wife, as a man 
of good habits and fair character.”  
By granting a new trial, justices were sending a complicated message: 
that parents had inherent, life-long rights to protect their children and that these 
rights were to be carefully weighed against that of a husband’s rights if the 
husband behaved immorally. Justices insisted that Bennet’s behavior, his 
“profligate habits and his criminal connection with other women,” alienated his 
wife’s “affections and destroyed the comfort he had of her company.” In other 
words, his actions pushed her away. Knowing this side of the story, the father’s 
motivation to advise his daughter to stay away from her husband becomes much 
less malevolent. Significantly, the person Bennet v. Smith and others revolved 
around had no voice in the case—possibly because she was legally an infant or 
because she was a dependent female, most likely a combination of the two. The 
fact that this young woman’s perspective was precluded only underscores the 
assumption that women, married or single, adult or minor, remained in a 
perpetual state of deferential dependence which required men to provide for and 
protect them.   
 




“an American woman is always mistress of herself.”524 When read against the 
court cases discussed above, de Tocqueville could not be more wrong. An 
American daughter was never her “own mistress.” Instead, she was always 
perceived as someone’s dependent, regardless of her age, because of her 
gender. This perception of female dependence was so expected that it was 
regularly upheld within the legal system, despite the fact that it went against 
statutes that defined adulthood by age. But the same could be said for most 
young men such as Joseph Prentis Junior or Lorenzo Lewis who deferred to their 
parents’ advice and relied upon their financial support past the age of legal 
independence. A more constructive and accurate way of interpreting Early 
Republican parent-child relationships, then, is to recognize the negotiation of 
power dynamics and control that continued irrespective of law, literature, and 
chronological age.  
As this chapter argues, parents continued to assert their authority and 
control over their children until they believed their child was ready to assume an 
independent identity, which was not always when that child reached the age of 
twenty-one. Although advice literature and legal definitions of dependence and 
independence acted as guidelines for parent-child interactions, in reality, parents 
continued to shape their relationships with their children based on their own 
familial needs and expectations. Letters give insight into day-to-day life within 
individual families and show how parents informally asserted their authority over 
their children. Seduction and loss of service suits demonstrate how parents 
disregarded legal definitions of independence and the narratives of family life 
																																																						




found within the trial records give us glimpses at the conflicts that existed 
between parents and their children regarding age, dependence, and deference.  
Finally, cases heard in the trial and appellate courts provide evidence of 
the way schisms appeared between local practice and the supposed absolute 
power of the law, highlighting how flexible statutes defining age and 
independence truly were. At the same time, cases that negotiate age and 
dependence provide evidence of the ways age was perceived within a particular 
community as well as strategically employed to win a legal case. As seen in 
Jacob Phipps v. John Garland, the exact age of Phipps’ daughter (thirty years 
old) was presented as evidence in the court case. The inclusion of the young 
woman’s age in trial testimony was a strategic decision on the part of the defense 
to undermine the father’s claim to her service. As will be shown in the following 
chapter, John Garland’s lawyers were not the first to argue for a strict 















“Well grown for his age”: 
Age as a Legal Strategy in the Courts 
On October 31st, 1851 in Houston County, Georgia, a young white woman 
named Mary Daniel arrived home from her job picking cotton “just at night… 
alarmed and in the deepest distress.” Her dress was torn in multiple places and 
her body had “marks of great violence and abuse” upon it. According to her 
parents, “there was no earthly doubt as to the nature and extent of the injury she 
had suffered… her person had been violated… and every appearance indicated 
that it was forcible and against her will.” Mary had told her mother that “it was 
Stephen (a black “man slave”) that hurt her.” Following Mary’s accusation, 
Stephen was arrested and put on trial for rape. On the surface, this case 
represents just one among many historical examples of the fraught debate 
surrounding race, gender, sexuality, and criminality, while also underscoring the 
vulnerability of black men to charges of rape.525 However, this case is significant 
not only for these reasons, but because gendered perceptions of age, maturity, 
and consent played the central role in securing a rape charge in addition to race. 
Through a close reading of cases like Stephen v. State, this chapter 
demonstrates that age-- a mutable construct that intersected with race and 
gender in critical ways-- became a key legal strategy employed during the Early 
Republican period.  
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Stephen’s “admission” to the crime thoroughly established his guilt, which 
automatically raises questions about the confession’s legitimacy. According to 
the state of Georgia, after Stephen was arrested he admitted the rape to a fellow 
prisoner, John W. Johnson, who later testified against him. Chained together “by 
the side of Moreland’s store house, at Hayneville,” Stephen allegedly told 
Johnson that:  
he was very sorry that he had done as he had, and that had it not been 
for Anthony (another slave) he should not have acted so.” Witness 
cautioned prisoner to be careful how he talked, for that it might cost him 
his life. He then asked him if the charge was true? He said, “Yes, but 
Anthony caused him to do it.” He stated, “that he had heard, that if a girl 
was not large enough, that to tie something around her waist, would 
make her big enough. Mary did not make much objection to having the 
handkerchief tied around her, but when it came to throwing her down on 
the ground, she objected and struggled.” He said, “he did not succeed in 
accomplishing his ends, she was too small.” He said, “the devil had 
induced him to do it… he sent for the girl to bring him a pin, making out 
that he had a splinter in his finger, and in that way he got hold of her. 
She was picking cotton on one side of the fence, and he at work on the 
other.526  
Not only did Stephen’s statements (as recounted by the fellow prisoner) 
confirm that the crime was premeditated, intentional, and forceful, but he also 
referred to Mary as a “girl” and made comments about the sexual immaturity of 
her genitals, referring to them as “too small” to “accomplish his ends.” This was a 
key aspect of the prosecution’s argument for charging Stephen with rape; 
regardless of her actual age, if Mary was not sexually (or intellectually) mature, 
she could not be considered a woman and the sex could not be consensual. 
Furthermore, its important to point out that this “admission” was never given to 
																																																						




the state directly by Stephen but rather through a third party, a fellow prisoner, 
who certainly could have traded his testimony against Stephen for his own 
favorable treatment or acquittal.    
With accusation and admission in hand, the initial jury trial was fairly cut-
and-dry. The jury found Stephen guilty and sentenced him to death within two 
months of the incident. However, Stephen’s legal counsel appealed the case to 
the state Supreme Court by questioning both the validity of Mary’s statements 
and the alleged admission. Mary never testified for herself in either case because 
her lawyers portrayed her as a “weak-minded creature” who was incapable of 
being “brought as a witness upon the stand.”  Her testimony instead came 
through her mother, who, as the defense pointed out, never mentioned “the pin 
and the splinter” incident “as it was related by the prisoner to Johnson.” The 
Georgia Supreme Court ruled that regardless of whether the testimony or the 
admission were factual, there was evidence that sexual intercourse had occurred 
between Mary and Stephen. As a result, a new issue was raised: whether Mary 
was capable of consent. 
By portraying Mary as a white girl rather than a white woman, the 
prosecution ensured that Mary would be viewed as a victim instead of a co-
perpetrator and that Stephen, a legal adult, would be charged with rape, rather 
than illicit sex, and sentenced to death. Following English precedent, Early 
Republican American common law defined the age of sexual consent at ten 
years old.527 Sex with a child younger than ten was automatically considered 
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rape and a capital crime, regardless of race. Additionally, in the state of Georgia 
at this time, interracial sex was illegal but not punishable by death; the rape of a 
free white woman by a black man, however, was.528 In this particular case, the 
prosecution worked to show that Mary was incapable of consenting to a sexual 
relationship regardless of her chronological age.  
It is important to consider the status of each Stephen and Mary in order to 
understand how legal interpretations of maturity and consent were the means by 
which this case was argued, not race. Mary’s status as a white, dependent 
daughter who lived at home, may have made it more likely for her to be viewed 
as “young” and vulnerable.529 At the same time, the fact that Mary worked in the 
cotton fields alongside slaves indicates her family was not elite, which could have 
been used to tarnish Mary’s image and undermine a claim of rape. As Martha 
Hodes has argued, in the antebellum South, a white woman accusing a black 
man of rape did not always end in a guilty verdict and execution— the “script of 
false conviction and sure death emerged and developed … in post-Civil War 
America.”530 For example, in North Carolina in 1825, an eighteen-year-old, poor 
																																																																																																																																																																	
before raising it again in 1885 to sixteen years old. America, however, did not change its 
consent laws until 1920 when they raised the age of consent to sixteen years old, with some 
states designating eighteen years old as the age of consent. Rape cases where the victim was 
over the age of ten were tried as misdemeanors which could result in some jail time or a fine. 
For more information on rape and the legal age of consent see Anthony E. Simpson, 
“Vulnerability and the Age of Female Consent: Legal Innovation and its Effect on Prosecutions 
of Rape in Eighteenth-Century London,” in Sexual Underworlds of the Enlightenment, ed. GS 
Rousseau and Roy Porter (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 181-205. 
See also Sharon Block, Rape and Sexual Power in Early America  
528 Adele Logan Alexander, Ambiguous Lives: Free Women of Color in Rural Georgia, 1789-
1879 (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 1991), 89. According to Alexander, 
“Miscegenation in any form was a crime in Georgia.” (Alexander, 89) 
529 For more information on the gender perceptions of dependency within families see chapter 
four of this dissertation. 




white woman, Polly Lane, accused an enslaved man, Jim, of raping her.531 
Initially, Jim was found guilty of the crime and sentenced to death; however, once 
it became clear that Polly was pregnant, witnesses began to come forward and 
attest to knowledge of the existence of a long-term, sexual relationship between 
the two. The likelihood of the consensual nature of the relationship was argued 
on the grounds that Polly was poor and most likely depraved because of her 
class status, making her more likely to willingly engage in sex with a black man. 
Subsequently, Jim was acquitted of the crime. Stephen, like Jim, was a slave, 
meaning he was someone’s property, and valuable property at that. After 1821, 
in North Carolina, “owners of executed slaves were [compensated] only two-
thirds their value,” consequently, a master would not have easily let his slave be 
executed based on a false claim of rape, especially by a lower classed 
woman.532 This reality reveals how critical perceived maturity was in establishing 
Stephen’s guilt—if Mary was legally incapable of consent, then it would not 
matter if she was a “willing” participant.  
Trial records never specified Mary’s age, but it is clear that she was older 
than ten, the legal age of consent, because lawyers highlighted her intellectual 
and physical “deficiencies” so as to challenge the law. More specifically, the 
prosecution insisted that she “lacked the instinctive intelligence to comprehend 
the nature and consequences of [sexual intercourse]… to distinguish, morally 
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532 R.H. Taylor, “Humanizing the Slave Code of North Carolina,” in The North Carolina Historical 




and legally, between right and wrong.”533 Physically, “her mother sw[ore] that she 
[was] nothing but a child; that she had never had her monthly courses; and that 
there was no appearance of womanhood about her.” Consequently, the 
prosecution asked: “in view then of her condition, both as to body and mind, why 
was she not as incapable of consenting, as females of ten years of age and 
younger are, ordinarily?”  
By incorporating a description of Mary’s sexual immaturity, the prosecution 
argued that Mary lacked the capacity for sexual intercourse in every possible 
way—she could not intellectually consent or physically engage in sex. These 
depictions of Mary could have been completely accurate; the only other 
description of Mary comes from Johnson’s retelling of Stephen’s admission and 
in it, she’s referred to as a “girl” and her genitals as “too small.” At the same time, 
these depictions may have been fabricated (along with Johnson’s alleged 
admission) to manipulate the case’s outcome in order to punish Stephen, a black 
man who had sex with a white, dependent daughter.  
The trial testimony suggests that, like race and gender, there was a 
performative element to age. Although there were assumptions about how 
people were supposed to act or a look at specific ages, they did not always act or 
look as expected.534 The prosecution’s descriptions of Mary mirrored descriptions 
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534 As Ariela Gross argues in What Blood Won’t Tell, “by reading trial transcripts critically, it is 
possible to catch glimpses of ordinary people's, as well as lower-level legal actors, 
understandings of legal and racial categories and their own places in the racial hierarchy. Legal 
rules passed by high courts and legislatures had to be translated into practical action on the 
ground. Witnesses, lawyers, and litigants learned to tell stories that resonated with juries or with 
government officials. At the intersection of law and legal culture, we can see the day-to-day 




of a prepubescent child, which suggests that there was a shared understanding 
of how the ability to consent related to one’s intellectual and physical maturity. In 
the state Supreme Court hearing of the case, justices sided with the prosecution 
and offered the following: “the period of ten years designated” by common law “is 
altogether arbitrary.” This was because “no definite time fixed by law [can] infer 
puberty,” rather, “it depends more upon the constitution and habits of body of the 
party, than upon age.” Additionally, one’s maturity (sexual or otherwise) was 
influenced by their community. Justices offered the example that “in cities these 
developments are made earlier than in the country; there females are often found 
living in a state of open prostitution at the early age of 12 or 13 years.” 
Consequently, justices broke from legal precedent and ruled that regardless of 
her chronological age, Mary’s immaturity made her “incapable of consenting.”   
Similar to the prosecution’s description of Mary, it is hard to accurately 
identify the motivations behind this ruling. Did the Georgia Supreme Court 
justices truly believe that legal definitions of age were arbitrary? Or, by ruling that 
Mary was incapable of consent and thus labeling the sexual relationship rape, 
were they simply trying to ensure that Stephen, a black man, would be punished 
for his interracial sexual encounter? Regardless, the verdict of Stephen v. State 
illustrates how chronological age could operate or be manipulated in the legal 
system during the Early Republican and antebellum periods; it demonstrates that 
courts explicitly recognized that the relatively new use of age as a legal marker 
was both important and arbitrary. Under no circumstance could a child under the 
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age of ten consent to a sexual relationship, however, to assume that everyone 
over the age of ten was capable of consent was also problematic and therefore 
open to judicial interpretation. More importantly, the legal significance and 
definition of age was up for debate, and both sides of the prosecutorial aisle 
seized upon the ambiguity of age to win their case.  
One kidnapping case, Davenport v. The Commonwealth, heard in the 
General Court of Virginia in 1829, provides an additional example of how legal 
perceptions of age and the ability to consent to a contract transcended gender 
and race. This case also shows how flexibly statutes could be applied. Alfred R. 
Davenport was found guilty of the kidnapping and attempted sale of a “free 
mulatto boy” named David Caesar. Alfred admitted that he knew David was free 
but insisted that he had the boy’s consent in transacting the sale. Consequently, 
the defense asked that the jury be “satisfied that the taking and carrying away of 
the free boy was against his consent.”535 However, adhering to the legal 
definition of age and consent, the judge ruled that because David was only eight 
years old he was “incapable of giving his consent, and incapable of collusion.” In 
this circumstance, perceptions of age took priority over race and gender; what 
was most important in determining Davenport’s guilt was the fact that David was 
a young child. However, this is not to say that a black boy’s rights were put above 
a white man’s life. While an act had been passed in 1788 that made the sale of 
free person a capital crime, Davenport was only sentenced to “two years” in the 
																																																						




penitentiary.536 In both trial and sentencing, flexibility existed in a seemingly rigid 
legal system. 
Questions of the significance of age entered courtroom discussions 
beyond rape and kidnapping cases; in addition to determining one’s capability, 
communities also used age to determine one’s reliability and culpability. For 
example, one had to understand the significance of being under oath in order to 
give a trustworthy testimony.537 As a result, common law assumed that children 
below the age of fourteen were incapable of testifying because they lacked 
discretion, or the ability to comprehend right from wrong, and the consequences 
of their actions—in other words they were unreliable. Adhering to these same 
assumptions meant that children below the age of fourteen could not be seen as 
culpable for criminal behavior. After the Revolution, states passed laws that 
established that young people below the age of twenty-one (or eighteen 
depending on the state) could not enter into contracts or be held financially 
accountable in business transactions due to their perceived inability to 
comprehend the consequences of their actions.538 When looking at statutes from 
																																																						
536 See June Purcell Guild, Black Laws of Virginia, (Westminster: Heritage Books, 2011), 95. For 
more information on the significance of manumission laws, see Eva Sheppard Wolf’s Race 
and Liberty in a New Nation: Emancipation in Virginia from the Revolution to Nat Turner’s 
Rebellion (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 2006).  
537 Holly Brewer traces the evolution of the use of children’s testimony in By Birth and Consent, 
see pages 155-180. Brewer explains that “during the early seventeenth century, young 
children in both England and America often testified, apparently without even the doubts of 
their veracity later offered by Blackstone.” (Holly Brewer, By Birth or Consent: Children, Law, 
and the Anglo American Revolution in Authority (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2007), 155.) However, “by the early nineteenth century, most criminal court decisions in 
America set fourteen as the minimum age for witness testimony in criminal cases.” Still, 
“judges retained the ability to make exceptions at their discretion if the child could prove 
extraordinary understanding or grasped the nature of an oath.” Brewer, 159. 
538 Brewer explains that in the Middle Ages, “very young children [could] consent to valid 
contracts of different types.” Brewer, 239. Contract laws did not become more formal, 




the first half of the nineteenth century, legal definitions of age and the ability to 
consent, give reliable testimony, or be culpable for crime seem absolute. In 
reality, it was not until the late nineteenth century that more consistent 
connections among chronological age and culpability, reliability, and capability 
were reflected in law and legal proceedings.  
During the Early Republican period, these age specifications acted more 
as guidelines and were regularly challenged by both victims and defendants, 
while jurists were routinely instructed to question the appropriateness of rigid age 
distinctions. Savvy offenders often manipulated interpretations of age meant to 
protect minors by either obscuring their own age in hopes of gaining a more 
lenient sentencing or challenging the testimony of their child victim as unreliable. 
Minors, on the other hand, leaned on definitions of age and culpability to avoid 
punishment for the crimes they committed, while prosecutors pushed back 
against this idea to hold minors more accountable for their actions.539  
This chapter looks specifically at court cases that questioned a child’s 
capacity or criminal culpability as well as cases that pertained to crimes with age 
boundaries, such as the validity of contracts, rape, and abduction and seduction, 
in order to highlight the many examples of how legal definitions of age were 
strategically used and actively challenged (or dismissed depending on the 
circumstances of the case) within the courts. By analyzing court cases that 
included age as evidence, much can be revealed about how communities legally 
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539 Bianca Premo discusses this phenomenon also in Colonial Lima courts. See Bianca Premo, 
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negotiated ideas such as culpability, reliability, and capability in the Early 
Republican period. I also consider the subtle differences in definitions of the 
terms capability, culpability, and reliability to explore how the perception of age 
and ability was used as a legal strategy in the nineteenth century. Culpability 
refers to the ability to be legally responsible for an action or inaction, whether a 
person can be held responsible for criminal activity. Reliability refers to the ability 
to be trusted to understand the significance of one’s words—whether a person 
understands the consequences of being untruthful. Capability refers to one’s 
competency or the ability to give informed consent, be it sexual activity or signing 
contracts. Unsurprisingly, most cases touch on at least two if not all three of 
these issues, further illustrating how entwined their definitions are.  
By looking at cases heard in Northern, Southern, and mid-Atlantic states 
as well as urban and rural areas, it becomes clear that regardless of region, age 
remained a critical tool of legal strategy that was regularly negotiated within the 
court systems of the Early Republic. Legal definitions of age and capability did 
differ slightly from state to state. In Massachusetts, for example, the legal age to 
marry without a parent’s consent was eighteen for girls and twenty-one for boys, 
while in Virginia the age was set at twenty-one for both genders.540 However, for 
the most part, laws which assigned a chronological age to determine one’s 
capacity, culpability, or reliability were the same across state lines.  Most states 
retained English common law as the basis for their legal code, but after the 
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Revolution, updated laws regarding consent and the ability to reason were 
passed “as an assertion of newfound independence.”541 Within all states, 
individuals under the age of eighteen (or twenty-one) were legally referred to as 
“infants.” While the term “infant” today refers to babies under the age of one year, 
historically the term was used in the wider sense to mean “a child” which explains 
its use to denote a minor in the legal arena. 
While not every case that weighed legal and social definitions of age with 
culpability, capability, and reliability ended in life or death, Stephen v. State did. 
Because the Georgia Supreme Court determined that Mary was incapable of 
giving her consent, despite her biological age, justices ruled that Stephen was 
guilty and “unworthy to have a place longer among the living.”542 Of course race 
and gender very likely played a role in the higher court’s final decision to 
reinterpret these perceptions of age and consent. Yet it is also important to note 
that the significance attached to age was a social construction just as race and 
gender were, and that each of these categories of identity mutually constituted 
the others. Many of the following cases seem to end with rulings that either 
protected or forgave young women and girls more often then boys and men, 
suggesting a gendered bias in perceptions of age, maturity, and criminality.  
The first section of this chapter focuses on cases that revolved around the 
question of the capacity of accused child murderers to demonstrate how 
seamlessly age was factored into arguments for or against one’s culpability 
alongside race, class, and gender. Concurrently, the cases discussed in this 
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section illuminate how these “categories of being”—male, female, white, black, 
free, slave, etc.,-- altered one’s perceived maturity and in turn the significance of 
their age as a guideline for criminal culpability. These cases clearly demonstrate 
how contextualized legal interpretations of age were as well as shed light on how 
and why age could be used as a defensive legal strategy—because of the 
willingness of the courts to consider the fluid and contextualized nature of age as 
an arbitrary legal boundary.   
The chapter then shifts to highlight cases where lawyers explicitly 
presented the age (sometimes down to the exact day) of a defendant or victim as 
a legal strategy to win their case. The cases to be discussed include contract 
fraud, rape, and abduction and seduction; and in each circumstance, legal actors 
attempted to argue for a strict interpretation of legal statute regarding age and 
culpability, capability, and reliability. Not all of the defendants, however, were 
minors. Indeed, a few cases existed in which adult males accused of infant rape 
strategically attempted to undermine their victim’s testimony based on legal 
definitions of age and reliability. Furthermore, the use of age as evidence was not 
always successful, demonstrating how circumstantial and inconsistent the 
application of these age-related statutes were.  
It is important to note that the majority of the cases examined here were 
appealed and settled at the state Supreme Court level, illustrating the difficulty 
legal participants faced when trying to reconcile community interpretations of 
culpability, reliability, capability and age with the new statutes. Juries often 




and retrials attempting to throw out rulings that did not adhere to the letter of the 
law. Success in appealing a verdict on the grounds that the original ruling did not 
follow Early Republican legal interpretations of age was mixed. Some justices 
doubled down on the new age restrictions while others shirked the new 
definitions of consent and age just as quickly as jurors did. Regardless, an 
analysis of cases that debated the significance of age of defendants and victims 
demonstrates that Early Republicans understood that the law of age was highly 
flexible and contextual, prompting legal participants to use the negotiability of age 
strategically within the court systems.  
 
In criminal cases, law suggested that age should determine one’s capacity 
to give a confession, be held culpable for a crime, and the level of punishment. 
Culpability is legally understood as the “blameworthiness” of an individual, 
whether a person can be held accountable for their actions or events. By the end 
of the eighteenth century, legal consensus set fourteen years old as the age of 
“discretion,” or the beginning of the ability to understand the consequences of 
one’s actions and be legally culpable for them.543  In turn, below the age of 
fourteen, no matter how horrendous the crime, the child was not supposed to be 
held accountable for their actions. Similarly, confessions given by children 
younger than fourteen were not supposed to be considered valid. A number of 
cases exist where children had confessed to violent crimes, and courts had to 
rule on the validity of these confessions in relation to the child’s perceived mental 
capacity.  
																																																						




The judges and justices who heard these types of cases were particularly 
interested in determining whether the child on trial had the necessary capacity to 
understand the significance of their confession. This is because it made the 
confession “reliable,” but also because if the accused had the capacity to 
understand the significance of their words, they also had the capacity to be 
culpable for the crime they committed. By analyzing the rulings as well as the 
language used to describe capacity in four infant murder cases heard between 
1806 and 1845, one tried in Tennessee, two in New Jersey, and the last in 
Delaware, we can see how race, class, and gender were factored into 
perceptions of age and capacity (and, in turn, culpability). Additionally, by 
exploring these connections we gain insight into how the flexibility of age was 
utilized strategically within the legal system. 
Sometime in early April 1806, Tennessean Michael Doherty, a poor 
widowed father of four young children, went missing. Known to be a drunk, his 
neighbors assumed he had stumbled off while intoxicated and was “dead 
somewhere.” After four days, they went to the Doherty house to check on his 
children. Twelve-year-old Mary, the eldest child, answered the door and 
attempted to brush off her visitors, insisting the children had stayed together on 
their own before and were “not afraid” without their father home. But something 
seemed off, and while discussing the oddity of the situation outside, one neighbor 
“by chance descried something under the house.” Mary reluctantly let the group 
back in, where they discovered Michael Doherty under the floor, dead. It was 




blood, but it was obvious he had met a violent end. More unnerving, however, 
was the fact that all four of his children “were present when the body was found, 
and none of them seem to be alarmed in the smallest degree.”544 Mary was 
quickly accused, and put on trial for the murder. 
The jury charged with determining Mary’s fate was instructed to decide, 
first, if Mary committed the murder and, second, if she appeared to be capable of 
“discerning between right and wrong” and could be held culpable for the crime. 
The trial judge explained to the jury that it is assumed a child under the age of 
fourteen lacks discretion; however, this presumption can be “removed if from the 
circumstances it appears that the person discovered a consciousness of wrong.” 
The court sought testimony that provided insight into Mary’s life, because after 
she was arrested, Mary “seems to have [gone] insane.” During the trial, Mary 
went mute and often stood with her “eyes nearly closed.” The jailer testified that 
while imprisoned, she never spoke and “appeared to be senseless.” More 
significantly, Mary was described as “ghastly pale, without the least expression, 
or indication of understanding.”  
Community members gave testimony insinuating that something was 
wrong with Mary (and her family) prior to her arrest. According to neighbors, 
Mary never went to school, was never seen conversing “with other children in the 
neighborhood,” and “did not appear to be employed as girls her age usually 
[were].” Her father was a known drunk, and her family was never seen at “a place 
of worship.” Furthermore, John Sheflet, a witness for the State, recalled Michael 
telling him that Mary and “two of his other children had run away” at one point, 
																																																						




suggesting Mary had attempted to rid herself of her father before. The testimony 
provided by neighbors worked to Mary’s benefit because it portrayed her as a 
sheltered, possibly abused child, and sheltered and abused children would not 
likely be intellectually advanced for their age.545 
The jury ultimately found Mary not guilty, largely because of her perceived 
incapacity exhibited during the trial. Mary’s story, however, did not end with her 
not guilty verdict. The judge attached a note to her trial transcript which illustrated 
how faulty and performative perceptions of capacity could be. The day after 
Mary’s trial, she was seen sitting outside the courthouse. As two judges walked 
by, Mary “threw up her head up and smiled… instead of her pale death-like 
countenanced exhibited in court, her complexion was vivid, and her countenance 
expressive.” Mary had successfully pulled off the ultimate deception, one “several 
hundreds, if not thousands,” had fallen for.546 Mary had acted incapacitated, 
which, when paired with her age and family history, made it impossible to hold 
her legally responsible for a crime. Her strange behavior shifted the focus of the 
trial from whether she committed the murder or not to whether she understood 
anything that was happening to her. As the judge later pointed out, Mary took 
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advantage of the fact that her community perceived her as “young, without 
education, decorum, a sense of religion, or the benefit of social intercourse.”547 
By doubling down on this perceived lack of intelligence and capacity, Mary pulled 
the wool over everyone’s eyes. 548   
In an interesting twist, the judge blamed Mary’s father for her devious 
behavior. Mary was capable of murder and deception because she possessed an 
“extraordinary character” which the judge attributed to her lack of “schooling, 
precept, example, morals, or light derived from social intercourse.” The judge 
determined that Mary’s “education was a disgrace to those whose duty it was to 
attend to it;” in other words, Mary’s parents had failed her, and, in turn, they were 
responsible for the monster that was created. “Parents,” the judge argued, 
regularly underestimate “the responsibility attached to them.” More importantly, 
the judge insisted that Mary’s case should be seen as “a warning to those who 
have the care of education,” as “crimes of children are too often owing to the 
want of good precepts, education, and morals.”549 After the Revolution, there was 
a significant rise in the education of children as reformers insisted that formal 
																																																						
547 State v. Mary Doherty 
548 Holly Brewer briefly discussed Mary Doherty’s case in By Birth or Consent. Her initial 
analysis coincides with my own in that she argues that Mary’s not guilty verdict was based on 
her youth and perceived lack of “mental awareness.” Brewer uses Mary’s case to argue that 
by the nineteenth century, “age was becoming critical to deciding not only punishment but guilt 
itself." Brewer, 220. However, Brewer does not mention the discovery of Mary’s deception. 
Without this crucial piece of the story, Brewer missed the larger point—that Mary was aware of 
how perceptions of age, capacity, and culpability intersected to determine guilt and that she 
strategically behaved in a way that played up her youth and “incapacity” in order to be 
acquitted.   




schooling was the key to a moral citizenry; the judge certainly applied this 
rhetoric to their interpretation of Mary’s case.550  
State v. Mary Doherty, and the notes attached at the end of the trial 
transcript, demonstrates how age and behavior were knowingly factored into the 
perceptions of capacity and culpability in ways that informed trial outcomes. 
Mary’s performance illustrates how widespread the knowledge of these 
relationships was. As the judge in Mary’s case pointed out, Mary was not very 
well socialized and uneducated. While they perceived these deficiencies as the 
root cause of Mary’s fraudulent character, read another way, Mary’s formal 
ineptitudes point to how commonly understood the relationship between age, 
maturity, behavior, capacity, and culpability actually were. That an uneducated 
child knew that by acting a particular way she could secure herself a not-guilty 
verdict is revealing. Still, Mary’s case was unique not only because of her 
sophisticated manipulation but also because the judge uncovered the truth in the 
end and made note of it in the trial records. The next three cases to be 
discussed, The State v. Aaron, The State v. James Guild, and The State v. Mary 
Bostick, collectively demonstrate how race, gender, and status informed legal 
perceptions of age and capacity.  
 
 In October of 1817 in New Jersey, eleven-year-old Aaron, slave of L. 
Solomon, was tried for the murder of two-year-old Stephen Conelly. On August 
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27th, 1817, the toddler had gone missing and prior to the discovery of his body, 
Aaron had been asked if he had seen him, to which Aaron replied “he is gone up 
the road.”551 Aaron was questioned while he sat perched on the branch of a 
cherry tree and when asked to help search for Stephen, he remained put and 
“called aloud three or four times.” A few hours later, the small child was pulled 
from the well. Witnesses testified that upon this discovery, Aaron simply stared at 
the young boy’s body and remarked, “so, you’ve found Stephen.” Aaron then 
returned home that night to his master, where he skipped dinner and went to bed 
early. The next day, Aaron confided in the apprentice of his master that “he saw 
Stephen fall into the well.” According to Aaron, “Stephen climbed over the curb, 
and thus fell in.” Aaron also insisted, “that he did not tell anybody for fear that 
they would think he did it.” 
 At first Aaron maintained he had nothing to do with the boy’s death. 
However, after “his master and one of the jurors took him aside… he told them 
he had done it; that Stephen went to the well and put his hands on the curb, and 
[Aaron] took hold of his legs and threw him over.” According to the trial records, 
Aaron then “continued for three or four weeks to make the same confession” 
before denying his involvement again just as his trial began. Aaron then 
proceeded to flip flop on the topic of his guilt; sometimes confessing he killed 
Stephen “to spite [the toddler’s] father… because he had driven [Aaron] out of his 
shop and threatened to whip him.” Other times he claimed he was innocent and 
that he only confessed because he was told by jurymen that “the devil would get 
him if he denied it, but if he confessed it he would not be sent to jail.”  
																																																						




In Aaron’s initial trial, the jury found him guilty. This was largely due to his 
confession, the perception of Aaron as “more cunning and smarter… than was 
usual for boys his age,” and the fact that many testified that due to the height of 
the curb surrounding the well, it would have been “impossible for [Stephen] to get 
over it” on his own. However, Aaron’s lawyers successfully appealed the case to 
the New Jersey Supreme Court and secured Aaron a retrial on the grounds that 
Stephen’s infancy made him legally incapable of giving a testimony, let alone a 
reliable confession. In the state Supreme Court ruling, justices explained that 
confessions obtained by threat are unreliable as “the human mind, under the 
pressure of calamity, is easily seduced…to acknowledge indiscriminately a 
falsehood or a truth.” “A confession,” the justice continued, “obtained from a 
defendant either by the flattery of hope or by the impressions of fear, however 
slightly the emotion may be implanted, is not admissible evidence.”552 
Furthermore, and most importantly, “if this be so with respect to confessions in 
general, how much more strong does it apply to the confessions of infants, 
especially under the age of twelve years old?”553   
As seen in the trial transcript, Aaron initially denied having anything to do 
with Stephen’s death; he then alternated between confessing and denying his 
involvement. Consequently, justices agreed that, in general, his confession 
needed to be thrown out because he might have been pressured to give it, and 
especially, because he was an infant. Although his actions that day might have 
been perceived as strange—staying in a tree when questioned, skipping his 
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dinner—they could have been the result of having been traumatized after 
witnessing Stephen’s fall. Justices stressed that Aaron “was so very young” and 
that the consequences of finding him guilty and culpable were extreme: 
execution. The fact that Stephen’s death could have been an accident seemed to 
be the swaying factor to grant the retrial.554 However, when the ambiguity 
surrounding accident and murder was resolved, as was the situation in the next 
New Jersey Supreme Court case, The State v. James Guild, justices were less 
willing to be sympathetic of one’s infant status. 
 
 On September 24th, 1827, sixty-year-old Catharine Beakes was found 
beaten to death on the floor of her home by a neighbor, Charles F. M’Coy. M’Coy 
had been near Catherine’s house earlier in the day and noticed twelve-year-old 
James Guild, a “coloured boy” and “servant of Joshua Bunn,” “hacking [a] tree 
with a corn knife.”555 However, it was not until later in the day that M’Coy visited 
Catharine’s house again and discovered her body. As the only person seen near 
the Beakes’ house the day of the murder, James was questioned that night by a 
constable. According to the trial transcript, James “was asked if he knew 
anything how the old lady came to her death. He denied knowing. He was twice 
asked.” But something did not sit right with the constable about James’s denial 
and the next day, he questioned the boy again, this time telling James that he 
“believed he was guilty of the murder.” After repeatedly pressing (and accusing) 
James, the constable finally got the boy to confess. 
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up happening to Aaron. 




 The State v. James Guild was similar to The State v. Aaron in some 
respects. Although ten years apart, both cases were murder trials that were 
heard and appealed in New Jersey where the accused was an enslaved black 
male around the age of twelve. In both cases, the child confessed to the murder 
and was found guilty in the jury trial. Also in both cases, the verdict was appealed 
to the state Supreme Court where the central question of the appellate case was 
whether that confession was coerced, and, if not, if the child understood the 
significance of their confession. What was different about The State v. James 
Guild from The State v. Aaron, however, was the gruesomeness and brutality of 
the Catharine Beakes’s murder. Prosecutors paired grisly details of the crime 
scene with testimony about James’ cunningness to argue that despite his 
infancy, James’s confession should be included in evidence, and he should be 
held criminally culpable for the crime.  
 A total of six people, including the boy’s master, were questioned in the 
original jury trial about James’s intellectual capacity, and their testimonies are 
indicative of how perceptions of maturity, gender, race, and culpability were 
presented within the legal system. Each of the character witnesses described 
James as some combination of “smart,” “cunning,” and “mischievous.”556 Two, 
Jonathan Vankirk and Daniel Cook, incorporated race in to their descriptions and 
testified that James was “smarter than common black boys of his age.”557 James’ 
																																																						
556 Charles M’Coy: James is “a smart, cunning, mischievous kind of boy.” Joseph Davis: “He is 
reputed a cunning smart boy.” Jonathan Vankirk: “He is account smarter than common black 
boys of his age; full of mischief; think him cunning boy.” Charles Bonnel, “he appeared to have 
considerable wit.” Stephen Albro, “He appeared to have a smartness of turn when talked to.” 
The State v. James Guild 
557 Daniel Cook stated: “he has a great deal of understanding; as much as any black boy I am 




own master, Joshua Bunn, conceded that the boy “in some respects knows the 
difference between good and evil,” and although he agreed that James was 
“mischievous,” Bunn insisted that James did “not bear malice.” Given that a guilty 
verdict would mean a loss of property for Bunn, his testimony was considered 
problematic.558 However, Stephen Albro, the jailor, supported Bunn’s perception 
of James, testifying that “he has capacity enough to distinguish between right 
and wrong; but I do not think he considers or reflects as much as some… I think 
his bad actions proceed more from passion than from malice.”559  
Yet there was no question that whoever killed Catharine Beakes did so 
viciously, and the prosecution included testimony of the grisly details of 
Catharine’s death in order to show that her murder was more than just an 
instinctive reaction of anger from a “passionate” person. M’Coy, who had 
discovered Catharine’s body, testified that at first he “thought she had a fit, and 
fell, and bruised herself,” but upon closer inspection he discovered that “the top 
of her skull… appeared to be mashed in.” He then “looked round and saw the 
yoke (a horse yoke) about four feet off… [with] some blood on [it.]”560 The doctor 
sent to inspect the woman’s body testified that “her hair [was] clotted; her breast 
covered with blood, which was still flowing; her head [was] dreadfully mangled 
[with] the scalp loose and cut through; a large bruise [was] on the right side of her 
head; [and] the under jaw [was] broken.” Most importantly, he testified that “a 
																																																						
558 In New Jersey, masters were compensated the full value of their executed slave. However, 
James was only a boy, which meant that he had not yet reached his potential full value. In 
turn, this reality would have been an incentive for his master to want him alive, because he 
would be worth more later as an adult man than he would be as a dead child.  
559 The State v. James Guild 
560 A yoke is a piece of metal or wood that serves as a link between pieces of leather fixed to a 




blow with the yoke by a boy might produce death.” By including such grim details, 
the prosecution hoped to insert malicious intent into James’ guilt, something 
necessary to try him as an adult. Catharine was not simply struck once because 
of a moment of uncontrolled passion, the prosecution argued, but was beaten 
over and over again until her head was “mangled” and “mashed in.”  
The final piece of James’s case was his confession, which he repeated to 
at least seven other people. For the most part, the stories each witness repeated 
were the same.561 On September 24th, 1827, James went to Catharine Beakes 
house and asked to “borrow a gun.” According to Eli Herbert, James told him that 
“the old bitch would not lend it to him” and instead accused James of letting her 
pigs and “pidgeons” out. Between the refusal and the accusation, James got 
angry. On the way “out the door, he saw the yoke… he picked it up and went 
back,” and “struck her” while her back was turned to work at the fire. According to 
James, after the first blow, “she did not fall, [so] he struck her again, and she fell.” 
James began to leave but then realized “if she got well, she would tell his 
mistress, and his mistress would thrash him.” Consequently, he stated, “he then 
went back to kill her,” which he did.  
James’s confession was a damning one because it showed that James 
had a violent, uncontrolled temper, but also that he thought through the murder—
opting to go back and kill the woman rather than risk punishment should she tell 
his mistress. While his logic was flawed (thinking he could avoid the risk of a 
beating in exchange for the risk of a death sentence), James’s understanding of 
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Stevenson, Ralph Knowles, S.G. Opdyke, Charles Bonell, Thomas J. Stout, and others.” The 




his actions that day was enough to convince the New Jersey Supreme Court 
justices that he had sufficient capacity to be convicted as an adult. The appeal 
trial ended with justices upholding the original guilty verdict and James’ 
execution.  
The State v. Mary Bostick, heard in Delaware in 1845, demonstrates how 
class, gender, and race could skew perceptions of age and culpability. Twelve-
year-old white servant Mary Bostick was indicted for arson and the subsequent 
murder of two children, four-year-old Truston Fenwick Fisher and two-year-old 
Frances Virginia Fisher, who died in the fire. Ann Eliza Fisher, the children’s 
mother and mistress of the household, was the only person to provide testimony 
regarding the incident.562  According to Ann Fisher, on March 10th, 1845, at 
“about 8 o’clock, the children were playing in the kitchen; and [Mary] without any 
direction from [Ann] ordered them to bed.”563 Allegedly, Mary “went up with them, 
and when she came down, she passed through the room where [Ann] sat with 
others, sewing and reading. After a short time, [the ladies] were alarmed by a 
noise… finding the house on fire, [they] rushed out, and fell down the stairs.” A 
few days after the accident, the children’s mother “took Mary into another room 
and questioned her” about the fire. At first Mary “denied” having anything to do 
with it; however, after Ann told the girl that “if she confessed it… she (Ann) did 
not expect to do any thing with her, but was going to send her home.” With the 
suggestion of immunity if she admitted guilt, Mary then “confessed that when she 
																																																						
562 Ann was married to George Purnell Fisher, a young successful lawyer in Dover who had 
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went up stairs in the evening, she placed a candle under the clothes which hung 
from the bed.” 
Ann started her testimony with a mental description of Mary, carefully 
choosing her words to keep in mind intellectual markers of class while at the 
same time represent Mary as competent enough to be capable, and so held 
liable, for her crime. Ann stated that Mary was a “very shrewd, artful girl” who had 
turned “twelve years old last August,” possibly emphasizing Mary’s age to place 
her closer to the age of criminal culpability which was fourteen. Using the familiar 
trope of the “crafty servant” to prove Mary’s guilt, Ann explained that Mary was 
“not intelligent, or very capable of learning; but smart to work” and most 
importantly, “shrewd in mischief.” Ann’s summary of Mary was also meant to 
provide evidence that Mary had “sufficient mental capacity to make confession of 
her guilt.” Despite Ann's testimony, the trial judge determined that Mary, like 
Aaron discussed earlier, was too young to give a reliable confession much less 
be culpable for the crime. Furthermore, without the disqualified confession, there 
was no remaining evidence against Mary; consequently, Mary was freed. 
Interesting overlaps exist in The State v. Aaron, The State v. James Guild, 
and The State v. Mary Bostick. In all three cases, judges and justices had to 
determine, first, if the children’s confessions were coerced, and, if they were not, 
whether the children had sufficient capacity to understand the ramifications of 
their confessions. All three children on trial were servants or slaves, and, 
significantly, all three children were described as “smart” and “mischievous.” Both 




boys [their] age.”564 The fact that these cases were heard years apart and in two 
different states provides insight into how a child’s capacity was interpreted during 
the Early Republican period. The terms “cunning” and “mischievous” both carry 
negative connotations, and even “smart” can be interpreted as negative 
descriptor. All suggest a level of comprehension and deliberate bad behavior.    
Important differences existed between the cases as well, which, when 
highlighted, shed light on the significance of race, status, and gender in 
perceptions of age, capacity, and culpability. For example, although, Aaron, an 
enslaved black boy, was eventually granted a retrial, he was initially found guilty 
for his crime. In comparison, Mary, a white servant girl, was acquitted of the 
crime outright and quickly deemed incapable of having the capacity to 
understand the consequences of her confession. At nearly the same age (Aaron 
was actually the younger of the two) and apparently both “smart” and 
“mischievous,” it would seem they had similar levels of capacity. Most likely, 
Mary’s status as a servant, not a life-long slave, as well as the fact she was a 
white female, worked in her favor to be immediately perceived as a dependent, 
incapable, and in need of protecting. Even if Mary had committed the crime, she 
could be rehabilitated and would be of little threat to the status quo. Aaron, 
however, as a black, male slave, was already viewed with constant suspicion and 
distrust—any hint of rebellion or hostility to whites needed to be squashed. Still, 
																																																						
564 According to Holly Brewer, James Guild was one of the last children under the age of 
fourteen to be executed in the United States. Brewer, 222. Furthermore, she points out the 
irony that “while so many people in the early nineteenth century were trying to prove that 
blacks were mentally inferior (in order to justify slavery and racism), many of the witnesses in 
this case vied to grant Guild an understanding equal to or greater than other boys his age, 




New Jersey was not a slave society, which meant a slave rebellion was less of a 
concern.565 Aaron was very young, at barely eleven years old, and his (potential) 
victim was a fellow male child, these particularities of his case increased his 
chances for a retrial.  
Similar to Mary and Aaron’s trials, justices acknowledged in James’ case 
that his confession may have been coerced and, more importantly, that he was 
an infant under the age of criminal culpability. But, as a black male slave, James 
was on trial for the brutal murder of an older white female, which made jurors and 
justices less sympathetic to his plea of infancy. For example, James trial judge 
pontificated on the following to assist jurors in their decision-making: “with 
respect to the ability of persons of his age, to commit crimes of this nature, the 
law is, that under the age of seven, they are deemed incapable of it. Between 
seven and fourteen, if there is no proof of capacity… the presumption is in their 
favour; a presumption however growing weaker and more easily overcome, the 
nearer they approach to fourteen.”566 This was an important point to make 
because James had just turned thirteen during the trial, making him much closer 
to fourteen than to seven. Furthermore, the justices added in their ruling: “at the 
age of this defendant, sufficient capacity is generally possessed in our state of 
society, by children of ordinary understanding… if you are satisfied that he was 
able, in a good degree, to distinguish between right and wrong; to know the 
																																																						
565 A “slave society” is a community whose existence is dependent upon slave labor and whose 
population is primarily composed of slaves. New Jersey was considered a “society with 
slaves,” which is a community that tolerates slavery but is not dependent on it for its survival. 
For more information on this topic see: Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two 
Centuries of Slavery in North America (New York: Belknap Press, 2000). 




nature of the crime which he is charged… his infancy will furnish no obstacle, on 
the score of incapacity, to his conviction.” James, unlike Mary and Aaron, was 
found guilty, denied a retrial, and executed.  
Culpability and capacity were legal concepts that were meant to be 
defined exclusively by age (and, as the century progressed, expanded to include 
interpretations of mental soundness).567 Yet as can be seen in the murder cases 
discussed above, gender, status, and race influenced how legal participants 
interpreted and depicted these concepts in actuality. They also indicate how 
easily lawyers could manipulate legal definitions of age as they related to 
perceptions of capacity and culpability as a defensive argument. A number of 
cases exist in which legal participants strategically presented the age of a 
defendant or victim and pushed for a literal interpretation of the law in order to 
win their case. In cases in which it was obvious a crime was committed, 
defensively, this was a smart tactic as it shifted the question away from guilt to 
culpability. Two state Supreme Court cases, Stoolfoos v. Jenkins, a contract 
fraud case, and State v. Pugh, a rape case, provide excellent examples of this 
strategy. In both cases, it was clear the accused had committed a crime while 
underage; consequently, guilt was not in question, but culpability was.  
In the spring of 1800, when Catherine Jenkins was “about the age of 
seventeen years,” she inherited land from her maternal grandfather. Soon after, 
she chose her father, James Hamilton, to act as her guardian regarding the 
management of the land. Within a month, James had lined up purchasers for the 
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land, promising them “a good title” to “all [of] the estate” that Catherine had 
inherited once she turned twenty-one. Before executing the deed, James 
“demanded” that the buyers provide “part of the purchase-money” up front, which 
they complied with. After James received £300, the release was then “sealed and 
delivered by the daughter Catherine, although she was not mentioned as a party 
in the body of the instrument,” which should have been an early indication that 
the deal would not go as planned. The land was never released and the money 
was never returned, resulting in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case Stoolfoos 
v. Jenkins. 
Stoolfoos v. Jenkins sought to answer the question of “whether there 
may… be cases of such gross and palpable fraud, committed by an infant, as 
would render valid a release of his right to land,” or simply, whether Catherine 
Jenkins could commit fraud as an “infant.”568 Due to guardianship laws, neither 
James as her guardian nor Catherine as a minor was legally allowed to release 
the land—once the investors realized this, they argued that they had been 
defrauded by both father and daughter. Additionally, they insisted that this was a 
preconceived plan: “the daughter began the business,” the purchasers insisted, 
“by petitioning the court that her father should be appointed guardian of her 
estate; she represented to the defendants, that their title was complete, by the 
release of her father, executed also by herself, and she received money from the 
defendants.” In other words, Catherine intentionally chose her father as her 
guardian so the two could bring their plan to fruition. By arguing that Catherine 
was capable of plotting such a sophisticated fraud, the purchasers hoped to 
																																																						




prove her intellect was beyond that of a normal minor and, thus, she should be 
culpable for the crime despite her infancy. If this were the case and she were 
found culpable, then the land should be released to the attempted buyers. 
Catherine’s lawyers framed their defense in a way that focused on 
Catherine’s vulnerability as a minor, utilizing newer definitions of childhood and 
the ability to reason to their advantage. They argued that although she had 
signed and sealed a release, this did not equal fraud. Her actions only provided 
evidence of “ignorance” on her part, as she did not understand that what she was 
doing had no validity. Conveniently, her lawyers cast the blame on the then-
deceased James and argued “if there has been a fraudulent combination, it has 
been practiced against the infant, and not by her. What could she know of the 
law, at the age of seventeen? How easy would it have been, for the guardian to 
prevail on his ward to execute this deed?” James was the one who should have 
known better and was assigned her guardian tasked with the responsibility of 
protecting her inheritance. According to the defense, the fact that Catherine 
needed a guardian was indicative of her inability to fully comprehend right from 
wrong, the significance of her actions, and in turn, be culpable for criminal 
activity.  
In offering their ruling, the justices considered the importance of 
chronological age in determining Catherine’s culpability. They began their opinion 
by stating that “although the law allows the plea of infancy, as a good defense, it 
will not permit the infant to convert it into an offensive weapon, for the purpose of 




“they are incapable of fully comprehending the obligation of moral duties…[as] 
their understanding has not arrived at maturity.” Even in the extreme 
circumstances in which an infant “represented himself to be of full age” in order 
to engage in business transactions, the contract the infant signed would not be 
valid because of his actual chronological age. Focusing on Catherine’s case, the 
justices ruled that there was no evidence to prove that Catherine intentionally 
defrauded the investors. “She did not pretend to be of full age, and the probability 
is, that acting under her father’s influence, she was ignorant of the law… it is not 
to be imagined, that a girl of seventeen should be acquainted with the law of 
contracts.” They then shifted the blame to the investors: “what man of common 
prudence could be deceived by her assertions in matters of law? Why did not the 
defendants consult their own counsel, rather than rely on the opinion of a child?” 
Ultimately, the court determined that Catherine could not be held accountable for 
a contract made in her minority and more importantly, she could not be held 
culpable for fraud. Consequently, the land remained in her possession.  
When placed side-by-side, Catherine Jenkins and Mary Bostick’s case 
outcomes are unsurprisingly similar. Both cases demonstrate how one could use 
age to shift the question of whether a person committed a crime to whether they 
could be culpable for it. Both Catherine and Mary (if we are to take her 
confession seriously) clearly committed crimes, fraud in Catherine’s case, and 
either arson or perjury in Mary’s. However, due to their youth (and most likely 
gender), the crimes themselves did not matter because the girls were too young 




used as a defense, but it was not supposed to be used as “an offensive weapon,” 
meaning young people could not hide behind their age to escape punishment for 
crimes they intentionally committed. Although legal definitions of age and 
culpability that were established following the Revolution were meant to protect 
minors, it became evident that these definitions were flexible and that more 
information had to be considered when establishing one’s culpability.  
The case, State v. Franklin Pugh, provides stronger evidence that gender 
factored into perceptions of culpability and age. Heard in 1859, thirteen-and a-
half-year-old Franklin Pugh stood trial for the rape of his schoolmate, fourteen-
year-old Elizabeth Foust.569 Common law, derived from British statute, assumed 
that a male below the age of fourteen was physically (as well as intellectually) 
incapable of committing rape.570 If the law had been strictly upheld, as it was for 
Catherine and Mary, Franklin would have walked free. However, possibly 
because he was a male who also assaulted a young white female, the court 
heard testimony on Franklin’s intellectual capacity and physicality before offering 
their ruling. Elizabeth testified that Franklin had “approached her in a run” before 
overtaking her “forcibly and against her will,” and throwing her to the ground. He 
																																																						
569 State v. Franklin Pugh, 7 Jones (NC) 61 (1859). 
570 Block, Rape and Sexual Power in Early America, 129. Additionally, an interesting case heard 
in North Carolina in 1855, Robert B Chambers v. Allen White, illustrates how this idea of 
chronological age and sexual capability was applied in non-rape cases as well. Champers v. 
White was actually a slander case, where Allen White accused Robert B. Chambers, a boy 
under the age of fourteen, of bestiality. In the original case, the judge had instructed the jury 
that they needed to be “not only satisfied that the words were spoken, but that the plaintiff was 
physically capable of committing the crime.” As a result, the plaintiff “took a non-suit and 
appealed to the Supreme Court.” The Supreme Court ruled that whether Chambers was 
sexually mature enough to engage in bestiality was of no consequence to a slander case as 
that was the not the crime on trial. The case is revealing because it shows how legal 
definitions of culpability and capability could be (and were) interpreted differently. (Additionally, 
there is no evidence that Chambers was tried separately for bestiality.) See Robert B. 




“held her down” and she “struggle[ed] to get up from him” while he “had his will of 
her.” Elizabeth stated repeatedly how he used force and that she resisted which 
made it difficult for Franklin to argue he did not know what he was doing was 
wrong.  
 Still, Franklin’s lawyers attempted to use his infancy as his defense by 
supplying a “witness who proved” that Franklin was “thirteen years and six 
months old when the transaction was alleged to have taken place.” However, 
because Franklin was nearly fourteen, the court decided that he was “liable to 
answer for a misdemeanor, if the jury believed he had sufficient capacity to 
distinguish right from wrong.” Asking for more information regarding Franklin’s 
competence, the same witness that testified on behalf of Franklin did state he 
was of “ordinary capacity and well grown for his age.” This is significant because 
the court acknowledged the arbitrariness of age boundaries when determining 
criminal culpability and, as they did with Aaron and James’ cases, the court 
factored in more information about Franklin to determine whether he knew what 
he was doing or not. Rather than dismiss the case as common law suggested, 
based on the fact Franklin was below the age of fourteen, the court decided to 
investigate the circumstances of the offense as well as Franklin’s competency, 
specifically regarding his capacity and physical size, before coming to their 
verdict. 
The jury found Franklin guilty, and, despite his efforts to appeal the 
verdict, the state Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s ruling. Justices stated 




“ordinary assault and battery,” and instead it was best to leave punishment of 
these wayward youth to schoolmasters or parents.  However, “if the battery be an 
aggravate kind… [if] it is prompted by a more brutal passion, such as unbridled 
lust, as in the case before us,” the minor must be apprehended by the law. More 
importantly, young men, like Franklin, need to be “made an example of… so that 
all others may know and fear the law.” In other words, both courts refused to let 
Franklin hide behind his “infancy” as a defense. This decision was strikingly 
different from Catherine and Mary Bostick’s verdicts. Ultimately, justices of the 
South Carolina Supreme Court determined that regardless of Franklin’s 
chronological age, the fact that he brutally attacked and raped his fellow 
schoolmate meant he needed to be punished for it as an adult.  
A comparison of the language of the rulings between the case State v. 
Franklin Pugh and State v. Mary Bostick suggests that gender influenced 
perceptions of age and culpability for violent crimes. Franklin and Mary were both 
under the age of fourteen, but only by a year or two. Both committed crimes of 
violence; Franklin assaulted and raped a young woman while Mary burned down 
a house, killing two young children. However, the court quickly dismissed the 
possibility of Mary having the mental capacity to comprehend right from wrong. 
Justices acknowledged that Mary was “shrewd, sensible, and artful,” adjectives 
that could also be used to argue she was intellectually advanced for her age and 
so capable and culpable. However, she was more importantly still a “girl,” a 
“child,” and children could not be held accountable for their actions. 




he needed to be brought “into court like a man” because of the nature of his 
crime. Franklin was listed as only having “ordinary capacity” for his age, which 
one would assume to mean he should be tried as any other child under the age 
of fourteen would be. However, justices ruled that Franklin had enough “malice 
and wickedness [to] supply the want of age.”  
What role race played in the court’s decision to try Franklin as an adult is 
hard to determine. Had Franklin assaulted a black woman rather than a young 
white woman, would justices have been as willing to reconsider the legal 
significance of age and culpability the same way justices in New Jersey did when 
they sentenced James Guild to death for murdering Catharine Beakes? 
Regardless, by making “an example” of Franklin, justices sent a clear message 
that young white women were to be protected, even it meant reinterpreting the 
law.571 Taken one step further, judges and justices at times reassigned blame 
away from young women by using notions of white adult male control. For 
example, Catherine Jenkins and Mary Doherty both committed crimes that were 
ultimately blamed on white adult men.572 In Catherine’s case, justices argued that 
																																																						
571 Society did not appear to always value the safety of young white women and girls over the 
legal rights of white men. For example, in 1860, fifteen-year-old Wesley Gray’s lawyers honed 
in on a legal loophole regarding the proof of rape to secure a new trial. In the original case, 
Gray was found guilty of raping eight-year-old Louisa E. Wheeler based on the testimony of a 
doctor who had examined the child shortly after the attack. According to Doctor Pugh, he 
“found her private parts very much swoolen, torn and lacerated; that there had been a 
penetration… as far as it was possible in a child of her age.” In the original trial, the jury found 
Gray guilty of the offense based on the evidence of penetration alone, but in the appeal case, 
justices determined that “proof of emission” was necessary as well. The justices explained that 
the original presiding judge had erred by assuming the state of North Carolina had passed a 
similar law as England that specified only penetration had to be proven to convict in a rape 
trial. Louisa had clearly been sexually violated, but the prosecution still lacked a legally 
necessary piece of evidence, proof of ejaculation. Consequently, Gray’s legal rights, as a 
white male, superseded the belief that children like Louisa should be legally protected due to 
their gender and age at all costs. See State v. Wesley Gray, 53 N.C. 170 (1860). 




the investors should have known better than to “rely on the opinion of a child,” 
while in Mary Doherty’s case, the judge argued that her father had failed to 
provide the necessary education and socialization that would have prevented the 
corruption of Mary’s character. Because Catherine and Mary were expected to 
be permanent dependents, they were perceived as inculpable; but Franklin was 
not only supposed to regulate his own behavior but also, eventually, that of his 
dependents, making him too much of a liability on the community to be given the 
benefit of the doubt. 
An unexpected place that a plea of infancy was regularly used as a legal 
strategy was against the military.573 US v. Bainbridge, heard in a Massachusetts 
circuit court in 1816, was one case regularly cited in judges’ and justices’ rulings. 
At the age of nineteen, Robert Treadwell enlisted in the United States Navy; 
within a month he had deserted, was court-martialed, and sentenced to two-
years service.574 Treadwell’s lawyer argued that because Treadwell was an 
infant, he was not legally capable of enlisting, and since his enlistment was 
invalid, his court martial sentencing should be annulled. The United States 
government, however, argued that Treadwell was not under the control of his 
father at the time he enlisted, instead “this individual was suffered by his father to 
roam at large, and gain his sustenance where he could.” The judge ruled that “if 
																																																																																																																																																																	
cases of female adultery. Rather than punish married women for sexual activity with black 
men, courts blamed white husbands for their inability to control their wives. See especially 
chapter 4, “Adultery Dorothea Bourne and Edmond.”    
573 There is a long history of minors enlisting and serving in the military both with and without 
parental consent. These cases are also inherently gendered as only men, sons, could enlist in 
the military. See Caroline Cox, Boy Soldiers of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2016); John A. Ruddiman, Becoming Men of Some 
Consequence: Youth and Military Service in the Revolutionary War (Charlottesville: University 
of Virginia Press, 2014) 




a father should voluntarily send his minor children away from home, to obtain 
maintenance and support in any manner, that they could; this would be an 
implied consent to any contract for that purpose, and a waiver of parental rights.” 
Consequently, Robert’s enlistment was ruled as valid and he was remanded to 
his commanding officer. Dozens of cases like Robert’s exist, indicating not only 
that minors regularly asserted their independence by choosing to enlist prior to 
their legal independence, but also, when things went wrong, many attempted to 
lean on their legal infancy as a way of escaping the consequences of their 
actions.  
Knowledgeable minors were not the only ones who attempted to work the 
law regarding culpability to gain a more lenient sentencing; youthful looking 
adults attempted to take advantage of these laws as well, especially in 
communities that had no formal way to document one’s age.575 Consequently, 
courts began to crack down on the necessity of proof to claim infancy as a 
defense. This was the case in the North Carolina murder trial, State v. Elijah 
Arnold, heard in 1850. According to court records, Elijah “appeared… to be a 
small boy,” but his exact age could not be ascertained. The defense appealed 
the case to the state Supreme Court and argued that Elijah was “under the age 
																																																						
575 As mentioned in a previous footnote, Bianca Premo examined this phenomenon in her work 
on colonial Lima, Children of the Father King: Youth, Authority, and Legal Minority in Colonial 
Lima (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2005). See specifically chapter four, “Minor Offenses: Youth 
and Crime in the Eighteenth Century.” Premo argues that both the courts and those tried 
“manipulated the reporting of ages in order to influence the outcome of a trial.” Premo, 119. In 
America, official forms of birth records did not become standard until the end of the nineteenth 
century. Instead, communities often relied upon private family records to prove their age and 
identity which of course could be incorrect or intentionally altered. For more information, see 
Shane Landrum, “From Family Bibles to Birth Certificates: Young People, Proof of Age, and 
American Political Cultures, 1820-1915” in Age in America: The Colonial Era to the Present, 





of presumed capacity” and that it should be up to the State to “prove that he was 
over the age, or, if under it, that he had such knowledge of right and wrong, as 
would render him responsible for the homicide.”576 However, justices “held the 
onus of proof lie on the prisoner as to his age.” Unable to prove he was under the 
age of fourteen, Elijah was convicted of the murder and sentenced as an adult 
would be. While Elijah’s actual age is not known, State v. Elijah Arnold illustrates 
how individuals used the ambiguity of chronological age to take advantage of 
culpability laws meant to protect minors.577  
Lawyers of defendants accused of crimes against children attempted to 
undermine the testimonies provided by their victims, especially in infant rape 
cases, by arguing for strict interpretations of legal definitions of age and 
reliability. Reliability as a legal concept is determined by how trustworthy a 
person is. In every state during the Early Republican period, children below the 
age of fourteen were not supposed to testify in court. Considered unreliable 
witnesses, it was assumed children lacked the capacity to understand the 
significance of their words. Still, both prosecutors and defense attorneys 
attempted to put children on the stand, either because they were the victims in 
the cases being tried or they happened to be the only witnesses available. More 
often then not, these testimonies were either struck from the record or never 
allowed to be given to begin with because trial judges or higher court justices 
																																																						
576 Iredell, James and Walter Clark, North Carolina Reports: Cases at Law Argued and 
Determined in the Supreme Court of North Carolina, From December Term 1851 to August 
Term 1852, Both Inclusive, “State v. Elijah Arnold,” 176. 
577 An example in which the defendant successfully provided evidence of his infancy can be 
seen in the 1837 North Carolina Supreme Court case, The State v. Jesse, a Slave. Jesse was 
acquitted of raping Bransy Witherington, a white female, because his legal counsel provided 
“evidence” that proved he was below the age of fourteen at the time the rape was alleged to 




determined the child had no “sense of the obligation of an oath, nor of any of the 
consequences of swearing falsely.”578  
An example of an infant rape case in which lawyers argued for a literal 
interpretation of the legal definitions of age and capability in order to undermine 
the reliability of their child victims’ testimonies can be seen in the 1813 South 
Carolina Supreme Court case, State v. Fracis Leblanc. Leblanc was found guilty 
of raping a young girl, “little more than seven years old at the time the charge 
[was] laid.”579 Sexual intercourse with a child under the age of ten years old was 
a capital crime, punishable by death because it had been long established that a 
child that young could not consent.580 The sole witness was the girl herself, and 
so Leblanc pled not guilty, pitting his word against hers.  
Supporting Leblanc’s defense were the circumstances surrounding the 
discovery of the crime as well as the “inconsistency” of the girl’s testimony. 
According to trial records, “several days elapsed before [the girl] disclosed any” 
information and shared what happened after her mother had “discovered blood 
on her linen” and “charged [the girl] with having had connection with a man.” 
After being “closely questioned as to the circumstances, the girl then pointed out 
the prisoner, as the offender and his house as the scene of the crime.” 
																																																						
578 State v Mary Doherty 
579 The State v. Fracis Leblanc, 1 Tread. 354 (1813). 
580 If the victim was over the age of ten, then the crime was considered a misdemeanor which 
might result in jail time or fines. More importantly, cases of child rape were easier to 
prosecute, because if it was known that sex occurred, consent was irrelevant as a child under 
the age of ten could not agree to the relationship. However, if the victim was over the age of 
ten years old, the defense could employ a number of arguments that might cast the victim in a 
negative light and result in an acquittal. This was because between 1770 and 1820, legal 
definitions of rape became more complicated and, as a result, harder to prove. The courts 
began considering the “competency of the witness, the level of force applied and resistance 
offered, and the precise intent of the aggressor,” in determining if crime occurred. See 
Simpson, “Vulnerability and the Age of Female Consent,” 182. See also, Block, Rape and 




Additionally, the girl was “inconsistent” in her testimony; she had declared to the 
“magistrate that she cried out, and in deposing in court, that she did not.”581 
 While Leblanc’s defense pointed to these issues as a reason to not trust 
the girl’s testimony, their biggest argument was that she was too young to be 
reliable. LeBlanc’s defense lawyers argued for a retrial on the grounds that it was 
wrong to “pay too much regard to the testimony of a child of nine years old,” 
especially when doing so would “deprive a man of his life.” A similar attempt to 
undermine a victim’s testimony based on age was made in trial that took place in 
Brooklyn, New York in 1797, where Nathaniel Price was accused of raping his 
ten-year-old servant, Unice Williamson. Price’s defense objected to Unice’s 
testimony arguing that she was an “incompetent witness, being incapable of 
knowing from her tender years the nature and obligation of an oath.”582 In this 
case, ultimately, the judge overruled the objection “after questioning [Unice] and 
hearing her answers,” further illustrating how flexible legal age restrictions were. 
Leblanc’s (and Price’s) shrewd defense utilized the same perception of childhood 
that made their actions a capital crime to question the victim’s ability to be a 
reliable witness. If the court assumed that children under the age of ten could not 
consent or be culpable for their actions because of their inability to reason or 
understand the consequences of their actions, then how could jurists trust their 
testimony? 
																																																						
581 It is important to remember that the girl was only seven years old at the time she gave her 
statement, furthermore, her delayed divulgence and inconsistent retelling of the event is a 
common occurrence for victims of assault. For example, Unice Williamson explained that she 
delayed several days before telling anyone that she was raped because her attacker had “said 
he would kill her if she told.” The Trial of Nathaniel Price, for Committing a Rape on the Body 
of Unice Williamson, a Child between 10 and 11 Years of Age, at Brooklyn in King’s County, in 
May 1797… (New York: Printed for Elijah Weedg., 1797), 3.  




In the end, the additional evidence against Leblanc was too incriminating 
for his tactic to work. The girl had incredibly specific details about Leblanc’s 
house, the scene of the crime and a place she should have had no knowledge of. 
For example, she gave a “description of the closet where the offence was 
committed, which she could not have known, if she had not been there.” Even 
more incriminating was the fact she had contracted the same venereal disease 
that Leblanc had.583 Consequently, the lower court’s verdict was upheld in the 
appeals court and Leblanc was sentenced to death. Although unsuccessful, 
Leblanc’s attempt illustrates the danger the court exposed itself to in adhering too 
strictly to legal definitions of age and capacity—the same definitions meant to 
protect minors could be used to harm them. 
The 1810 New Jersey Supreme Court case, Van Pelt v. Van Pelt, provides 
another example of the flexibility in legal age requirements regarding testimonies 
provided by minors. The son of the defendant was excluded from giving his 
testimony because a justice had been told the boy “was about twelve years of 
age,” and more importantly, “he did not appear to understand the nature of an 
oath.”584 Following an unsatisfactory verdict, Van Pelt, the defendant, collected 
“affidavits… to prove that the boy was a few days more than fourteen years of 
age at the time of the trial” in an effort to gain a retrial that included the boy’s 
testimony. State Supreme Court justices conceded that the boy “possessed 
																																																						
583 According to the trial record, “although it is admitted that the infection may be communicated 
without carnal intercourse, yet, such a thing is not to be presumed: and when this fact is relied 
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lameness which was immediately observed by the mother, and the stains upon her clothes, 
although not absolutely conclusive, are certainly strong corroborating circumstances.” The 
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ordinary understanding” and “was not uncommonly deficient in mental 
qualifications,” however, he “did not appear” to be “fourteen years of age at the 
trial.” Consequently, they affirmed the lower court’s judgment and denied a 
retrial. Van Pelt v. Van Pelt perfectly illustrates how age and reliability laws were 
important and arbitrary. The boy’s father thought that by providing evidence that 
the boy was “a few days more than fourteen,” his testimony would have to be 
heard as he was legally considered a competent witness. However, justices 
insisted the boy did not appear fourteen, despite the affidavits, and so they 
reaffirmed the decision to deny his participation in the trial.  
 
Other cases where the significance of age of the victim was strategically 
highlighted, challenged, or qualified were abduction and seduction cases. The 
cases to be discussed in this chapter are different from the seduction and loss of 
service cases analyzed in chapter four because parents were not seeking 
redress for impregnated and abandoned daughters, but rather the physical and 
legal separation from their child via marriage or labor arrangements. Three cases 
in this chapter primarily focused on the child’s ability to consent-- whether they 
had the capacity to understand what they were agreeing to. In other words, these 
cases questioned how “capable” children were as active participants in running 
off to get married or commit to employment. A study of abduction and seduction 
cases reveals how deeply gendered perceptions of these types of crimes were 
as well as tells us about the types of opportunities that were available for young 




solely with charges of “abduction” are regarding young males and labor. 
Conversely, all cases I have found that deal solely with charges of “seduction” or 
“abduction and seduction” are regarding young females and marriage or sexual 
relationships. The fact that there is no record of cases where young men were 
“seduced” away by older women or young women were “abducted” solely for 
labor purposes is suggestive of how perceptions of gender influenced the 
persecution of these types of crimes.  
Keeping in mind the gendered assumptions inherent in abduction and 
seduction cases, these legal disputes can also reveal much about how 
communal perceptions of age and familial dependence infiltrated the legal 
system and influenced court rulings.585 Abduction charges stemmed from 
employing minors without their parent’s consent. In most cases, the father filed 
suit against the employer in an effort to reclaim his “losses.” Fathers were legally 
entitled to the labor and services of their children until they reached the age of 
twenty-one; this included the right to contract out their child’s labor and collect 
their earnings. This legal right extended equally to sons and daughters, yet there 
are no examples of fathers taking employers to court for “abducting” their 
daughters as laborers. This was most likely due to differences in employment 
opportunities of men and women. For example, transportation companies were 
always in need of sailors—an occupation not available to women. Consequently, 
a number of cases exist were fathers accused various ships of “abducting” their 
sons and depriving them their right to their child’s service. Although typically the 
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rulings of these cases tell us more about how communities legally defined familial 
relationships and responsibilities (as is argued in chapter four), occasionally 
perceptions and expectations linked to chronological age appear. The first 
example of this can be seen in the 1850 Massachusetts case, The Platina.  
On July 13th, 1850, James N. Luce, said to be “nineteen years and three 
months,” left New Bedford, Massachusetts with The Platina, a whaling ship 
headed for the Pacific Ocean. According to Andrew Hicks, the owner of The 
Platina, James had been paid “full wages,” which meant that James either 
presented himself “as a man of full age,” or “that, if he was a minor, he had been 
emancipated, and had been permitted to act for himself, and enjoy the proceeds 
of his labor and industry.” Hicks also explained that after James’ contract ended, 
James was settled with “at Talcahuana, a port in Chile, and there paid the full 
amount of his lay, and by his own consent discharged from the ship for the 
purpose of going on another whaling voyage.”586 Three years later, the Platina 
returned to New Bedford without James, prompting his father, James W. Luce, to 
take Hicks to court to claim a portion of his son’s wages as well as damages 
because of the “violation of his paternal rights by the wrongful abduction of his 
child.”  
The ruling in The Plantina is illuminating because although James’ legal 
minority was “satisfactorily proved,” justices argued against the notion that James 
was vulnerable dependent because of his age. According to court records, it was 
established that Hicks’ “agents” knew at the time that James was “a minor, as in 
the crew list he is, in the description of his person, put down as of the age of 
																																																						




nineteen.” It was also proven that James’ family at the time actively benefited 
from the young man’s labor, as he “worked with [his father] on his farm,” 
dispelling any potential argument that James was away from home and acting as 
an independent adult. The law stated that fathers were entitled to the labor and 
services of their children while they were minors—this was very clear and so the 
jury readily agreed that James’s father was owed a percentage of the young 
man’s wages. However, James’ father did not just want wages but also 
damages, arguing that “in withdrawing [James] from his [father’s] control, and 
depriving [his father] of the comfort and satisfaction of his son’s society, and the 
child of the benefit of the influence, counsels, and examples of a parent in 
forming his habits for his future life.” This is where the jury drew the line, the 
district court judge held that “this claim would stand on stronger ground, if the boy 
had been of a tender age.” In reality, because James “had arrived nearly at full 
age,” his father should not be additionally compensated for this theoretical “loss.”  
Gender factored in how the judge perceived the significance of James’s 
age. This is particularly evident when The Platina ruling is compared to an 1804 
seduction case heard in New Jersey. In Vaughn v. Perrine, New Jersey Supreme 
Court justices awarded damages to the father of eighteen-year-old Mary Vaughn 
because she had been seduced and impregnated by Mr. Perrine, a man 
“between thirty and forty years of age.”587 Justices stated that “the daughter was 
an inexperienced girl of eighteen, a perfect child, seduced by a man double her 
age.” The father had been “injured” because his child had been “disgraced,” and 
so it was only right he be awarded damages. This perception that at nineteen, 
																																																						




James was nearly an adult, while at eighteen, Mary was a “perfect child,” 
demonstrates how gender informed perceptions of age and one’s vulnerability in 
abduction and seduction trials.  
Common law made it illegal to marry without parental consent or 
impregnate a young woman under the age of eighteen (in some states, twenty-
one).588 Individuals accused of this crime were accused of having “seduced” a 
minor. In most states, a similar law existed that made the crime of marrying or 
having sex with a minor below the age of sixteen (but over the age of ten) an 
additional offense, called the “seduction and abduction” of a minor. The original 
law was derived from the English statute meant to prevent young women poised 
to inherit significant lands or tenements from running off with “inferior” men. 
However, new understandings of age and capability forced courts to redefine 
these types of laws in order to close loopholes and protect minors, specifically 
young women and girls. It is important to note that no cases of seduction exist 
regarding young men and boys, which is most likely explained by the origins of 
the law. Men retained their legal independence and ownership of their property 
after marriage. Marriage set into motion the husband’s legal acquisition of their 
wife’s property and consumption of her identity, not ever vice versa. In turn, 
young men’s inheritance did not need to be protected in the same way.  
The ruling in the “seduction and abduction” case, State v. Edward Findlay, 
attempted to set a precedent, at least in South Carolina, that age would be the 
sole factor in determining these types of cases and that the “class and station” of 
a young woman was irrelevant. In 1802, South Carolinian Edward Findlay was 
																																																						




found guilty of “seducing” away a young girl below the age of sixteen. According 
to the trial record, “upon observing too great a degree of familiarity between 
[Findlay] and their daughter, [they] forbad him [from] their house, and desired him 
to have no kind of intercourse with her, as she was a child incapable of judging 
for herself, and much too young to think of matrimony.”589 Findlay evidently 
ignored the parents’ request and continued to visit the house in order to “pay his 
addresses to her” before “seduc[ing] her to go off with him.” The parents 
explained that he “had lived openly with her ever since,” unmarried. Furthermore, 
they claimed that “in frequent conversations with different persons who censured 
him for his improper conduct in seducing away a child from her parents, he 
declared, and indeed in some degree boasted, that she was old enough, or 
woman enough for him.” As can be seen in the parents' testimony, a complicated 
relationship existed between individuals, families, and communities regarding 
perceptions and expectations of age, maturity, and deference.  
Edward was found guilty of seduction but appealed the case, arguing that 
because the girl had come from “poor people,” the law was not meant to apply to 
her circumstance. The South Carolina Constitutional Court of Appeals upheld the 
guilty verdict and argued that the law was meant to “promote the security and 
happiness of young inexperienced females of all descriptions, whether poor or 
opulent.” The ruling was significant because it illustrates the new focus on 
chronological age in determining one’s vulnerability and a reinterpretation of old 
laws to reflect these new perceptions of age. The law’s original intention was to 
safeguard family wealth by requiring parental consent for marriage. However, 
																																																						




South Carolina justices made clear that class was irrelevant and that the law was 
now meant to protect the innocence of young women regardless of their social 
status.590  
With the new interpretation of the law came an increased focus on the 
chronological age and physical appearance of the young women at the center of 
an illegal act. An example of this can be seen in the 1850 South Carolina case, 
State v. Isaac Tidwell where Isaac Tidwell was found guilty of seduction and 
abduction.591 Tidwell was charged with abducting and marrying thirteen-year-old 
Lucy Jane Crankfield, the daughter of Tidwell’s employer, Jonathan Crankfield. 
According to trial records, Crankfield was “the owner of lands and of 25 or 30 
slaves,” and he and his wife had five children together, Lucy being the second 
oldest. Tidwell had worked for the Crankfield for about “18 months or two years, 
often absent upon business, but when at home eating at [the Crankfield] table 
and sleeping in [their] house.” On Thursday, March 22nd, 1850, after her parents 
had gone to bed around “11 o’clock” at night, after midnight, Lucy left with Tidwell 
and proceeded to the magistrate’s house who “without delay solemnized the 
contract of matrimony between Tidwell and Lucy Jane.” 
Lucy’s lawyers presented testimony to argue that Lucy was clearly legally 
and intellectually thirteen (meaning she was not mentally mature for her age). 
																																																						
590 Lindsay Keiter highlights what she calls “male fortune hunters,” or examples of men praying 
on young heiresses. According to Keiter, one example can be seen with James Henry 
Hammond, who “explicitly selected a wife, teenager Catherine Fitzsimons, for whom he cared 
little in order to obtain her fortune.” Lindsay Keiter, “Uniting Interests: The Economic Functions 
of Marriage in America, 1750-1860,” Ph.D Dissertation, The College of William and Mary, 
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Hammond and the Old South: A Design of Mastery (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1985), chapter 4. 




Lucy’s exact birthdate—September 10th, 1836—was provided to the court as 
evidence of her infancy. It was also stated that “at trial she was in height and 
weight equal to many grown women, but her countenance, figure, and whole 
appearance denoted her very tender year.” This is significant because it 
demonstrates that average people understood the increasing significance of 
chronological age within the legal system. It also illustrates an understanding that 
these age-based laws could be flexible if one seemed physically or intellectually 
mature for one’s age. The purpose of including Lucy’s birthdate and description 
of her demeanor as evidence was to push back against any suggestion that 
Tidwell was mistaken about Lucy’s age because she was larger than the average 
thirteen-year-old girl.  
Finally, Samuel Anderson v. Commonwealth illustrates how chronological 
age, down to the day, could be used as evidence to acquit oneself of this type of 
crime. It also illustrates how arbitrary certain age-specific laws could be. In 1826, 
Samuel Anderson, was found guilty of the “seduction and abduction” of Elizabeth 
F. Hargrove.592 However, that same year, he appealed his case in the General 
Court of Virginia, submitting evidence that Elizabeth was “the age of sixteen 
years, two months, and nineteen days” at the time of the alleged crime. Samuel 
successfully argued he could not be charged with abduction because Elizabeth 
was over the age of sixteen.593 In this case, justices adhered strictly to the law, 
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593 “Our statute… punishes by imprisonment… the person who unlawfully takes and carries 
away any maiden, or woman child, being within the age of sixteen years, from the possession, 
and against the will of her father, mother, or other person having custody of such maiden: and 
the punishment is greatly increased if the maid be defloured. The maiden in this case being 





but it is easy to see how this decision could be challenged by Elizabeth’s parents 
as “two months and nineteen days” could hardly have made a difference in her 
ability to reason and consent to the relationship. The underlying theme in each of 
these “seduction and abduction” cases is the protection of young women. As 
justices ruled in The State v. Edward Findlay, the purpose of the law was to 
“protect all the young women of our country, of every degree and condition 
whatever.”594 Young women were perceived as particularly vulnerable because 
of their gender and their age. 
The significance of age and vulnerability of white girls was not just 
debated in criminal courts, but also in civil courts regarding custody disputes. 
Republican child-rearing beliefs, and the use of an English legal doctrine known 
as parens patriae, allowed nineteenth century American courts to intervene and 
“reformulate child-custody procedures” upon the dissolution of a family, either 
through death or divorce.595 According to Grossberg, “gradually a father’s 
custody power evolved from a property right to a trust tied to his responsibilities 
as a guardian; his title as father thus became more transferable.”596 This shift 
created an opening for mothers to argue for, and win, custody of children. Known 
as the “tender years doctrine,” mothers were the best guardian for children below 
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595 According to Michael Grossberg, parens patriae was an old doctrine expanded by the 
English courts in the seventeenth century in response to the abuse of feudal wardships. 
“Under [the expansion], the courts assumed sovereign custodial power over children and other 
dependents in the name of the crown. They used these powers mainly to ensure the orderly 
transfer of feudal duties. Chancellors hesitated to rely on the doctrine to override custody 
rights of a child’s natural parents. Yet they did begin to act more vigorously in custody 
disputes involving parents accused of being grossly immoral or heretical. The development of 
parens patriae into a means of challenging parental custody rights went on more rapidly and 
fully in North America.” Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in 
Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 236. 
596 Grossberg argues this shift was a result of the “anti-patriarchal ethos embedded in republican 




the age of puberty, “under it, mothers gained presumptive claim to their young 
children.”597 At the same time, “the tender years doctrine required the courts to 
devise a standard for maternal fitness;” a fit mother was a woman who was moral 
and reasonable, in turn an adulterous mother could not be so.598  
A three-year custody dispute between Barbara Lee and her ex-husband, 
Joseph Lee, over their two young daughters, Adelaide and Frances, provides a 
look at how chronological age and gender was used to negotiate custody 
arrangements. The original case, The Commonwealth v. Addicks and Wife, 
occurred in 1813 in Pennsylvania.599 Barbara and Joseph divorced that same 
year because she had an affair with a man named John Addicks. After the 
divorce, Barbara and John married and held custody of the girls, while her ex-
husband retained custody of their son. Joseph attempted to use the affair to his 
advantage, arguing that due to “the nature of the intercourse between their 
mother and Addicks,” it was “highly improper to permit them to remain under her 
care.” Justices disagreed, arguing that although they frowned upon Barbara’s 
conduct, they believed she provided excellent care and education to the girls. 
More importantly, due to the girls “sex as well as age,” the court felt that they 
should remain with their mother as they were currently in need of “that kind of 
assistance which can be afforded by none so well as a mother.” At the time of the 
first trial, Adelaide was ten years old and Frances was seven.  
Three years later, Joseph Lee sought out custody again in The 
Commonwealth v. Addicks and Lee, arguing that because Adelaide was now 
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thirteen, she was morally at risk of being influenced by her mother’s “bad 
example.”600 Additionally, with Frances now almost ten, the girls no longer 
required “those attentions which a mother alone can properly bestow.” 
Consequently, Joseph thought that the custody of both girls should be 
transferred to himself. This time, the justices agreed with Joseph and explained 
in their ruling: “these children do not stand before us in the same situation as 
formerly; the eldest has now arrived at a critical age; every moment is important; 
and the education of the next three years will probably be decisive of her fate. 
The case of the youngest is not so urgent; but it is important that the sister 
should not be separated.” More importantly, the girls were coming of an age 
where they would understand why their parents were divorced, and the court was 
insistent that by giving their father custody, and, in turn, punishing their mother, it 
would teach the girls that “the marriage contract, unless dissolved by the laws of 
the country, is sacred and inviolable.” 
The rulings of the original custody hearing and its subsequent appeal are 
significant because they demonstrate in which contexts and by what terms 
chronological age, gender, and children’s needs were beginning to be negotiated 
during the Early Republican period. Traditionally, fathers held sole custody 
following divorce. However, during this period, courts began to consider the 
wellbeing of children in determining who deserved custody, and, more 
importantly, when they deserved custody. According to justices in Pennsylvania, 
female children below a certain chronological age belonged with their mothers—
in this circumstance ten years old or younger. However, girls’ needs changed 
																																																						




dramatically as they aged—in this case, just three years. By the age of twelve, 
courts assumed female children were rapidly approaching sexual maturity, which 
meant they required morally upright influences or risked falling into depravity.601 
With Adelaide already thirteen and Frances only two years away from puberty, 
the courts had to act fast to prevent the girls from mimicking their mother’s 
behavior. The quickest way the courts could do this was by reassigning custody 
to the girls’ father.   
 
The chronological age at which a person was most vulnerable was up for 
debate and varied widely due to one’s gender and the circumstances of the crime 
they were involved in. However, the use of age as evidence was not always 
related to protecting or discrediting youth; two final cases underscore this point, 
James W. Dupree v. Lewis B. Dupree and Edward Cooper v. Elizabeth Cooper. 
As laws associated with age definitions were increasingly passed in the Early 
Republican period, age became one of many tools legal participants used to 
plead their case, even when there was no age related statute to uphold or 
challenge. This indicates that Early Republicans were increasingly paying 
attention to and employing understandings of age in ways they never had before.  
On January 9th, 1817, Patience Goff executed a deed that conveyed to her 
grandchildren, “Washington and Lewis Dupree, sons of Robert and Rachel 
Dupree, and to the next of their heirs lawfully begotten of their bodies… a slaved 
																																																						
601 According to an Early Republican legal dictionary, girls went through puberty and began to 
“have discretion” at the age of twelve. See John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary Adapted to the 
Constitution and Laws of the United States of the American Union and of the Several States of 





named Rose.” At the time, Washington and Lewis were the only two sons that 
Robert and Rachel knew about, however, within 280 days (the length of a full-
term pregnancy), another son was born: James. Consequently, James took his 
brother, Lewis, to court in 1853 to claim his share of the inheritance—specifically 
“one-third of Rose and her increase.” James insisted that because he was “in 
ventre sa mere,” (in his mother’s womb) at the date of the deed, he technically 
“existed” and so was capable of inheriting alongside his brothers. More 
specifically, James determined that he had been conceived “six days before the 
date of the deed,” forcing court justices to debate whether “a thing in its mother’s 
womb, six days old” counted as a person capable of inheriting. The North 
Carolina Supreme Court conceded that James existed, however, they ruled 
against him due to the fact that when the deed was executed James was unable 
to physically claim his property as his brothers could.602  
The circumstances of James W. Dupree v. Lewis B. Dupree were unique; 
however, as this chapter has shown, the inclusion of one’s chronological age 
down to the day as presented as evidence in the courts was not. On the surface, 
this case seems like a desperate ploy to gain access to inheritance. However, at 
the heart of Dupree v. Dupree was a question of the relationship between age, 
capability, and, one could argue, the legal definition of personhood—a concept 
that would take on its own significance in the twentieth century. James lost his 
case because, as a “six-day-old” fetus, he was physically and intellectually 
incapable. But, the fact that James’s “age” was legitimately used as evidence 
																																																						




suggests how ubiquitous the discussion of chronological age had become within 
the legal system by this point.  
Edward Cooper v. Elizabeth Cooper is a particularly revealing case 
because it attempted to use an argument for the vulnerability of old age.603 In 
1832, Edward Cooper took his granddaughter, Elizabeth, to court to declare that 
a deed that had conveyed several of his slaves to her was fraudulent. In case he 
failed to prove the deed was an outright forgery, Edward insisted that Elizabeth 
had obtained the deed by “practicing upon his great age, and weakness of 
mind.”604 In other words, if the court determined that he had signed the deed, he 
claimed he did not remember doing so and the signing was contrary to his 
wishes. What is interesting about this case is that, despite his geriatric age, 
Edward was evidently competent enough to represent himself in court, while at 
the same time arguing that his age made him vulnerable and incapable of 
consenting to a contract. More likely is that Edward changed his mind and used 
the excuse of his “great age” to his advantage. Still, his age-related argument 
demonstrates another way that perceptions of age and capability were 
manipulated in the Early Republican legal system.  
																																																						
603 Another example can be seen in 1810 when the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia heard 
the case, Harvey and Wife v. Pecks in which the children of Jacob and Lydia Peck accused 
Robert Harvey and his wife of taking advantage of the elder Pecks in 1797 by manipulating 
them into selling land at an extremely low price. At the time the deeds were transacted, Jacob 
was “about one hundred years” and Lydia “upwards of eighty.” According to the court record, 
“the witnesses differed in opinion concerning their capacity to make contracts; but the 
evidence was strong as to the mental imbecility and dotage of Jacob Peck.” Harvey and Wife 
v. Pecks, 1 Munf. 518 (1797). For more information on the history of perceptions of old age in 
early America, see: W. Andrew Achenbaum, Old Age in the New Land: The American 
Experience since 1790 (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1980); Carole Haber, Beyond Sixty-
Five: The Dilemma of Old Age in America’s Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985). Haber’s chapter, “Medical Models of Growing Old,” is particularly helpful in 
understanding the nineteenth century shift in awareness of old age as medically and 
psychologically distinct from “adulthood.” Haber, 47-63. 




Post-Revolutionary lawmakers legally defined capability and culpability by 
chronological age in an effort to protect minors, especially young white women. 
However, as the nineteenth century progressed, it became clear that in many 
ways these age boundaries were arbitrary and could be easily manipulated to 
benefit criminals. Consequently, perceptions of age and life stage were 
continually questioned, qualified, and redefined during court cases regarding age 
related crimes. By providing exact birthdates or additional information regarding a 
person’s capacity, size, or demeanor, the legal significance of chronological age 
could be negotiated away. Furthermore, as the cases discussed in this chapter 
have shown, the legal significance of one’s age was influenced by one’s race, 
class, and gender. In turn, particularly mature minors, at least when male, could 
still be punished as adults. Conversely, legal adults, at least when female, could 









































The significance of age in the Early Republican United States appears 
almost everywhere in contemporary sources once one looks for it. As this study 
has shown, young people, their families, and officials regularly negotiated age 
and its perceived influence on defining marriageability, independence and 
dependence, culpability, capability, and reliability in the Early Republican United 
States. The relative importance of age varied considerably by region, venue, 
youth culture, community, and individual or family context. Although state 
statutes attempted to provide baseline definitions of independence, culpability, 
and capability, as court cases analyzed throughout this dissertation have shown, 
legal definitions were still incredibly fluid, circumstantial, and uneven in their 
application. Furthermore, as age-defined boundaries were enacted ostensibly to 
protect youth, these same boundaries took on lives of their own as legal actors 
manipulated perceptions of age as a strategy to win court cases. Just as the 
significance of age could be challenged within the legal arena, it was also 
regularly tested more quietly as particularly independent minors took it upon 
themselves to marry or enlist without parental permission. Often, these acts of 
youthful defiance went unnoticed, but sometimes they resulted in public, 
complicated negotiations about when age mattered and why. Only by looking at 
both of these scenarios—the quiet acceptance and the loud debate-- can we get 
a fuller understanding of how youth was perceived and experienced in the Early 




This dissertation is focused primarily on elite, white youth; their voices 
tend to be amplified by their archival presentation. Still, important work has been 
done on age and slavery. Historian Wilma King, for example, argues that 
enslaved youth, due to the horrific experiences of slavery, were denied a 
childhood; they “grew old before their time,” she concluded.605 We can also find 
meaningful points of inquiry that challenge us to think about the significance of 
age for lower-class and working-class whites or freed African American youth. To 
start, we should reconsider sources that historians have traditionally used to 
“count” and produce demographics for particular populations and regions; these 
types of sources include censuses, pension records, ship logs, and plantation or 
slave records, to name just a few.606 Free Black Registers are particularly 
revealing sources because clerks often diligently recorded an individual’s age 
alongside family relationships, occupations, and the physical descriptions of free 
																																																						
605 See Wilma King, Stolen Childhood: Slave Youth in Nineteenth-Century America 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), xx. See also Marie Jenkins Schwartz, Born in 
Bondage: Growing Up Enslaved in the Antebellum South (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2001). 
606 For example, Revolutionary War Pension Records required pensioners to state their age in 
their paperwork. Historian Caroline Cox has used this information to identify “boy” (under the 
age of sixteen) soldiers who served in the Revolutionary War in her work Boy Soldiers of the 
American Revolution. See also, A Census of Pensioners for Revolutionary Military Services 
with their Names, Ages, and Places of Residence as Returned by the Marshals of the Several 
Judicial Districts, Under the Act for Taking the Sixth Census (Washington: Printed by Blair and 
Rives, 1841). Family papers that include plantation records of slaves are bountiful throughout 
southern archives, one notable document can be found in the Duke University Archives from 
the Virginian Dromgoole Family labeled “Negroe Ages.” As Daina Ramey Barry has shown in 
her recent work The Price for their Pound of Flesh, plantation records that included inventory 
of slaves as well as records of selling, buying, and insuring the lives of slaves usually recorded 
the specific age or relative age of an individual and in turn, these sources provide information 
on the economic valuation of age and race. According to historian Sharon Murphy, the 
Baltimore Life Insurance Company “routinely charged double the rate quoted on white lives of 
the same age; for example, the premium on a 25-year-old slave was $2 per $100 of insurance 
(versus $1 on the corresponding white life).” See Sharon Murphy, “Securing Human Property: 
Slavery, Life Insurance, and Industrialization in the Upper South” in Journal of the Early 
Republic 25.4 (2005), 615-652 and Daina Ramey Berry, The Price for their Pound of Flesh: 





people of color. When read for more than just the numbers, these types of 
sources can raise important questions about what significance age had within 
free, non-elite and/or non-white communities.  
The Early Republican Free Black Registers of Petersburg, Virginia offer a 
more explicit example of the questions that still need to be answered about the 
significance of age and race.607 On March 21st, 1816, W[ilia]m Arnet, “17 years 
old” registered himself as a free person of color in Petersburg. In addition to 
providing a physical description of William and noting that he worked as a 
“Waterman,” the clerk made careful mention “that [William] is not father or mother 
alive & not under Controul of any Person by Indentures.”608 By registering William 
on his own and providing him with a copy of his freedom papers, the Petersburg 
county clerk recognized William an independent adult within the free black 
community. But what did that mean for William? Was he now legally an adult and 
recognized as such by the state of Virginia? Was he socially or culturally 
recognized as an adult by his free black peers? The answers to these questions 
are beyond the scope of this project, but I raise them to highlight the work that 
still needs to (and can) be done to fully explore the significance or insignificance 
of age and life stage in the Early Republican period.    
																																																						
607 Petersburg, Virginia was home to one of the largest free black communities in the antebellum 
South. In 1793, the state of Virginia passed a law that required all free blacks to formally 
register with the state to receive “freedom papers,” which they were to have on their person at 
all times. The close attention to detail—regarding one’s age and physical description-- was 
meant to prevent fraud and ensure the person claiming the status of free (and in turn, the 
freedom papers that would permit them to travel and not be arrested or re-enslaved) was who 
they said they were. For more information on Free Black Registers as well as how they can be 
used to glean important social and cultural details about free black communities see Beth 
Wood, “The Family Politic: Race, Gender, and Belonging in Old Virginia,” Ph.D. dissertation, 
The College of William and Mary, forthcoming.  
608 Petersburg, Virginia. Registration of Free Negroes and Mulattoes, 1794-1819 #1-944, 




In January of 2016, The Atlantic published the article “When Are You 
Really an Adult?” In it, journalist Julia Beck argues that “the line between 
childhood and adulthood is blurrier than ever.”609 But when was it ever clear? 
Adulthood as a concept is now legislated just as it was in the Early Republic, set 
at the arbitrary age of eighteen or twenty-one; and biological, cultural, and social 
markers of adulthood were no less murky then as they are today. Although now it 
is much more common to know one’s actual age-- and be able to document it-- 
we continue to negotiate the significance of age in our justice system when we 
charge minors as adults after they commit particularly sophisticated or 
devastating crimes.610 In twenty-two states, children as young as seven can still 
be legally be tried as adults.611 Furthermore, only in 2016, Virginia passed a state 
law that raised the minimum age at marriage for females from thirteen to 
eighteen.612 Rather than fixate on how perceptions of age “evolved” by the 
twentieth century, historians need to think about the ways age remains a 
																																																						
609 Julia Beck, “When Are You Really an Adult?” in The Atlantic, January 5, 2016, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/01/when-are-you-really-an-adult/422487/. 
610 According to Shane Landrum, “during the 1840s, every American state had laws that allowed 
parents to record their children’s births and deaths, but they did not compel adherence. As a 
result, American birth certificates did not become useful identity documentation at a mass 
level until sometime in the early twentieth century.” Shane Landrum, “From Family Bibles to 
Birth Certificates: Young People, Proof of Age, and American Political Cultures, 1820-1915,” in 
Age in America: The Colonial Era to the Present, ed. Nicholas L. Syrett and Corinne T. Field, 
(New York: New York University Press, 2015),125. Furthermore, race continues to heavily 
influence the perception of age, culpability, and criminality, for example, according to the 
Campaign for Youth Justice, “African American youth are 9 times more likely, Latino youth are 
40% more likely to receive an adult prison sentence as white youth.” See Campaign for Youth 




612 Or sixteen if the child is legally emancipated. See Jenna Portnoy, “Why 13-year-olds can no 







continuously contextual category of identity as well as consider what it means 
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